Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Antitrust and Trade Regulation (8)
- Economics (7)
- Industrial Organization (7)
- Law and Economics (7)
- Social and Behavioral Sciences (7)
-
- Economic Policy (4)
- Intellectual Property Law (4)
- Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation (4)
- Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration (4)
- Business (3)
- Supreme Court of the United States (3)
- Technology and Innovation (3)
- Business Organizations Law (2)
- Communications Law (2)
- Administrative Law (1)
- Computer Sciences (1)
- Constitutional Law (1)
- Courts (1)
- Databases and Information Systems (1)
- Economic Theory (1)
- Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations (1)
- Internet Law (1)
- Legislation (1)
- Other Economics (1)
- Physical Sciences and Mathematics (1)
- Science and Technology Law (1)
- Science and Technology Policy (1)
- State and Local Government Law (1)
Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Law
Antitrust And The 'Filed Rate' Doctrine: Deregulation And State Action, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust And The 'Filed Rate' Doctrine: Deregulation And State Action, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
In its Keogh decision the Supreme Court held that although the Interstate Commerce Act did not exempt railroads from antitrust liability, a private plaintiff may not recover treble damages based on an allegedly monopolistic tariff rate filed with a federal agency. Keogh very likely grew out of Justice Brandeis's own zeal for regulation and his concern for the protection of small business — in this case, mainly shippers whom he felt were protected from discrimination by filed rates. The Supreme Court's Square D decision later conceded that Keogh may have been “unwise as a matter of policy,” but reaffirmed it …
Antitrust And Nonexcluding Ties, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust And Nonexcluding Ties, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Notwithstanding hundreds of court decisions, tying arrangements remain enigmatic. Conclusions that go to either extreme, per se legality or per se illegality, invariably make simplifying assumptions that frequently do not obtain. For example, by ignoring double marginalization or tying product price cuts it becomes very easy to prove that a wide range of ties are anticompetitive. At the other extreme, by ignoring foreclosure possibilities one can readily conclude that ties are invariably benign.
Ties have historically been thought to produce two kinds of competitive harm: “leverage,” or extraction; and foreclosure, or exclusion. The two theories are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, …
Competition And Innovation In Copyright And The Dmca, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Competition And Innovation In Copyright And The Dmca, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This book of CASES AND MATERIALS ON INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY is intended for educational use. The book is free for all to use subject to an open source license agreement. It differs from IP/antitrust casebooks in that it considers numerous sources of competition policy in addition to antitrust, including those that emanate from the intellectual property laws themselves, and also related issues such as the relationship between market structure and innovation, the competitive consequences of regulatory rules governing technology competition such as net neutrality and interconnection, misuse, the first sale doctrine, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Chapters …
Antitrust’S State Action Doctrine And The Ordinary Powers Of Corporations, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust’S State Action Doctrine And The Ordinary Powers Of Corporations, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court has now agreed to review the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Phoebe-Putney, which held that a state statute permitting a hospital authority to acquire hospitals implicitly authorized such acquisitions when they were anticompetitive – in this particular case very likely facilitating a merger to monopoly. Under antitrust law’s “state action” doctrine a state may in fact authorize such an acquisition, provided that it “clearly articulates” its desire to approve an action that would otherwise constitute an antitrust violation and also “actively supervises” any private conduct that might fall under the state’s regulatory scheme.
“Authorization” in the context of …
Antitrust And The Costs Of Movement, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust And The Costs Of Movement, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust is rightfully concerned about the structure of markets as well as the bargaining that occurs in them. As a result, the absolute cost of redeploying resources can be just as important as the transaction costs of arranging for their movement. This paper examines several broad themes in antitrust, considering the role of various assumptions about the costs of getting resources moved toward superior positions and the ability of the antitrust system to facilitate this movement. Part II very briefly examines structuralism as a theory underlying antitrust enforcement, particularly its assumptions about the difficulty and costs of moving resources. Harvard …
Competition In Information Technologies: Standards-Essential Patents, Non-Practicing Entities And Frand Bidding, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Competition In Information Technologies: Standards-Essential Patents, Non-Practicing Entities And Frand Bidding, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Standard Setting is omnipresent in networked information technologies. Virtually every cellular phone, computer, digital camera or similar device contains technologies governed by a collaboratively developed standard. If these technologies are to perform competitively, the processes by which standards are developed and implemented must be competitive. In this case attaining competitive results requires a mixture of antitrust and non-antitrust legal tools.
FRAND refers to a firm’s ex ante commitment to make its technology available at a “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory royalty.” The FRAND commitment results from bidding to have one’s own technology selected as a standard. Typically the FRAND commitment is …
Innovation And Competition Policy: Statutory Supplement And Other Materials, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Innovation And Competition Policy: Statutory Supplement And Other Materials, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This Supplement to Cases and Materials on Innovation and Competition Policy includes the following: (1) a statutory supplement containing relevant provisions of the antitrust laws, the Patent Act, the Copyright Act, and the DMCA: (2) an annotated table of contents. Other supplemental materials, including discussion of recent decisions or other developments, will be added from time to time.
This book will be supplemented frequently as important new decisions or other developments occur. However, the author will attempt not to revise individual chapters during the course of the academic semester in order to avoid confusion in pagination or printing. Instead, supplemental …
Antitrust And The Movement Of Technology, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust And The Movement Of Technology, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Patents create strong incentives for collaborative development. For many technologies fixed costs are extremely high in relation to variable costs. A second feature of technology that encourages collaborative development is the need for interoperability or common standards. Third, in contrast to traditional commons, intellectual property commons are almost always nonrivalrous on the supply side. If ten producers all own the rights to make a product covered by a patent, each one can make as many units as it pleases without limiting the number that others can make. That might seem to be a good thing, but considered ex ante it …
Markets In Merger Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Markets In Merger Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust merger policy suffers from a disconnect between its articulated concerns and the methodologies it employs. The Supreme Court has largely abandoned the field of horizontal merger analysis, leaving us with ancient decisions that have never been overruled but whose fundamental approach has been ignored or discredited. As a result the case law reflects the structuralism of a bygone era, focusing on industrial concentration and market shares, largely to the exclusion of other measures of competitive harm, including price increases. Only within the last generation has econometrics developed useful techniques for estimating the price impact of specific mergers in differentiated …