Law Commons^™

Facebook, Welfare, And Natural Monopoly: A Quantitative Analysis Of Antitrust Remedies, Felix B. Chang, Seth Benzell

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

This Article advances a novel theoretical model for assessing policy interventions against Facebook. As prosecutors barrel forward against digital platforms, soon it will fall upon courts and, eventually, regulators to devise remedies. We argue that any sensible solution must include quantification of the welfare effects on the platform’s various constituents. Our model prioritizes the effects upon total societal welfare—or, in economists’ terms, social welfare. Applied to Facebook, the model calculates social welfare as the sum of four components: (i) consumer welfare; (ii) advertising profits; (iii) tax revenues; and (iv) the value of a large user base.

Drawing on surveys of …

Racially Collusive Boycotts: African American Purchasing Power In The Wigs And Hair Extensions Market, Felix B. Chang, Janelle Thompson, Anisha Rakhra

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

This Essay analyzes expressive boycotts in the market for wigs and hair extensions, where consumers are primarily African Americans and producers are almost uniformly Korean Americans. This type of ethnically segmented and misaligned (“ESM”) market raises unique doctrinal and theoretical questions. Under antitrust caselaw, the treatment of a campaign to divert business from Korean American–owned to African American–owned hair stores is uncertain because of the campaign’s mixed social and economic motives. Delving into the theoretical implications of this ESM market can help steer the doctrine appropriately. Along the way, such an exercise illuminates the nuances of racial solidarity and market …

Mining The Harvard Caselaw Access Project, Felix B. Chang, Erin Mccabe, James Lee

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

This Essay illustrates how machine learning can disrupt legal scholarship through the algorithmic extraction and analysis of big data. Specifically, we utilize data from Harvard Law School’s Caselaw Access Project to model how courts tackle two thorny question in antitrust: the measure of market power and the balance between antitrust and regulation.

Ethnically Segmented Markets, Felix B. Chang

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Races often collide in segmented markets where buyers belong to one ethnic group while sellers belong to another. This Article examines one such market: the retail of wigs and hair extensions for African Americans, a multi-billion-dollar market controlled by Korean Americans. Although previous scholarship attributed the success of Korean American ventures to rotating credit and social capital, this Article ascribes their dominance in wigs and extensions to collusion and exclusion, tactics scrutinized under antitrust.

This Article is the first to synthesize the disparate treatment of ethnically segmented markets in law, sociology, and economics into a comprehensive framework. Its primary contribution …

Second-Generation Monopolization: Parallel Exclusion In Derivatives Markets, Felix B. Chang

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

The reluctance of antitrust to condemn parallel exclusion permits oligopolies to be entrenched. This is because parallel exclusion—multiple-firm conduct that inhibits market entrants—cannot satisfy the current strictures of monopolization, which is understood to prohibit single-firm conduct. Yet this is an outdated way of conceptualizing monopolization. An expansion of monopolization—to cover parallel, non-collusive acts by an oligopoly—is due.

To push the law toward recognizing parallel exclusion, this Article examines concentration in the markets for financial derivatives, which are perennially dominated by the same big banks. Even after losses under first-generation antitrust claims, the dominant derivatives dealers have found ways to retain …

Financial Market Bottlenecks And The 'Openness' Mandate, Felix B. Chang

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Financial market infrastructures (“FMIs”), which facilitate the execution of financial transactions, exhibit such strong economies of scale that they are natural monopolies. In each market, production is controlled by a few dominant players. Federal courts have traditionally checked the abuses of natural monopolies under the Sherman Act. Yet recent Supreme Court decisions have reined in the role of antitrust in regulated industries, where administrative bodies set and enforce standards. To this effect, financial regulations require certain FMIs to grant open, nondiscriminatory access to users.

This Article argues that weak “openness” regulations must be buttressed by their antitrust counterpart — specifically, …