Law Commons^™

Custom In Our Courts: Reconciling Theory With Reality In The Debate About Erie Railroad And Customary International Law, Nikki C. Gutierrez, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

One of the most heated debates of the last two decades in U.S. legal academia focuses on customary international law’s domestic status after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. At one end, champions of the “modern position” support customary international law’s (“CIL”) wholesale incorporation into post-Erie federal common law. At the other end, “revisionists” argue that federal courts cannot apply CIL as federal law absent federal legislative authorization. Scholars on both sides of the Erie debate also make claims about the sources judges reference when discerning CIL. They then use these claims to support their arguments regarding CIL’s domestic status. Interestingly, neither …

Customary International Law: An Instrument Choice Perspective, Laurence R. Helfer, Ingrid B. Wuerth

Faculty Scholarship

Contemporary international lawmaking is characterized by a rapid growth of “soft law” instruments. Interdisciplinary studies have followed suit, purporting to frame the key question states face as a choice between soft and “hard” law. But this literature focuses on only one form of hard law—treaties—and cooperation through formal institutions. Customary international law (CIL) is barely mentioned. Other scholars dismiss CIL as increasingly irrelevant or even obsolete. Entirely missing from these debates is any consideration of whether and when states might prefer custom over treaties or soft law.

How Customary Is Customary International Law?, Emily Kadens, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Codifying Custom, Timothy Meyer

Faculty Scholarship

Codifying decentralized forms of law, such as the common law and customary law, has been a cornerstone of the positivist turn in legal theory since at least the nineteenth century. Commentators laud codification’s purported virtues, including systematizing, centralizing, and clarifying the law. These attributes are thought to increase the general welfare of those subject to legal rules, and therefore to justify and explain codification. The codification literature, however, overlooks codification’s distributive consequences. In so doing, the literature misses the primary motive for codification: to define legal rules in a way that advantages individual codifying institutions, regardless of how codification affects …

Mandatory Versus Default Rules: How Can Customary International Law Be Improved?, Curtis A. Bradley, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

Customary International Law (CIL) is plagued with uncertainties about its sources, its content, its manipulability, and its normative attractiveness. The rise of law-making through multilateral treaties also makes the proper role of CIL increasingly uncertain. This is an opportune time, therefore, to be thinking of ways to revive and improve CIL. In a prior article, we argued that the "Mandatory View" of CIL, pursuant to which nations are barred from ever withdrawing unilaterally from rules of CIL, is functionally problematic, at least when applied across the board to all of CIL. We also suggested that CIL might be improved by …

International Law And The U.S. Common Law Of Foreign Official Immunity, Curtis A. Bradley, Laurence R. Helfer

Faculty Scholarship

In Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010), the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not apply to lawsuits brought against foreign government officials for alleged human rights abuses. The Court did not necessarily clear the way for future human rights litigation against such officials, however, cautioning that such suits “may still be barred by foreign sovereign immunity under the common law.” At the same time, the Court provided only minimal guidance as to the content and scope of common law immunity. Especially striking was the Court’s omission of any mention of the …

Withdrawing From International Custom, Curtis A. Bradley, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

Treaties are negotiated, usually written down, and often subject to cumbersome domestic ratification processes. Nonetheless, nations often have the right to withdraw unilaterally from them. By contrast, the conventional wisdom is that nations never have the legal right to withdraw unilaterally from the unwritten rules of customary international law (CIL), a proposition that we refer to as the “Mandatory View.” It is not obvious, however, why it should be easier to exit from treaties than from CIL, especially given the significant overlap that exists today between the regulatory coverage of treaties and CIL, as well as the frequent use of …

International Common Law: The Soft Law Of International Tribunals, Andrew T. Guzman, Timothy L. Meyer

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Historical Practice And The Contemporary Debate Over Customary International Law, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

Response to: Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

A.J. Bellia and Brad Clark have performed a valuable service for other scholars interested in foreign relations law and federal jurisdiction by collecting and illuminating—with their usual care and insight—the historical practice of both English and early American courts with respect to the law of nations. Their recent Article, The Federal Common Law of Nations, demonstrates that, while American courts have not generally treated customary international law (CIL) as supreme federal law, they have applied such law where …

Federal Suits And General Laws: A Comment On Judge Fletcher's Reading Of Sosa V. Alvarez-Marchain, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.