Law Commons^™

It's All Interpretation, All The Way Down, Or, The Reason We Call It The “Practice” Of Law: With Observations From Two Different Legal Systems, John R. Prince Iii

John R. Prince III

This article explores one aspect of the philosophy of law; not what it means to refer to “the law” but what it means to discuss the “practice of law.” That practice is identified as a discursive practice, one where a text is applied to a particular factual context, and thus an interpretive practice. However, the type of interpretation involved in the practice of law is not one of translating one verbal formulation of a rule into another verbal formulation, but the act of bridging the gap between the rule and what that rule means here, and now, in a particular …

The Fixation Thesis: The Role Of Historical Fact In Original Meaning, Lawrence B. Solum

Lawrence B. Solum

The central debate in contemporary constitutional theory is the clash between originalists and living constitutionalists. Originalism is the view that the original meaning of the constitutional text should constrain or bind constitutional practice—paradigmatically, the decision of constitutional cases by the United States Supreme Court. Living constitutionalists contend that the content of constitutional law should evolve over time in response to changing values and circumstances. One of the central questions in this debate is over the question whether the meaning of the constitutional text is fixed or changeable. This essay makes the case for the Fixation Thesis—the claim that the linguistic …

Efficient Contextualism, Juliet P. Kostritsky, Peter M. Gerhart

Juliet P Kostritsky

This Article recommends an economic methodology of contract interpretation that enables the court to maximize the benefits of exchange for the parties and thereby enhance the institution of contracting. We recommend a methodology that asks the parties to identify the determinants of a surplus maximizing interpretation so that the court can determine whether the determinants raise issues that need to be tried. We thus avoid the false choice between textualist and contextualist methodologies, while allowing the parties and the court to avoid costly litigation. For textualist courts, our methodology helps the judge determine when the terms the parties used are …

Deciding Who Decides: Searching For A Deference Standard When Agencies Preempt State Law, John R. Ablan

John R Ablan

When a federal agency determines that the statute that it administers or regulations it has promulgated preempt state law, how much deference must a federal court give to that determination? In Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide what standard of deference courts should apply when an agency makes a preemption determination pursuant to a specific congressional delegation to do so. Under this circumstance, this Article counsels against applying any single deference standard to an agency’s entire determination. Instead, it observes that preemption determinations are a complex inquiry involving questions of federal law, state law, and …

Crushing Animals And Crashing Funerals: The Semiotics Of Free Expression, Harold Anthony Lloyd

Harold Anthony Lloyd

This article addresses judicial choices and semantic errors involved in United States v. Stevens, 130 S.Ct. 1577 (2010) (refusing to read “killing” and “wounding” to include cruelty and thus striking down a federal statute outlawing videos of animal cruelty), and Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011) (finding a First Amendment right to picket military funerals and to verbally attack parents of dead soldiers as part of purportedly-public expression). This article maintains that a better understanding of semiotics (the theory of signs) exposes the flaws in both decisions and bolsters the arguments of the lone dissenter in both cases, Justice …

Construing Laws Governing International And U.S. Domestic Contracts For The Sale Of Goods: A Comparative Evaluation Of The Cisg And Ucc Rules Of Interpretation, Sarah H. Jenkins

Sarah H Jenkins

CONSTRUING LAWS GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. DOMESTIC CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS: A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THE CISG AND UCC RULES OF INTERPRETATION ABSTRACT Some twenty-four years after the effective date of UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and seventy-eight contracting states, U.S. domestic lawyers, judges, academics, and law students remain challenged by the provisions and policies of the Convention. Early on, the practicing bar in the United States ignored or was oblivious to the applicability of the Convention. Some encouraged domestic clients to opt-out of the Convention’s coverage, choosing instead the security of the …

A Consequentialist Approach To Interpretation, Probabilistic Mechanisms, And Risk: Let’S Not Limit Courts’ Techniques Of Common Law Adjudication; Rethinking Judicial Intervention From Contracts To The Chrysler Bankruptcy, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

Employing an economics-based consequentialist approach to contract interpretation (focusing on the prospective effect and the factors that might justify intervention) this Article attempts to identify the precise parameters of an optimal framework for contract interpretation. Such a framework would seek to maximize gains from trade. The issue in such cases is always, given the words the parties used, what is the best (surplus maximizing) interpretation of the bargain. Courts can achieve that interpretation by, in part, minimizing the interpretive risk that parties face when they draft an express contract but fail to completely resolve all possible issues. This Article uses …

Interpretation And Institutional Choice At The Wto, Joel P. Trachtman

Joel P Trachtman

This article develops a new framework of comparative institutional analysis for assessing the implications of judicial interpretation in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The analytical framework offers an improved means to describe and assess the consequences of choices made in treaty drafting and interpretation in terms of social welfare and participation in social decision-making. The analysis builds from specific examples from WTO case law. Our framework approaches treaty drafting and judicial interpretive choices through a comparative institutional lens — that is, in comparison with the implications of alternative drafting and interpretive choices for social welfare and participation in social decision-making …

