Law Commons^™

Modular Bankruptcy: Toward A Consumer Scheme Of Arrangement, John A. E. Pottow

Law & Economics Working Papers

The world of international bankruptcy has seen increasing use of the versatile scheme of arrangement, a form of corporate reorganization available under English law. A key feature of the scheme is its modularity, whereby a debtor can restructure only a single class of debt, such as bond indentures, without affecting other debt, such as trade. This is the opposite of chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code’s comprehensive reckoning of all financial stakeholders. This article considers a novel idea: could the scheme be transplanted into the consumer realm? It argues that it could and should. Substantial benefits of more individually …

Liability For Non-Disclosure In Equity Financing, Albert H. Choi, Kathryn E. Spier

Law & Economics Working Papers

The paper analyzes the effects of holding firms liable for non-disclosure of material information when raising capital. We develop a model in which a privately-informed entrepreneur can choose to withhold information from prospective investors when issuing and selling stock and the investors can bring suit against the firm ex post for (alleged) non-disclosure. The damage payment received by the investors is partially offset by the reduced value of their equity stake. The analysis shows that the equilibrium depends on, among others, (1) the amount of personal capital the entrepreneur has to commit, (2) the frequency with which the entrepreneur is …

Class Actions And Private Antitrust Litigation, Albert H. Choi, Kathryn E. Sprier

Law & Economics Working Papers

When firms collude and charge supra-competitive prices, consumers can bring antitrust lawsuits against the firms. When the litigation cost is low, firms accept the cost as just another cost of doing business, whereas when the cost is high, the firms lower the price to deter litigation. Class action is modeled as a mechanism that allows plaintiffs and attorneys to obtain economies of scale. We show that class actions, and the firms' incentive to block them, may or may not be socially desirable. Agency problems, settlement, fee-shifting, treble damages, public enforcement, and sustaining collusion through repeat play are also considered.

Tesla And The Car Dealers’ Lobby, Daniel A. Crane

Law & Economics Working Papers

Tesla Motors, the offspring of the South African-American entrepreneur Elon Musk who also brought us Pay-Pal and SpaceX, is the most exciting automotive development in many decades and a marquee story of American technological dynamism and innovation. The company’s luxury electric cars have caused a sensation in the auto industry, including a review by Consumer Reports calling Tesla’s Model S the best car it ever tested.

Tesla faces enormous challenges in penetrating an automotive market that has been dominated for a century by internal combustion engines. Not only must it build cars that customers want to drive (and, ultimately, produce …