Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Law
Price-Fixing: Hefty Penalties On Big-Biz Cartels Will Provide Level Playing Field To Small Businesses, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
Price-Fixing: Hefty Penalties On Big-Biz Cartels Will Provide Level Playing Field To Small Businesses, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
Cartels are illegal in India, as they are almost everywhere. They are subject to heavy fines. Why, then, do businesses frequently try to fix prices? Because doing so usually is profitable. On average cartels raise prices by more than 20%, and probably face less than a 25% chance of being caught and convicted. Based upon a sample of 75 international cartels, the authors calculate that the expected profits from price fixing almost always exceed the penalties. No wonder businesses often try to fix prices.
Introduction: Benefits Of Private Enforcement: Empirical Background, Robert H. Lande
Introduction: Benefits Of Private Enforcement: Empirical Background, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
This short piece takes a first step toward providing the empirical bases for an assessment of the benefits of private enforcement. It presents evidence showing that private enforcement of the antitrust laws is serving its intended purposes and is in the public interest. Private enforcement helps compensate victimized consumers, and it also helps deter anticompetitive conduct. This piece demonstrates this by briefly summarizing a more detailed analysis of forty of the largest recent successful private antitrust cases.
To analyze these cases' compensation effects this presents, inter alia, the amount of money each action recovered, what proportion of the money was …