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Full-Text Articles in Law

Financial Holding Company Liability After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Eric J. Gouvin Jan 2002

Financial Holding Company Liability After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines the extent to which financial holding companies formed under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act) will bear the costs of the failure of their bank subsidiaries. Pre-GLB Act banking law provided numerous ways to impose liability on bank holding companies for bank failure. The GLB Act itself added some provisions dealing with holding company liability, providing protections for receivers of failed institutions and adding ammunition to the regulators' "source of strength" theory for imposing liability on bank holding companies, and, by extension, on financial holding companies. But despite tinkering at the edges, the GLB Act did not provide …


Law Enforcement Under Incomplete Law: Theory And Evidence From Financial Market Regulation, Chenggang Xu, Katharina Pistor Jan 2002

Law Enforcement Under Incomplete Law: Theory And Evidence From Financial Market Regulation, Chenggang Xu, Katharina Pistor

Faculty Scholarship

This paper studies the design of law-making and law enforcement institutions based on the premise that law is inherently incomplete. Under incomplete law, law enforcement by courts may suffer from deterrence failure, defined as the social-welfare loss that results from the regime's inability to deter harmful actions. As a potential remedy a regulatory regime is introduced. The major functional difference between courts and regulators is that courts enforce law reactively, that is only once others have initiated law enforcement procedures, while regulators enforce law proactively, i.e. on their own initiative. Proactive law enforcement may be superior in preventing harm. However, …


Sovereign Bonds And The Collective Will, Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati Jan 2002

Sovereign Bonds And The Collective Will, Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Credit Cards And Debit Cards In The United States And Japan, Ronald J. Mann Jan 2002

Credit Cards And Debit Cards In The United States And Japan, Ronald J. Mann

Faculty Scholarship

The widespread use of cards is one of the most salient features of consumer retail payment systems in the United States. American consumers use those cards to pay for about one-fourth of their retail purchases each year. And this is not a static phenomenon; among other things, the use of debit cards, though still relatively small, is rising rapidly. That pattern of use is not, however, typical of other countries. Even in some highly industrialized nations, consumers use cards to pay for purchases much less frequently. Statistics from the Bank for International Settlements, for example, suggest about sixty card-based payment …


Regulation And Investors' Trust In The Securities Market, Tamar Frankel Jan 2002

Regulation And Investors' Trust In The Securities Market, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

The subject of investor confidence in the securities markets has received wide attention recently as details of fraud and avarice continue to emerge. Investors' trust in the securities markets is important for the reasons discussed in Professor Stout's marvelous paper.1 This Comment focuses on the relationship between investors' trust and government regulation of the markets. By regulation I mean congressional legislation and actions by federal agencies. I exclude the courts mainly because their lawmaking is not primarily policy-based, and my aim is to sound the alarm for legislative and regulatory policy-directed actions. Many an economist and academic have argued …


Understanding Enron: "It's About Gatekeepers, Stupid", John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2002

Understanding Enron: "It's About Gatekeepers, Stupid", John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

What do we know after Enron's implosion that we did not know before it? The conventional wisdom is that the Enron debacle reveals basic weaknesses in our contemporary system of corporate governance. Perhaps, this is so, but where is the weakness located? Under what circumstances will critical systems fail? Major debacles of historical dimensions – and Enron is surely that – tend to produce an excess of explanations. In Enron's case, the firm's strange failure is becoming a virtual Rorschach test in which each commentator can see evidence confirming what he or she already believed.


What Enron Means For The Management And Control Of The Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, Jeffrey N. Gordon Jan 2002

What Enron Means For The Management And Control Of The Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

The Enron case plays on many different dimensions, but its prominence is not merely part of popular culture's obsession with scandal du jour. Rather, the Enron situation challenges some of the core beliefs and practices that have underpinned the academic analysis of corporate law and governance, including mergers and acquisitions, since the 1980s. These amount to an interlocking set of institutions that constitute "shareholder capitalism," American-style, 2001, that we have been aggressively promoting throughout the world. We have come to rely on a particular set of assumptions about the connection between stock market prices and underlying economic realities; the reliability …