Law Commons^™

Standing In The Way Of The Ftaia: Exceptional Applications Of Illinois Brick, Jennifer Fischell

Michigan Law Review

In 1982, Congress enacted the Foreign Antitrust Trade Improvements Act (FTAIA) to resolve uncertainties about the international reach and effect of U.S. antitrust laws. Unfortunately, the FTAIA has provided more questions than answers. It has been ten years since the Supreme Court most recently interpreted the FTAIA, and crucial questions and circuit splits abound. One of these questions is how to understand the convergence of the direct purchaser rule (frequently referred to as the Illinois Brick doctrine) and the FTAIA. Under the direct purchaser rule, only those who purchase directly from antitrust violators are typically permitted to sue under section …

Balancing Effects Across Markets, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

In Philadelphia National Bank (PNB), the Supreme Court held that it is improper to weigh a merger's procompetitive effects in one market against the merger's anticompetitive effects in another. The merger in question, which ostensibly reduced retail competition in the Philadelphia area, could not be justified on the grounds that it increased competition against New York banks and hence perhaps enhanced competition in business banking in the mid-Atlantic region. I will refer to the Supreme Court's prohibition on balancing effects across markets as a "market-specificity" rule. Under this rule, efficiencies that may counterbalance anticompetitive aspects must be specific to …

Market Power Without Market Definition, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Antitrust law has traditionally required proof of market power in most cases and has analyzed market power through a market definition/market share lens. In recent years, this indirect or structural approach to proving market power has come under attack as misguided in practice and intellectually incoherent. If market definition collapses in the courts and antitrust agencies, as it seems poised to do, this will rupture antitrust analysis and create urgent pressures for an alternative approach to proving market power through direct evidence. None of the leading theoretic approaches—such as the Lerner Index or a search for supracompetitive profits—provides a robust …

Pay-For-Delay Settlements In The Wake Of Actavis, Michael L. Fialkoff

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

“Pay-for-delay” settlements, also known as reverse payments, arise when a generic manufacturer pursues FDA approval of a generic version of a brand-name drug. If a patent protects the brand-name drug, the generic manufacturer has the option of contesting the validity of the patent or arguing that its product does not infringe the patent covering the brand-name drug. If the generic manufacturer prevails on either of these claims, the FDA will approve its generic version for sale. Approval of a generic version of a brand-name drug reduces the profitability of the brand-name drug by forcing the brand-name manufacturer to price its …

Actavis, The Reverse Payment Fallacy, And The Continuing Need For Regulatory Solutions, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

The Actavis decision punted more than it decided. Although narrowing the range of possible outcomes by rejecting the legal rules at the extremes and opting for a rule of reason middle ground, the opinion failed to grapple with the most challenging issues of regulatory policy raised by pharmaceutical patent settlements. In particular, it failed to clearly delineate the social costs of permitting and disallowing patent settlements, avoided grappling with the crucial issues of patent validity and infringement, and erroneously focused on “reverse payments” as a distinctive antitrust problem when equally or more anticompetitive settlements can be crafted without reverse payments. …

The Tempting Of Antitrust: Robert Bork And The Goals Of Antitrust Policy, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Of all Robert Bork’s many important contributions to antitrust law, none was more significant than his identification of economic efficiency, disguised as consumer welfare, as the sole normative objective of U.S. antitrust law. The Supreme Court relied primarily on Bork’s argument that Congress intended the Sherman Act to advance consumer welfare in making its landmark statement in Reiter v. Sonotone that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” This singular normative vision proved foundational to the reorientation of antitrust law away from an interventionist, populist, Brandeisian, and vaguely Jeffersonian conception of antitrust law as a constraint on …

Model-Based Pricing In Hurricane Insurance: A Case Study For Judicial Reform Of The Mccarran-Freguson Act, Benjamin Holland Able

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA) exempts various aspects of state insurance operations from federal antitrust enforcement. This exemption is a source of longstanding controversy, due in part to its potentially harmful effect on consumers in product pricing. In hurricane insurance, there is a burgeoning debate concerning insurers' use of predictive computer models rather than shared loss data to set premiums for the industry. By using these models in hurricane-prone states, insurers have increased the price of hurricane insurance dramatically. Where these new prediction methods are used, MFA exemption may facilitate supracompetitive pricing in ways its architects could not have foreseen. This …

