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Full-Text Articles in Law
Brief Of Constitutional Law Professors As Amici Curiae In Support Of Petitioner, Ernest A. Young
Brief Of Constitutional Law Professors As Amici Curiae In Support Of Petitioner, Ernest A. Young
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Roberts’ Rules: The Assertiveness Of Rules-Based Jurisprudence, Joseph Blocher
Roberts’ Rules: The Assertiveness Of Rules-Based Jurisprudence, Joseph Blocher
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Statutory Meanings: Deriving Interpretive Principles From A Theory Of Communication And Lawmaking, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez
Statutory Meanings: Deriving Interpretive Principles From A Theory Of Communication And Lawmaking, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Empagran’S Empire: International Law And Statutory Interpretation In The Us Supreme Court Of The 21st Century, Ralf Michaels
Empagran’S Empire: International Law And Statutory Interpretation In The Us Supreme Court Of The 21st Century, Ralf Michaels
Faculty Scholarship
In its Empagran decision in 2004, the US Supreme Court decided that purchasers on foreign markets could not invoke US antitrust law even against a global cartel that affects also the United States. The article, forthcoming in a volume dedicated to the history on international law in the US Supreme Court, presents three radically different readings of the opinion. The result is that Empagran is a decision that is transnationalist in rhetoric, isolationist in application, and hegemonial in its effect. A decision with a seemingly straightforward argument is found riddled in the conflict between these different logics. A decision with …
Special Incentives To Sue, Margaret H. Lemos
Special Incentives To Sue, Margaret H. Lemos
Faculty Scholarship
In an effort to strengthen private enforcement of federal law, Congress regularly employs plaintiff-side attorneys’ fee shifts, damage enhancements, and other mechanisms that promote litigation. Standard economic theory predicts that these devices will increase the volume of suit by private actors, which in turn will bolster enforcement and encourage more voluntary compliance with the law. This Article challenges the conventional wisdom. I use empirical evidence to demonstrate that special incentives to sue do not dependably generate more litigation. More crucially, when such incentives do work, they often trigger a judicial backlash against the very rights that Congress sought to promote. …