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Full-Text Articles in Law
Antitrust Censorship Of Economic Protest, Hillary Greene
Antitrust Censorship Of Economic Protest, Hillary Greene
Duke Law Journal
Antitrust law accepts the competitive marketplace, its operation, and its outcomes as an ideal. Society itself need not and does not. Although antitrust is not in the business of evaluating, for example, the "fairness" of prices, society can, and frequently does, properly concern itself with these issues. When dissatisfaction results, it may manifest itself in an expressive boycott: a form of social campaign wherein purchasers express their dissatisfaction by collectively refusing to buy. Antitrust should neither participate in nor censor such normative discourse. In this Article, I explain how antitrust law impedes this speech, argue why it should not, and …
The Ncaa’S Lost Cause And The Legal Ease Of Redefining Amateurism, Virginia A. Fitt
The Ncaa’S Lost Cause And The Legal Ease Of Redefining Amateurism, Virginia A. Fitt
Duke Law Journal
The recent resolution of the Andrew Oliver case may mark the death throes of the NCAA's no-agent rule, prohibiting college athletes from retaining agents in professional contract negotiations, and perhaps the traditional paradigm of amateurism in sport. In light of the trial court's ruling, as well as continuing calls for the revocation of the NCAA's tax-exempt status, the time is ripe for a reexamination of amateurism and the law. This Note argues that the NCAA has developed a complicated web of largely unenforceable rules and regulations that are unnecessary to maintain tax-exempt status in light of the regulatory environment. This …
Judgment-Sharing Agreements, Christopher R. Leslie
Judgment-Sharing Agreements, Christopher R. Leslie
Duke Law Journal
Antitrust law condemns price-fixing cartels and seeks to encourage private suits against the conspirators by automatically trebling antitrust damages and by providing for joint and several liability. Because the Supreme Court has held that there is no right to contribution among antitrust violators, this creates the risk of a single defendant being saddled with damages significantly greater than three times the amount of the harm associated with that firm's own market share. Firms engaged in-or accused of-price fixing often try to ameliorate this risk by entering into judgment-sharing agreements, which essentially create a right to contribution through contract. Despite their …
Perspectives On State And Federal Antitrust Enforcement, Stephen Calkins
Perspectives On State And Federal Antitrust Enforcement, Stephen Calkins
Duke Law Journal
This Article reviews federal and (especially) state antitrust enforcement in light of the Microsoft proceeding. Criticism of state enforcement based on that case is misplaced. The Article identifies three consensus comparative advantages of state enforcers: familiarity with local and regional markets, closeness to state and local institutions, and ability and experience in compensating individuals. A review of state enforcement activities finds that the vast majority are consistent with one or more of these advantages. The Article also identifies hallmarks of generally accepted federal civil non-merger enforcement: both antitrust agencies participate actively, using a variety of tools, while showing support for …
“A Derelict In The Stream Of The Law”: Overruling Baseball’S Antitrust Exemption, Morgen A. Sullivan
“A Derelict In The Stream Of The Law”: Overruling Baseball’S Antitrust Exemption, Morgen A. Sullivan
Duke Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Refining Product Market Definition In The Antitrust Analysis Of Bank Mergers, Tim Mccarthy
Refining Product Market Definition In The Antitrust Analysis Of Bank Mergers, Tim Mccarthy
Duke Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Beyond Economic Theory: A Model For Analyzing The Antitrust Implications Of Exclusive Dealing Arrangements, Wanda Jane Rogers
Beyond Economic Theory: A Model For Analyzing The Antitrust Implications Of Exclusive Dealing Arrangements, Wanda Jane Rogers
Duke Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Countervailing Power—Different Rules For Different Markets? Conduct And Context In Antitrust Law And Economics, Barbara Ann White
Countervailing Power—Different Rules For Different Markets? Conduct And Context In Antitrust Law And Economics, Barbara Ann White
Duke Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Nfl Free Agency Restrictions Under Antitrust Attack, Richard E. Bartok
Nfl Free Agency Restrictions Under Antitrust Attack, Richard E. Bartok
Duke Law Journal
No abstract provided.
A Counter-History Of Antitrust Law, Rudolph J. Peritz
A Counter-History Of Antitrust Law, Rudolph J. Peritz
Duke Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Efficiency And Image: Advertising As An Antitrust Issue, Elizabeth Mensch, Alan Freeman
Efficiency And Image: Advertising As An Antitrust Issue, Elizabeth Mensch, Alan Freeman
Duke Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Fact, Value And Theory In Antitrust Adjudication, Herbert Hovenkamp
Fact, Value And Theory In Antitrust Adjudication, Herbert Hovenkamp
Duke Law Journal
No abstract provided.
What Are The Alternatives To Chicago?, Wesley J. Liebeler
What Are The Alternatives To Chicago?, Wesley J. Liebeler
Duke Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Interest Groups, Antitrust, And State Regulation: Parker V. Brown In The Economic Theory Of Legislation, William H. Page
Interest Groups, Antitrust, And State Regulation: Parker V. Brown In The Economic Theory Of Legislation, William H. Page
Duke Law Journal
The Parker doctrine requires that state regulatory arrangements seeking exemption from federal antitrust law be clearly articulated by the state "as sovereign." Professor Page argues that the clear-articulation requirement is justified because it reinforces representative political processes. He rejects Professor Wiley's capture preemption approach and the Supreme Court's analysis in Fisher v. City of Berkeley, arguing that both misconceive the nature of governmental relationships with interest groups. Professor Page concludes that the essentially collective nature of economic regulation supports adherence to the clear-articulation requirement as the measure of political legitimacy.
Doctors And Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective On Traditional Relationships, Clark C. Havighurst
Doctors And Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective On Traditional Relationships, Clark C. Havighurst
Duke Law Journal
Under new pressures for cost containment, hospitals are increasingly asserting interests that conflict with those of physicians. Professor Havighurst argues that legal rules under which practitioners have challenged denials of hospital admitting privileges should be clarified in order that hospitals can more effectively carry out their new cost-containment and other responsibilities. He invokes antitrust law's "essential-facilities" doctrine to protect those abused by their competitors on a hospital staff, but he contends that, if a hospital participates in decisionmaking as an independent actor--even though it acts in concert with its physicians--, antitrust courts should lower the level of scrutiny to a …
Federal Preemption Under The Railway Labor Act: Traditional Vs. Essential State Functions In The Context Of Commuter Transit Systems, Morris A. Ellison
Federal Preemption Under The Railway Labor Act: Traditional Vs. Essential State Functions In The Context Of Commuter Transit Systems, Morris A. Ellison
Duke Law Journal
No abstract provided.
The “Competitive Advantages” Explanation For Intrabrand Restraints: An Antitrust Analysis, Peter M. Gerhart
The “Competitive Advantages” Explanation For Intrabrand Restraints: An Antitrust Analysis, Peter M. Gerhart
Duke Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Anticompetitive Data Dissemination In The Medical Profession: The Conflict Between The Sherman Act And The First Amendment, Michael R. Young
Anticompetitive Data Dissemination In The Medical Profession: The Conflict Between The Sherman Act And The First Amendment, Michael R. Young
Duke Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Labor-Antitrust: The Problems Of Connell And A Remedy That Follows Naturally, Joseph T. Casey Jr., Michael J. Cozzillio
Labor-Antitrust: The Problems Of Connell And A Remedy That Follows Naturally, Joseph T. Casey Jr., Michael J. Cozzillio
Duke Law Journal
No abstract provided.