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Articles

2001

Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law

Constitutional Law

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Full-Text Articles in Law

In Defense Of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect Of Constitutional Tort Remedies, Myriam E. Gilles Apr 2001

In Defense Of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect Of Constitutional Tort Remedies, Myriam E. Gilles

Articles

Legal economists are concerned with setting optimal deterrence levels. Armed with information concerning the public and private costs and benefits of a particular harmful activity, the legal economist seeks to set a “price” for the activity which, to some socially optimal extent, minimizes external costs while retaining external benefits. If the economist's information is perfect, he can predict precisely how an economically rational actor will respond to a particular price and achieve optimal deterrence of activities whose costs outweigh their benefits.