Antitrust And The Judicial Virtues, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Although commentators frequently debate how judges should decide antitrust cases substantively, little attention has been paid to theories of judicial virtue in antitrust decision making. This essay considers four pairings of virtues: (1) striving for substantive purity versus conceding to institutional realism; (2) incrementalism versus generalism; (3) presenting a unified face versus candidly conceding differences among judges on an appellate panel; and (4) adhering strictly to stare decisis versus freely updating precedents to reflect evolving economic learning or conditions. While recognizing the complexities that sometimes pull judges in the opposite direction, this Article gives the nod to institutional realism, incrementalism, …

"The Magna Carta Of Free Enterprise" Really?" , Daniel A. Crane

Articles

In U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc., Justice Thurgood Marshall announced that "[a] ntitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.", In The Antitrust Constitution, Thomas Nachbar takes seriously the idea that federal antitrust laws serve a constitutional function. He argues that, contrary to common assumptions, the antitrust laws cannot be understood merely as a form of economic utilitarianism. Rather, they serve the additional purpose of preventing "regulatory harm," the assertion of law-like control over the conduct of others outside the sphere of one's own property interests.

A Neo-Chicago Perspective On Antitrust Institutions, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

It has long been fashionable to categorize antitrust by its "schools." From the Sherman Act's passage to World War II, there were (at least) neo-classical marginalism, populism, progressivism, associationalism, business commonwealthism, and Brandeisianism. From World War II to the present, we have seen (at least, and without counting the European Ordo-Liberals) PaleoHarvard structuralism, the Chicago School, Neo-Harvard institutionalism, and Post -Chicagoans. So why not Neo-Chicago? I am already on record as suggesting the possible emergence of such a school, so it is too late for me to dismiss the entire "schools" conversation as window-dressing. This Symposium is dedicated to defining …

Unfit For Prime Time: Why Cable Television Regulations Cannot Perform Trinko's 'Antitrust Function', Keith Klovers

Michigan Law Review

Until recently, regulation and antitrust law operated in tandem to safeguard competition in regulated industries. In three recent decisions-Trinko, Credit Suisse, and Linkline-the Supreme Court limited the operation of the antitrust laws when regulation "performs the antitrust function." This Note argues that cable programming regulations-which are in some respects factually similar to the telecommunications regulations at issue in Trinko and Linkline-do not perform the antitrust function because they cannot deter anticompetitive conduct. As a result, Trinko and its siblings should not foreclose antitrust claims for damages that arise out of certain cable programming disputes.

The Case For Rebalancing Antitrust And Regulation, Howard A. Shelanski

Michigan Law Review

The continued growth of forensic DNA databases has brought about greater interest in a search method known as "familial" or "kinship" matching. Whereas a typical database search seeks the source of a crime-scene stain by making an exact match between a known person and the DNA sample, familial searching instead looks for partial matches in order to find potential relatives of the source. The use of a familial DNA search to identify the alleged "Grim Sleeper" killer in California brought national attention to the method, which has many proponents. In contrast, this Article argues against the practice of familial searching …

Reflections On Section 5 Of The Ftc Act And The Ftc's Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC’s”) unprecedented enforcement action against Intel raises profound issues concerning the scope of the FTC’s powers to give a construction to Section 5 of the FTC Act that goes beyond the substantive reach of the Sherman Act. While I have urged the FTC to assert such independence from the Sherman Act, this is the wrong case to make a break. Indeed, if anything, Intel poses a risk of seriously setting back the development of an independent Section 5 power by provoking a hostile appellate court to rebuke the FTC’s effort and cabin the FTC’s powers in …

Chicago, Post-Chicago, And Neo-Chicago, Daniel A. Crane

Reviews

Of all of Chicago's law and economics conquests, antitrust was the most complete and resounding victory. Chicago, of course, is a synecdoche for ideological currents that swept through and from Hyde Park beginning in the 1950s and reached their peak in the 1970s and 1980s. From early roots in antitrust and economic regulation, the Chicago School branched outward, first to adjacent fields like securities regulation, corporate law, property, and contracts, and eventually to more distant horizons like sexuality and family law. Predictably, the Chicago School exerted its greatest influence in fields closely tied to commercial regulation. But never did Chicago …

