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- Economics (5)
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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
Demand-Side Bidding Will Reduce The Level And Volatility Of Electricity Price, Bart Wilson, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith
Demand-Side Bidding Will Reduce The Level And Volatility Of Electricity Price, Bart Wilson, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
The Effectiveness Of Low Price Matching In Mitigating The Competitive Pressure In Low Friction Electronic Markets, Bart Wilson, Cary Deck
The Effectiveness Of Low Price Matching In Mitigating The Competitive Pressure In Low Friction Electronic Markets, Bart Wilson, Cary Deck
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Collusion In Procurement Auctions: An Experimental Examination, Bart Wilson, Douglas Davis
Collusion In Procurement Auctions: An Experimental Examination, Bart Wilson, Douglas Davis
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Experimental Methods And Antitrust Policy, Bart Wilson, Douglas Davis
Experimental Methods And Antitrust Policy, Bart Wilson, Douglas Davis
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
A Comparison Of Auctions And Multilateral Negotiations, Bart Wilson, Charles Thomas
A Comparison Of Auctions And Multilateral Negotiations, Bart Wilson, Charles Thomas
Bart J Wilson
We compare first-price auctions to an exchange process that we term 'multilateral negotiations.' In multilateral negotiations, a buyer solicits price offers for a homogeneous product from sellers with privately known costs, and then plays the sellers off one another to obtain additional price concessions. Using the experimental method, we find that with four sellers, transaction prices are statistically indistinguishable in the two institutions, but with two sellers, prices are higher in multilateral negotiations than in first-price auctions. The institutions are equally efficient with two sellers, but multilateral negotiations are slightly more efficient with four sellers.
Using Experiments To Inform The Privatization/Deregulation Movement In Electricity, Bart Wilson, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith
Using Experiments To Inform The Privatization/Deregulation Movement In Electricity, Bart Wilson, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.