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Reply Brief. Crouse V. Caldwell, 138 S.Ct. 470 (2017) (No. 17-242), Eric Schnapper, Steven H. Goldblatt, Shon Hopwood, Marybeth Mullaney, Jennifer Munter Stark Oct 2017

Reply Brief. Crouse V. Caldwell, 138 S.Ct. 470 (2017) (No. 17-242), Eric Schnapper, Steven H. Goldblatt, Shon Hopwood, Marybeth Mullaney, Jennifer Munter Stark

Court Briefs

QUESTIONS PRESENTED (1) When disputes of fact arise regarding whether speech by a public employee is protected by the First Amendment, should those factual issues be resolved by a trier of fact (the rule in the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits), or by the court as a matter of constitutional law (the rule in the Fourth Circuit)? (2) When a government employee engages in speech on a subject of public concern, and a court applying Pickering balances the First Amendment interest against any contrary interests of the employer, should the extent of that First Amendment interest be “lessened” …


Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari, Crouse V. Caldwell, 138 S.Ct. 470 (2017) (No. 17-242), Eric Schnapper, Steven H. Goldblatt, Shon Hopwood, Marybeth Mullaney, Jennifer Munter Stark Aug 2017

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari, Crouse V. Caldwell, 138 S.Ct. 470 (2017) (No. 17-242), Eric Schnapper, Steven H. Goldblatt, Shon Hopwood, Marybeth Mullaney, Jennifer Munter Stark

Court Briefs

QUESTIONS PRESENTED (1) When disputes of fact arise regarding whether speech by a public employee is protected by the First Amendment, should those factual issues be resolved by a trier of fact (the rule in the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits), or by the court as a matter of constitutional law (the rule in the Fourth Circuit)? (2) When a government employee engages in speech on a subject of public concern, and a court applying Pickering balances the First Amendment interest against any contrary interests of the employer, should the extent of that First Amendment interest be “lessened” …


Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari. Lavigne V. Cajun Deep Foundations, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. 1328 (2017) (No. 16-464), 2016 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 3646, 2016 Wl 5929996, Eric Schnapper, Ruth W. Woodling Jun 2016

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari. Lavigne V. Cajun Deep Foundations, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. 1328 (2017) (No. 16-464), 2016 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 3646, 2016 Wl 5929996, Eric Schnapper, Ruth W. Woodling

Court Briefs

No abstract provided.


Reply Brief. Frew V. Traylor, 136 S.Ct. 1159 (2016) (No. 15-483), Eric Schnapper, Timothy B. Garrigan, Timothy David Craig, Jane Swanson Jan 2016

Reply Brief. Frew V. Traylor, 136 S.Ct. 1159 (2016) (No. 15-483), Eric Schnapper, Timothy B. Garrigan, Timothy David Craig, Jane Swanson

Court Briefs

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Litigation regarding the legal responsibilities of large institutions, such as schools or prisons, is frequently resolved by consent decree. The widespread use of such consent decrees regularly gives rise to inter-related disputes about how to interpret provisions of those decrees, and about when the decrees themselves have been satisfied and may thus be dissolved. In the instant case the Fifth Circuit, expressly disagreeing with the standards applied in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, interpreted in a narrow manner, and then ordered dissolution of, key provisions earlier agreed to by Texas that protect the rights of millions of indigent …


Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari. Frew V. Traylor, 136 S.Ct. 1159 (2016) (No. 15-483), 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 3632, 2015 Wl 6083505, Eric Schnapper, Timothy B. Garrigan, Timothy David Craig, Jane Swanson Oct 2015

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari. Frew V. Traylor, 136 S.Ct. 1159 (2016) (No. 15-483), 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 3632, 2015 Wl 6083505, Eric Schnapper, Timothy B. Garrigan, Timothy David Craig, Jane Swanson

Court Briefs

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Litigation regarding the legal responsibilities of large institutions, such as schools or prisons, is frequently resolved by consent decree. The widespread use of such consent decrees regularly gives rise to inter-related disputes about how to interpret provisions of those decrees, and about when the decrees themselves have been satisfied and may thus be dissolved. In the instant case the Fifth Circuit, expressly disagreeing with the standards applied in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, interpreted in a narrow manner, and then ordered dissolution of, key provisions earlier agreed to by Texas that protect the rights of millions of indigent …


Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari. Rochow V. Life Insurance Company Of North America, 136 S. Ct. 480 (2015) (No. 15-163), 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 2657, Eric Schnapper, Erik W. Scharf, John J. Cooper Aug 2015

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari. Rochow V. Life Insurance Company Of North America, 136 S. Ct. 480 (2015) (No. 15-163), 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 2657, Eric Schnapper, Erik W. Scharf, John J. Cooper

Court Briefs

QUESTION PRESENTED When a benefit plan, in violation of ERISA, wrongfully denies or delays payment of a benefit, the court may award relief because of the improper delay in the payment of that benefit. The question presented is: Should 'the amount of a remedy based on the improper delay in the payment of a benefit be based on: (1) only the amount needed to redress the loss that the beneficiary sustained as a result of the wrongful delay (the rule in the Sixth Circuit), (2) either the amount needed to redress the loss that the beneficiary sustained as a result …


Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari. Brush V. Sears Holding Corp., 568 U.S. 1143 (2013) (No. 12-268), 2013 U.S. Lexis 925, Eric W. Scharf, Wayne R. Atkins, Eric Schnapper, Brian D. Buckstein Aug 2012

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari. Brush V. Sears Holding Corp., 568 U.S. 1143 (2013) (No. 12-268), 2013 U.S. Lexis 925, Eric W. Scharf, Wayne R. Atkins, Eric Schnapper, Brian D. Buckstein

Court Briefs

QUESTION PRESENTED

Section 704(a) of Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee because he or she opposed discrimination forbidden by Title VII. The lower courts are divided as to how such anti-retaliation provisions apply to management officials, such as personnel or EEO officials, whose duties include assuring compliance with Title VII or implementing an employer’s anti-discrimination policy.

The question presented is: Are management officials: (1) subject to exclusion from protection under section 704(a) if their actions are within the scope of their official duties (the rule in the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits),
(2) protected under …