Law Commons^™

Collaborative Departmentalism, Matthew Steilen

Journal Articles

This article examines the effect of departmentalism on presidential compliance with constitutional law. Most commentators agree that departmentalism weakens the influence of courts in the determination of constitutional meaning and the control of non-judicial actors. The article takes a different view. It defines “moderate departmentalism” as the authority of the President to refuse to adopt a constitutional interpretation announced by the Supreme Court. Drawing on ideas developed in the literature on “new governance” and administrative law, it then argues that moderate departmentalism increases the capacity of the federal courts to control presidential conduct.

Maximum Feasible Participation Of The Poor: New Governance, New Accountability, And A 21st Century War On The Sources Of Poverty, Tara J. Melish

Journal Articles

In 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson called for a Nationwide War on the Sources of Poverty to “strike away the barriers to full participation” in our society. Central to that war was an understanding that given poverty’s complex and multi-layered causes, identifying, implementing, and monitoring solutions to it would require the “maximum feasible participation” of affected communities. Equally central, however, was an understanding that such decentralized problem-solving could not be fully effective without national-level orchestration and support. As such, an Office of Economic Opportunity was established – situated in the Executive Office of the President itself – to support, through …

Private Import Safety Regulation And Transnational New Governance, Errol E. Meidinger

Contributions to Books

Published as Chapter 12 in Import Safety: Regulatory Governance in the Global Economy, Cary Coglianese, Adam M. Finkel & David Zaring, eds.

This paper examines the role of ‘private’ (non-governmental) regulatory programs in assuring the safety of imported products. Focusing particularly on food safety it argues that private regulatory institutions have great capacity to control safety hazards and to implement dynamic systems for detecting and correcting nascent risks. However, to establish the accountability and legitimacy relationships necessary for long-term effectiveness, private safety regulatory programs must devise new ways of incorporating and responding to the interests of developing country producers, laborers, …

Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation: How Could It Be Democratic?, Errol E. Meidinger

Journal Articles

This paper explores the possibility that a developing form of regulatory governance is also sketching out a new form of anticipatory regulatory democracy. 'Competitive supra-governmental regulation' is largely driven by non-state actors and is therefore commonly viewed as suffering a democracy deficit. However, because it stresses broad participation, intensive deliberative procedures, responsiveness to state law and widely accepted norms, and competition among regulatory programs to achieve effective implementation and widespread public acceptance, this form of regulation appears to stand up relatively well under generally understood criteria for democratic governance. Nonetheless, a more satisfactory evaluation will require a much better understanding …