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Acus - And Administrative Law - Then And Now, Michael Herz
Acus - And Administrative Law - Then And Now, Michael Herz
Faculty Articles
The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) both shapes and reflects the intellectual, policy, and practical concerns of the field of administrative law. Its recommendations are therefore a useful lens through which to view that field. Also, because of an unfortunate hiatus, ACUS has gotten underway not once but twice. Those two beginnings provide a kind of natural experiment, and they make a revealing contrast. This article traces the transformations of American administrative law, as well as the field’s perpetual concerns, by comparing the initial recommendations of ACUS 1.0 (1968 to 1970) with the initial recommendations of ACUS 2.0 …
Cost-Benefit Analysis As A Commitment Device, Matthew Wansley
Cost-Benefit Analysis As A Commitment Device, Matthew Wansley
Faculty Articles
Cost-benefit analysis does not age well. As scientific understanding of health, safety, and environmental risks accumulates over time — and as the technology to mitigate those risks becomes more affordable — the assumptions underlying a rule’s cost-benefit analysis obsolesce. Yet because of agency inaction, rulemaking ossification, and inattention to priority setting, outdated rules persist. In order to combat obsolescence, agencies should use cost-benefit analysis as a commitment device. When an agency analyzes a rule, it should precommit to subsequently adopting a more stringent rule than the one it initially promulgates, if and when a private actor credibly demonstrates that the …
Virtuous Capture, Matthew Wansley
Virtuous Capture, Matthew Wansley
Faculty Articles
A regulatory agency is captured if, instead of the public interest, it pursues the interests of powerful firms it is intended to regulate. Scholars disagree about which agencies are captured, how they become captured, and what reforms, if any, can prevent capture. There is consensus on one issue: capture is a vice.In this Article, I argue that capture can be a virtue. When powerful interest groups thwart justified regulation, the optimal strategy for pursuing that regulation may be to indirectly empower interest groups that stand to profit from it in the long-run. Legislation creating new interest groups — or altering …