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Full-Text Articles in Law
Money And Rights, Deborah Hellman
Money And Rights, Deborah Hellman
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter looks at when constitutionally protected rights are interpreted by courts to include a concomitant right to spend money to effectuate the underlying right and when they are not. It concludes that there are two strands in our constitutional law: the Integral Strand, in which a right includes the right to spend money and the Blocked Strand, in which it does not.
Money And Rights, Deborah Hellman
Money And Rights, Deborah Hellman
Faculty Scholarship
This article looks at when constitutionally protected rights are interpreted by courts to include a concomitant right to spend money to effectuate the underlying right and when they are not. It concludes that there are two strands in our constitutional law: the Integral Strand, in which a right includes the right to spend money and the Blocked Strand, in which it does not.
Balancing Competing Individual Constitutional Rights: Raising Some Questions, Taunya Lovell Banks
Balancing Competing Individual Constitutional Rights: Raising Some Questions, Taunya Lovell Banks
Faculty Scholarship
Despite increasing support for global human rights ..., some scholars and constitutional democracies, like the United States, continue to resist constitutionalizing socio-economic rights. Socio-economic rights, unlike political and civil constitutional rights that usually prohibit government actions, are thought to impose positive obligations on government. As a result, constitutionalizing socio-economic rights raises questions about separation of powers and the competence of courts to decide traditionally legislative and executive matters. ... [W]hen transitional democracies, like South Africa, choose to constitutionalize socio-economic rights, courts inevitably must grapple with their role in the realization of those rights.... Two questions immediately come to mind: (1) …
The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts To Congress To Constitutional Order, Mark A. Graber
The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts To Congress To Constitutional Order, Mark A. Graber
Faculty Scholarship
This review documents how scholarly concern with democratic deficits in American constitutionalism has shifted from the courts to electoral institutions. Prominent political scientists are increasingly rejecting the countermajoritarian difficulty as the proper framework for studying and evaluating judicial power. Political scientists, who study Congress and the presidency, however, have recently emphasized countermajoritarian difficulties with electoral institutions. Realistic normative appraisals of American political institutions, this emerging literature on constitutional politics in the United States maintains, should begin by postulating a set of democratic and constitutional goods, determine the extent to which American institutions as a whole are delivering those goods, and …