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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
The New Dividend Puzzle, William W. Bratton
The New Dividend Puzzle, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Wealth, Utility, And The Human Dimension, Jonathan Klick, Francesco Parisi
Wealth, Utility, And The Human Dimension, Jonathan Klick, Francesco Parisi
All Faculty Scholarship
Functional law and economics, which draws its influence from the public choice school of economic thought, stands in stark contrast to both the Chicago and Yale schools of law and economics. While the Chicago school emphasizes the inherent efficiency of legal rules, and the Yale school views law as a solution to market failure and distributional inequality, functional law and economics recognizes the possibility for both market and legal failure. That is, while there are economic forces that lead to failures in the market, there are also structural forces that limit the law’s ability to remedy those failures on an …
The Academic Tournament Over Executive Compensation, William W. Bratton
The Academic Tournament Over Executive Compensation, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Microfoundations Of Standard Form Contracts: Price Discrimination Vs. Behavioral Bias, Jonathan Klick
The Microfoundations Of Standard Form Contracts: Price Discrimination Vs. Behavioral Bias, Jonathan Klick
All Faculty Scholarship
Standard form contracts, or contracts of adhesion, appear to provide contradictory evidence for the operation of bargaining in the markets where they are common. Non-negotiated contract terms that seemingly benefit sellers to the detriment of buyers call into question the efficiency implications of the Coase Theorem, which forms the foundation of positive law and economics. Proponents of the behavioral school of law and economics have suggested that behavioral biases, observed in experimental contexts, provide the most plausible explanation for standard form contracts. However, price discrimination might provide a more parsimonious explanation for abusive terms in contracts. If there is heterogeneity …