Linkline's Institutional Suspicions, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Antitrust scholars are having fun again. Not so long ago, they were the poor, redheaded stepchildren of the legal academy, either pining for the older days of rigorous antitrust enforcement or trying to kill off what was left of the enterprise. Other law professors felt sorry for them, ignored them, or both. But now antitrust is making a comeback of sorts. In one heady week in May of 2009, a front-page story in the New York Times reported the dramatic decision of Christine Varney-the Obama Administration's new Antitrust Division head at the Department of Justice-to jettison the entire report on …

Obama's Antitrust Agenda, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Antitrust law is back in vogue. After years in the wilderness, antitrust enforcement has reemerged as a hot topic in Washington and in the legal academy. In one heady week inMay of 2009, a frontpage story in the New York Times reported the dramatic decision of Christine Varney —theObama administration’s new AntitrustDivision head—to jettison the entire report onmonopolization offenses released by the Bush JusticeDepartment just eightmonths earlier. In a speech before the Center for American Progress, Varney announced that the Justice Department is “committed to aggressively pursuing enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.” As if to prove that …

Reading Too Much Into Reeder-Simco?, Jeremy M. Suhr

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that a careful analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion in Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. demonstrates that, despite the expansive dicta appearing in part IV of that opinion, the Court did not intend to reshape the course of its Robinson-Patman Act jurisprudence in any significant way. The Court's opinion operated well within the confines of established Robinson-Patman Act doctrine, even if its searching review of the evidence presented at trial represented a rare foray into the arena of factual error correction. After Reeder-Simco, however, many commentators emphasized the dicta in part IV …

There's No "I" In "League": Professional Sports Leagues And The Single Entity Defense, Nathaniel Grow

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that outside of labor disputes, sports leagues should be presumed to be single entities. Part I argues that professional sports leagues are single entities in disputes regarding league-wide, non-labor policy. In particular, the focus of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on economic reality rather than organizational form necessitates a finding that professional sports leagues are single entities in non-labor disputes. Part II argues that professional sports leagues are not single entities for purposes of labor disputes; sports leagues, on the whole, do not involve a unity of interest for labor matters. More importantly, existing precedent outside of the …

Controlling The Competitor Plaintiff In Antitrust Litigation, William H. Page, Roger D. Blair

Michigan Law Review

In Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, Edward Snyder and Thomas Kauper survey a sample of private antitrust cases from the period 1973-1983 and review critically the recent economic literature on raising rivals' costs as an exclusionary practice.

Much in Snyder and Kauper's study is worthy of comment. They have given us a useful picture of private antitrust litigation during the period covered by the sample, one that may be more accurate than a reading of reported cases from that period would suggest. Moreover, their generally critical treatment of the literature on raising rivals' costs is clear …

Misuse Of The Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, Edward A. Snyder, Thomas E. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

In this article we ask (1) under what circumstances are competitor suits meritorious, and (2) do existing rules, such as those requiring proof of market power or other so-called filters and the requirement that plaintiffs suffer "antitrust injury," afford a reasonable prospect of eliminating anticompetitive misuses of the remedy by competitor plaintiffs? We evaluate a sample of seventy-four cases in which plaintiffs sued their rivals to learn how competitor plaintiffs use the private antitrust remedy. And because many of these cases allege anticompetitive exclusionary practices, we consider how recent theories of exclusionary practices may be used to support competitor claims. …

Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn And Sylvania: An Argument For The Continuing Use Of A Partial Per Se Approach, Martin B. Louis

Michigan Law Review

This phenomenon has been manifested in the vertical distribution cases, which seem to cry out for a departure from the rule of reason approach for several reasons. First, as section I of this article will show, vertical cases frequently involve a package of restraints--a characteristic that compounds all of the difficulties of evaluation mentioned above. Second, vertical restraints reduce intrabrand competition in order, supposedly, to promote interbrand competition. Thus, even if we could identify and measure both the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of a particular restraint, we cannot assume a one-to-one equivalency, and we lack a workable process by which …

Connell: Antitrust Law At The Expense Of Labor Law, Theodore J. St. Antoine

Articles

From the outset, the difficulty in applying the antitrust concept to organized labor has been that the two are intrinsically incompatible. The antitrust laws are designed to promote competition, and unions, avowedly and unabashedly, are designed to limit it. According to classical trade union theory, the objective is the elimination of wage competition among all employees doing the same job in the same industry. Logically extended, the policy against restraint of trade must condemn the very existence of labor organizations, since their minimum aim has always been the suppression of any inclination on the part of working people to offer …

United States V. Falstaff Brewing Corporation: Potential Competition Re-Examined, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note will examine and criticize the perceived potential competition doctrine suggested by the Court. Then, it will discuss the questions raised in the concurrences concerning the use of subjective evidence and the role of incipient competitive effects. Finally, an alternative approach that focuses on the acquisition of or the possibility of acquiring small, "toehold" firms will be proposed.

