Law Commons^™

Pay For Play: The Compensated Leisure Flaw Of Contract Damages, Mitchell L. Engler

Articles

Contract damages aim to leave the injured party in as good a position as if the contract had been fulfilled. But discharged laborers often obtain a much better result due to the lack of a reduction for their excused work effort on breach. After first exposing the problematic ramifications of this unjustified deviation, this Article then provides two workable corrections.

After Philip Morris V. Williams: What Is Left Of The "Single-Digit" Ratio?, Anthony J. Sebok

Articles

This short essay was written for a symposium on The Future of Punitive Damages held at the Charleston School of Law in 2007. I argue that the ratio rule (that punitive damages that exceed a single digit ratio presumptively violate the Due Process Clause), introduced by the Supreme Court in Campbell, is unlikely to survive. I argue this for three reasons. First, many lower courts have found ways to conceal punitive damages awards that impose, in reality, ratios in the double-digits. Second, the refusal of the Court to reverse the plaintiffs punitive damages award in Williams under the ratio rule …

Indemnity, Liability, Insolvency, David G. Carlson

Articles

Suppose A has a claim against B. B has a claim over against C. B, however, is insolvent and has not actually paid A. B's only asset is, in fact, B v C. To what extent can C claim that B v C is valueless - that B was not damaged because B was too broke to pay A?

This paper argues that the fundamental legal distinction between indemnity and liability is beginning to dissolve, because B can always pay A (and thereby give value to B v C) by borrowing the amount B owes and using B v C …

What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding The History Of Punitive Damages Matters Today, Anthony J. Sebok

Articles

In 2001 the Supreme Court, in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. suggested that, although modern punitive damages punish, in earlier times they almost exclusively compensated for noneconomic damages that were ignored by a less progressive legal system. This article demonstrates that the historical foundation upon which the Supreme Court bases its argument is groundless. In the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries punitive damages served a number of functions, but none of them were to provide the noneconomic damages identified by the court. Instead, as the article shows, the sort of injuries for which punitive damages were once demanded …