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Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Law
Antitrust: What Counts As Consumer Welfare?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust: What Counts As Consumer Welfare?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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Antitrust’s consumer welfare principle is accepted in some form by the entire Supreme Court and the majority of other writers. However, it means different things to different people. For example, some members of the Supreme Court can simultaneously acknowledge the antitrust consumer welfare principle even as they approve practices that result in immediate, obvious, and substantial consumer harm. At the same time, however, a properly defined consumer welfare principle is essential if antitrust is to achieve its statutory purpose, which is to pursue practices that injure competition. The wish to make antitrust a more general social justice statute is understandable: …
Anticompetitive Mergers In Labor Markets, Ioana Marinescu, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Anticompetitive Mergers In Labor Markets, Ioana Marinescu, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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Mergers of competitors are conventionally challenged under the federal antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition in some product or service market in which the merging firms sell. Mergers can also injure competition in markets where the firms purchase. Although that principle is widely recognized, very few litigated cases have applied merger law to buyers. This article concerns an even more rarefied subset, and one that has barely been mentioned. Nevertheless, its implications are staggering. Some mergers may be unlawful because they injure competition in the labor market by enabling the post-merger firm anticompetitively to suppress wages or salaries. …
The Merger Incipiency Doctrine And The Importance Of "Redundant" Competitors, Peter C. Carstensen, Robert H. Lande
The Merger Incipiency Doctrine And The Importance Of "Redundant" Competitors, Peter C. Carstensen, Robert H. Lande
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The enforcers and the courts have not implemented the merger incipiency doctrine in the vigorous manner Congress intended. We believe one important reason for this failure is that, until now, the logic underlying this doctrine has never been explained. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that markets’ need for “protective redundancy” explains the incipiency policy. We are writing this article in the hope that this will cause the enforcers and courts to implement significantly more stringent merger enforcement.
To vastly oversimplify, the current enforcement approach assumes that if N significant competitors are necessary for competition, N-1 competitors could …
Merger Review By The Federal Communications Commission: Comcast-Nbc Universal, Christopher S. Yoo
Merger Review By The Federal Communications Commission: Comcast-Nbc Universal, Christopher S. Yoo
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The Communications Act of 1934 created a dual review process in which mergers in the communications industry are reviewed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as well as the antitrust authorities. Commentators have criticized dual review not only as costly and redundant, but also as subject to substantive and procedural abuse. The process of clearing the 2011 Comcast-NBC Universal merger provides a useful case study to examine whether such concerns are justified. A review of the empirical context reveals that the FCC intervened even though the relevant markets were not structured in a way that would ordinarily raise anticompetitive concerns. …
Efficiencies In Merger Analysis: Alchemy In The Age Of Empiricism?, Thomas L. Greaney
Efficiencies In Merger Analysis: Alchemy In The Age Of Empiricism?, Thomas L. Greaney
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One is hard-pressed to find in law an undertaking more fraught with uncertainty than the application of the efficiencies defense in merger analysis. Generalist fact finders (judges) and politically-attuned government officials (prosecutors and regulators) are charged with two Herculean tasks: (1) predicting the outcome of organic changes in business enterprises and (2) comparing the magnitude of those changes to the equally uncertain amount of harm to future competition that the transaction will cause. Given the enormous, perhaps intractable, uncertainty of this inquiry, it is therefore paradoxical that many of the strongest advocates for strengthening the role of efficiencies analysis in …
Antitrust & Hospital Mergers: Does The Nonprofit Form Affect Competitive Substance?, Thomas L. Greaney
Antitrust & Hospital Mergers: Does The Nonprofit Form Affect Competitive Substance?, Thomas L. Greaney
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Following a string of government losses in cases challenging hospital mergers in federal court, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice issued their report on competition in health care seeking to set the record straight on a number of issues that underlie the judiciary's resolution of these cases. One such issue is the import of nonprofit status for applying antitrust law. This essay describes antitrust's role in addressing the consolidation in the hospital sector and the subtle influence that the social function of the nonprofit hospital has had in merger litigation. Noting that the political and social context …
Mission, Margin, And Trust In The Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, Thomas L. Greaney, Kathleen Boozang
Mission, Margin, And Trust In The Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, Thomas L. Greaney, Kathleen Boozang
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The law governing charitable corporations remains neglected and thoroughly muddled. Still unsettled are central issues regarding the accountability of directors and management, legal standards governing organic changes by nonprofit institutions, and mechanisms to ensure fidelity to the organization's charitable mission. For nonprofit corporations in the health care sector, which represent a large proportion of all health services supplied nationwide, particularly charity care, these shortcomings have had serious repercussions. The central issue addressed in this Article is how fidelity to the mission of the charitable health care corporation should be monitored. It advances the normative perspective that the law should maximize …
Night Landings On An Aircraft Carrier: Hospital Mergers And Antitrust Law, Thomas L. Greaney
Night Landings On An Aircraft Carrier: Hospital Mergers And Antitrust Law, Thomas L. Greaney
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Abstract: Analysis of the competitive effects of hospital mergers requires antitrust tribunals to make exceedingly fine-tuned appraisals of complex economic relationships. The law requires fact finding in a number of complex areas, e.g., defining product and geographic markets, predicting the possibility of that firms will engage in coordinated behavior; and assessing efficiencies flowing from the merger. Further complicating the process is the fact that these decisions require judgments regarding what the future may hold in an industry undergoing revolutionary change. Like pilots landing at night aboard an aircraft carrier, courts are aiming for a target that is small, shifting and …
Afterword: Could A Merger Lead To Both A Monopoly And A Lower Price?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande, Walter Vandaele
Afterword: Could A Merger Lead To Both A Monopoly And A Lower Price?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande, Walter Vandaele
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This article demonstrates that significant net efficiencies from a merger could cause prices to decrease, even if the merger results in a monopoly. The article also shows that a price focus would require substantially more efficiencies to justify an otherwise anticompetitive merger than would an efficiency focus (in other words, it re-does the Williamsonian merger tradeoff, using price to consumers instead of net efficiencies as its focus). We demonstrate this by calculating how large the necessary efficiency gains would have to be to prevent price increases under different market conditions.
Efficiency Considerations In Merger Enforcement, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande
Efficiency Considerations In Merger Enforcement, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande
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This is one of the first articles to demonstrate that the primary goal of antitrust is neither exclusively to enhance economic efficiency, nor to address any social or political factor. Rather, the overriding intent behind the merger laws was to prevent prices to purchasers from rising due to mergers (a wealth transfer concern). This is the first article to show how to analyze mergers with this goal in mind. Doing so challenges the fundamental underpinnings of Williamsonian merger analysis (which assumes mergers should be evaluated only in terms of net efficiency effects).
In this and three related articles we re-do …