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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
Rejecting The Marie Antoinette Paradigm Of Prejudgment Interest, Royce De R. Barondes
Rejecting The Marie Antoinette Paradigm Of Prejudgment Interest, Royce De R. Barondes
Faculty Publications
This paper examines principles for properly computing prejudgment interest by examining the impact on different corporate constituencies. This paper concludes that prejudgment interest at a promisor's cost of funds can undercompensate promisees, by shifting value from the promisee's equityholders to its creditors through a forced investment that decreases the risk of the promisee's portfolio of assets.
Drifting Down The Dnieper With Prince Potemkin: Some Skeptical Reflections About The Place Of Compliance Programs In Federal Criminal Sentencing (Symposium), Frank O. Bowman Iii
Drifting Down The Dnieper With Prince Potemkin: Some Skeptical Reflections About The Place Of Compliance Programs In Federal Criminal Sentencing (Symposium), Frank O. Bowman Iii
Faculty Publications
This Article explains how the federal organizational sentencing guidelines work and how they have created incentives for businesses to set up compliance programs. It then considers the paucity of evidence that compliance programs actually prevent the occurrence of corporate crime. It also questions whether investments in compliance programs make sense even for companies caught in a federal criminal investigation. There is little evidence that compliance programs have any significant effect on the likelihood that federal prosecutors will file criminal charges in the first instance. Even more surprisingly, examination of U.S. Sentencing Commission statistics reveals that the compliance program movement seems …
Using "Norms" To Change International Law: Un Human Rights Laws Sneaking In Through The Back Door, Troy A. Rule
Using "Norms" To Change International Law: Un Human Rights Laws Sneaking In Through The Back Door, Troy A. Rule
Faculty Publications
For decades, multinational businesses have self-regulated their operations with respect to human rights, largely unfettered by international law. In recent years, however, human rights groups have advocated that the United Nations (“UN”) create clear legal obligations for multinationals respecting their human rights-related conduct. At least partly due to the substantial burden such obligations could place on international businesses, these efforts by human rights proponents have proven largely fruitless--until now.On August 13, 2003, the UN Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights adopted the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human …
Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious History And Distressing Implications Of The Criminal Provisions Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act And The Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, Frank O. Bowman Iii
Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious History And Distressing Implications Of The Criminal Provisions Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act And The Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, Frank O. Bowman Iii
Faculty Publications
This Article presents a legislative history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the subsequent amendments to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. It explains the surprising interaction between the civil and criminal provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley. The Article also provides a dramatic and detailed account of the interplay of political interests and agendas that ultimately led to large sentence increases for serious corporate criminals and blanket sentence increases for virtually all federal fraud defendants. The tale illuminates the substance of the new legislation and sentencing rules, but is more broadly instructive regarding the distribution of power over criminal sentencing between the three branches and …