Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
Fictionalism About Folk Psychology, Daniel Hutto
Fictionalism About Folk Psychology, Daniel Hutto
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers (Archive)
This paper argues that fictionalism about folk psychology, FaF, is ill motivated in any domain. It is argued that there is no advantage in trying to vindicate folk psychology by treating the constructs of classical cognitivism--namely, subpersonal mental representations--as useful fictions in contrast to serious scientific posits or as serving as the basis for philosophical explanations. Both scientific and philosophical considerations point to the conclusion that subpersonal representations of the sort that classical cognitivism posits should be eliminated, not preserved, by our best science of mind. Yet there is no need to assume that folk psychological explanations are subpersonally based. …
Psychology Unified: From Folk Psychology To Radical Enactivism, Daniel Hutto
Psychology Unified: From Folk Psychology To Radical Enactivism, Daniel Hutto
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers (Archive)
A properly radical enactivism—one that eschews the idea that all mentality is necessarily contentful and representational—has better prospects of unifying psychology than does traditional cognitivism. This paper offers a five-step argument in support of this claim. The first section advances the view that a principled way of characterizing psychology’s subject matter is what is required if it is to be regarded as a special science. In this light, section two examines why and how cognitivism continues to be regarded as the best potential unifier for the discipline. But the third section exposes a serious problem about the scope of cognitivism …
The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins And Applications Of Folk Psychology, Daniel Hutto
The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins And Applications Of Folk Psychology, Daniel Hutto
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers (Archive)
Psychologically normal adult humans make sense of intentional actions by trying to decide for which reason they were performed. This is a datum that requires our understanding. Although there have been interesting recent debates about how we should understand ‘reasons’, I will follow a long tradition and assume that, at a bare minimum, to act for a reason involves having appropriately interrelated beliefs and desires.
Review: Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique Of Folk Psychology, Theory Of Mind And Simulation, Daniel Hutto
Review: Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique Of Folk Psychology, Theory Of Mind And Simulation, Daniel Hutto
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers (Archive)
Ask nearly any analytic philosopher of mind how we understand intentional actions performed for reasons and you are bound to be told that we do so by deploying mental concepts, such as beliefs and desires, in systematic ways. This way of making sense of actions is known as commonsense or folk psychology (or CSP or FP for short). There have been many interesting debates about CSP over the years. These have focused on questions including: How fundamental and universal is this practice? Which species engage in it? What mechanisms underwrite the competence? How is the ability acquired? And, what exactly …