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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Keeping Our Distinctions Straight: A Response To “Originalism: Standard And Procedure”, Mitchell N. Berman
Keeping Our Distinctions Straight: A Response To “Originalism: Standard And Procedure”, Mitchell N. Berman
All Faculty Scholarship
For half a century, moral philosophers have distinguished between a “standard” that makes acts right and a “decision procedure” by which agents can determine whether any given contemplated act is right, which is to say whether it satisfies the standard. In “Originalism: Standard and Procedure,” Stephen Sachs argues that the same distinction applies to the constitutional domain and that clear grasp of the difference strengthens the case for originalism because theorists who emphasize the infirmities of originalism as a decision procedure frequently but mistakenly infer that those flaws also cast doubt on originalism as a standard. This invited response agrees …
[Dis]Integration: Second-Order Diversity And Schools, Anders Walker
[Dis]Integration: Second-Order Diversity And Schools, Anders Walker
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This article challenges the prevailing definition of diversity in schools. Borrowing from legal theorist Heather Gerken, it argues that diversity is best understood not simply as a rationale for creating integrated spaces, but also [dis]integrated ones, places where minority students and faculty can occupy majority positions, and are able to exercise majority control. Such spaces serve legitimate pedagogical goals that are different from those associated with statistical integration, and therefore warrant consideration by courts tasked with reviewing the use of race in university admissions.
Petitioning And The Making Of The Administrative State, Maggie Blackhawk
Petitioning And The Making Of The Administrative State, Maggie Blackhawk
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The administrative state is suffering from a crisis of legitimacy. Many have questioned the legality of the myriad commissions, boards, and agencies through which much of our modern governance occurs. Scholars such as Jerry Mashaw, Theda Skocpol, and Michele Dauber, among others, have provided compelling institutional histories, illustrating that administrative lawmaking has roots in the early American republic. Others have attempted to assuage concerns through interpretive theory, arguing that the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 implicitly amended our Constitution. Solutions offered thus far, however, have yet to provide a deeper understanding of the meaning and function of the administrative state …
The Presumptions Of Classical Liberal Constitutionalism, Matthew J. Lindsay
The Presumptions Of Classical Liberal Constitutionalism, Matthew J. Lindsay
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Richard A. Epstein’s The Classical Liberal Constitution is an imposing addition to the burgeoning body of legal scholarship that seeks to “restore” a robust conception of economic liberty and limited government to its rightful place at the center of American constitutionalism. Legislators and judges operating within a “classical liberal conception of government,” Epstein explains, would approach skeptically “[a]ll [regulatory] proposals that deviate from the basic common law protections of life, liberty, and property.” Classical liberal constitutional courts would thus renounce the toothless rational basis review of the post-New Deal “progressive mindset,” and instead subject to exacting scrutiny the government’s “purported …
Judge Posner’S Simple Law, Mitchell N. Berman
Judge Posner’S Simple Law, Mitchell N. Berman
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The world is complex, Richard Posner observes in his most recent book, Reflections on Judging. It follows that, to resolve real-world disputes sensibly, judges must be astute students of the world’s complexity. The problem, he says, is that, thanks to disposition, training, and professional incentives, they aren’t. Worse than that, the legal system generates its own complexity precisely to enable judges “to avoid rather than meet and overcome the challenge of complexity” that the world delivers. Reflections concerns how judges needlessly complexify inherently simple law, and how this complexification can be corrected.
Posner’s diagnoses and prescriptions range widely—from the Bluebook …
Reconstruction And Resistance, Kermit Roosevelt Iii
Reconstruction And Resistance, Kermit Roosevelt Iii
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This review essay considers Jack Balkin’s two recent books, Living Originalism and Constitutional Redemption. It argues that Balkin’s theoretical contribution is substantial. His reconciliation of originalism and living constitutionalism is correct and should mark a real advance in constitutional theory and scholarship. Political considerations may, however, complicate its reception. Something like political considerations seem also to have complicated Balkin’s theory. He suggests that we may think of American constitutional history as an attempt to redeem the promises of the Declaration of Independence. I argue that the Reconstruction Amendments are a much more appropriate focus for redemption and speculate that Balkin …
Constitutional Theory And The Rule Of Recognition: Toward A Fourth Theory Of Law, Mitchell N. Berman
Constitutional Theory And The Rule Of Recognition: Toward A Fourth Theory Of Law, Mitchell N. Berman
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This essay, a contribution to a forthcoming edited volume on Hart's rule of recognition and the U.S. Constitution, advances one argument and pitches one proposal. The argument is that Hart's theory of law does not succeed. On Hart's account, legal propositions are what they are - that is, they have the particular content and status that they do - by virtue of their satisfying necessary and sufficient conditions that are themselves established by a special sort of convergent practice among officials. American constitutional theorists are often troubled by this account because it seems to imply that in the "hard cases" …