Attempts And Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer To The Prophylactic Riddle Of Section Two, Edward H. Cooper

Articles

The efforts of activist antitrust lawyers to redefine the contours of attempted monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act1 have again forced the courts to wrestle with the classic antitrust dilemma: How far must single-firm competitive behavior be restrained to make competition free? The answer given by the majority of current decisions is that, absent some other established offense, single-firm behavior should be prohibited as an attempt to monopolize only when there is a specific intent to monopolize and the firm has come dangerously near to unlawful monopolization. A contemporary challenge to this orthodox answer is rapidly gaining force. …

Territorial Restrictions And Per Se Rules--A Re-Evaluation Of The Schwinn And Sealy Doctrines, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Horizontal territorial restrictions have traditionally been said to be per se illegal. That is, they are illegal no matter what effect they may have on competition. The legality of vertical territorial restrictions, however, is still an unsettled issue. The past decade saw a trend toward considering such restrictions per se violations of section I of the Sherman Act. That trend culminated in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., a case better known for its speculation than its reasoning. The Supreme Court, which ostensibly announced the per se illegality of these restrictions in Schwinn, will have an opportunity …

Secondary Boycott: From Antitrust To Labor Relations, Theodore J. St. Antoine

Articles

The ethos of the labor movement cuts against the American grain at several points. Our national instinct, reflected in many statutes and much judge-made law, is to exalt the rugged individualist over the anonymous group, to favor wide-open competition rather than a controlled market, and to prize the right of each person to remain aloof from the quarrels and concerns of his neighbors. It is not for nothing that our most universal folk hero is the frontiersman, who proudly stands alone and self-sufficient. Yet the ordinary workingman does not have the capacity to assume that heroic stance. For him strength …

The "Warren Court" And The Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism, And Cynicism, Thomas` E. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

No one could quarrel with the simple assertion that the so-called "Warren Court" has had a significant, if indeed not extraordinary, impact on the development of the antitrust laws. It could hardly have been otherwise. The fifteen years since 1953 represent virtually one-fourth of the total history of the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts, and one fifth of the time which has elapsed since passage of the Sherman Act. Every Supreme Court decision under the 1950 amendments to section 7 of the Clayton Act, the so-called antimerger law, has come after the accession of Chief Justice Warren to the …

Note And Comment, Horace Lafayette Wilgus, Edson R. Sunderland, Carl G. Brandt, A George Bouchard

Michigan Law Review

Boycott - Clayton Act - In Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering et al. (January 3, 192I) 41 S. Ct. 172, the facts were: The plaintiff, a Michigan corporation, manufactures at Battle Creek, and sells throughout the United States, especially in and around New York City, and abroad, very large, heavy and complicated newspaper printing presses. Purchasers furnish workmen, but ordinary mechanics alone are not competent to do this, and so they are supervised by specially skilled machinists furnished by plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have always operated on the "open shop" plan, without discrimination against union or non-union labor, either at …

Can A Manufacturer Be Compelled To Sell?, Henry M. Bates

Articles

The fight for price maintenance is not yet completely settled, despite, the decisions in Dr. Miles Medical Company v. Parks & Sons Company, 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376, 55 L. Ed. 502, and Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 616, 58 L. Ed. 1041, which held invalid contracts, whether nominally of agency, or of sale, between manufacturer and wholesaler or jobber whereby the latter in purchasing agreed himself to maintain and to sell only to others who would maintain a schedule of prices established by the manufacturer. But there are more …

The Commodity Clause Of The Hepburn Act, Edwin C. Goddard

Articles

The Supreme Court of the United States has added another to the interesting line of cases construing the so-called "Commodity Clause" of the HEPBURN ACT of 1906. In United States v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co. and the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Coal Co., decided on June 21, 1915, 35 Sup. Ct. 873, the court reversed the decree of the District Court as reported in 213 Fed. 240, and found the relation and contract between the Railroad Company and the Coal Company to be in violation of the HEPBURN ACT and the SHERMAN ACT.