Law Commons^™

Regulating Land Use In A Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts Of Exactions, Mark Fenster

ExpressO

In a refreshingly clear and comprehensive decision issued towards the end of its 2004 Term, the Supreme Court explained in Lingle v. Chevron (2005) that the Takings Clause requires compensation only for the effects of a regulation on an individual’s property rights. Under the substantive due process doctrine, by contrast, courts engage in a deferential inquiry into both a regulation’s validity and the means by which the regulation attempts to meet the government’s objective. Lingle’s explanation appeared to cast doubt on the doctrinal foundation and reach of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994), …

Twenty-Five Years Of The Substantial Advancement Doctrine Applied To Regulatory Takings: From Agins To Lingle V. Chevron, Larry Salzman

ExpressO

Beginning with Agins v. City of Tiburon, and continuing for 25 years, the United States Supreme Court has held that regulation effects a taking when it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests. Throughout this period, many have criticized this standard as “a return to Lochner,” opposed to the extreme deference accorded economic and property regulation since the New Deal.

A careful review of cases reveals, however, that the “substantial advancement” doctrine is not simply a means-ends review of the efficacy of economic legislation. Rather, the doctrine was initially conceived, and has been applied, as a cause-effect test to ensure …

“Oh Lord, Please Don't Let Me Be Misunderstood!”: Rediscovering The Penn Central And Mathews V. Eldridge Frameworks, Gary Lawson, Katharine A. Ferguson, Guillermo Montero

ExpressO

The manuscript re-examines the origins and purposes of two of the most misunderstood constructs in modern legal doctrine: the so-called Penn-Central and Mathews v. Eldridge three-factor tests. We say “so-called,” because neither case actually invented a three-factor test. Penn Central set forth a framework involving two factors that later cases (unwisely, in our view) expanded to three, and the framework in Mathews was initially crafted by litigators in the Solicitor General’s office in order to resolve the specific issue facing the Court in that case. More significantly, neither Penn Central nor Mathews purported to set forth a methodology for deciding …

The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation And The Roots Of The Takings Muddle, Bradley C. Karkkainen

ExpressO

This article traces the roots of the current muddle in the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence to an ill-considered “phantom incorporation” holding in Penn Central v. New York (1978), the seminal case of the modern regulatory takings era. The Penn Central Court anachronistically misread a long line of Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process cases as Fifth Amendment Takings Clause cases, misattributing to Chicago Burlington & Quincy v. Chicago (1897) (“Chicago B & Q”) the crucial holding that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause applied to the states. Like other cases of its era, Chicago B & Q was decided strictly on …