Judicial Discretion In Constitutional Cases, Todd E. Pettys

Todd E. Pettys

A damaging dichotomy is hindering the nation’s ability to talk intelligently and constructively about the constitutional work of the courts. The “legitimacy dichotomy” holds that, when adjudicating constitutional disputes, judges either obey the sovereign people’s determinate constitutional instructions or illegitimately trump the sovereign people’s value judgments with their own. The legitimacy dichotomy leaves little or no room for the possibility that an array of conflicting interpretations of the Constitution might be reasonably available to a judge; it leaves little or no room, in other words, for judicial discretion. This article begins by examining the legitimacy dichotomy from three different vantage …

Common Law Constitutional Interpretation: A Critique, Brannon P. Denning

Brannon P. Denning

This is a review of David Strauss, The Living Constitution (2010). In it, I critique his claim that common law constitutional interpretation is a superior alternative to originalism.

A Consequential Approach To Interpretation And Interpretive Risk: Rethinking Judicial Intervention From Contracts To The Chrysler Bankruptcy, J. P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

Abstract When contracts remain ambiguous or incomplete, courts and scholars must confront the inevitable question of when intervention in private contracts is justified. To deal with the unresolution or residual uncertainty, the Austrian economists and the new textualists suggest that any intervention would be a fool’s errand. Their position amounts to an unvarying posture that any party asking for an additional term or a broad interpretation will always lose. Recognizing that there is an interpretive risk in all contracts, the court should adopt an interpretive methodology that parties would be willing to adopt and that would enhance the willingness of …

Interpretive Risk And Contract Interpretation: A Suggested Approach For Maximizing Value, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

• The Article offers a theory of judicial intervention and interpretation in Contracts. It posits that the principal objective of courts interpreting, supplementing, or overriding terms is to ask whether such intervention can serve the broad objective of maximizing gains from trade while minimizing transaction costs and the costs of opportunism, collectively, an interpretive risk. It offers an economic rationale for a broad approach to interpretation and explores several examples from Contract law where courts depart from the parties’ textual choices and follow the theory suggested in this Article. These examples directly challenge the theory of the new formalists.

Interpretive Risk And Contract Interpretation: A Suggested Approach For Maximizing Value, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

• The Article offers a theory of judicial intervention and interpretation in Contracts. It posits that the principal objective of courts interpreting, supplementing, or overriding terms is to ask whether such intervention can serve the broad objective of maximizing gains from trade while minimizing transaction costs and the costs of opportunism, collectively, an interpretive risk. It offers an economic rationale for a broad approach to interpretation and explores several examples from Contract law where courts depart from the parties’ textual choices and follow the theory suggested in this Article. These examples directly challenge the theory of the new formalists.

Constructing The Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution Of Federalist 10, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This paper is part of larger symposium convened for the 2010 AALS annual meeting. In it I adapt some of my earlier constitutional theoretical work to engage the topic of that symposium: the so-called “interpretation/construction distinction”. I make two related criticisms of the distinction: (1) it relies on a flawed conception of linguistic meaning, and (2) while these flaws may be harmless in the “easy” cases of interpretation, they are much more problematic in the difficult cases of most concern. Thus, I doubt the ultimate utility of the distinction as part of a “true and correct” model of constitutional theory. …

A Consequential Approach To Interpretation And Interpretive Risk: Rethinking Judicial Intervention From Contracts To The Chrysler Bankruptcy, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

Abstract When contracts remain ambiguous or incomplete, courts and scholars must confront the inevitable question of when intervention in private contracts is justified. To deal with the unresolution or residual uncertainty, the Austrian economists and the new textualists suggest that any intervention would be a fool’s errand. Their position amounts to an unvarying posture that any party asking for an additional term or a broad interpretation will always lose. Recognizing that there is an interpretive risk in all contracts, the court should adopt an interpretive methodology that parties would be willing to adopt and that would enhance the willingness of …

The Myth Of The Written Constitution, Todd E. Pettys

Todd E. Pettys

Many Americans have long subscribed to what this Article calls the myth of the written constitution—the claim that the nation’s Constitution consists entirely of those texts that the sovereign American people have formally ratified, and the claim that the will of the American people, as expressed in those ratified texts, determines the way in which properly behaving judges resolve constitutional disputes. Drawing on two different meanings of the term myth, this Article contends that neither of those claims is literally true, but that Americans’ attachment to those claims serves at least three crucial functions. Subscribing to the myth helps to …

Just Semantics: The Lost Readings Of The Ada, Jill C. Anderson

Jill C. Anderson

Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the ADA

Jill C. Anderson

INTRODUCTION

I. THE NARROWED DISABILITY DEFINITION

II. DE DICTO-DE RE AMBIGUITY

III. HOW THE COURTS MISS AMBIGUITY

IV. RESOLVING AMBIGUITY

V. APPLICATIONS IN CASE LAW

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM

CONCLUSION

Abstract

Disability rights advocates and commentators agree that the ADA has veered far off course from its mandate of protecting people with disabilities---actual or perceived---from discrimination. They likewise agree that the fault lies in the language of the statute itself and in the courts’ “literalist” reading of its definition of disability. As a result, many disability rights advocates have …

Ex Aequo Et Bono: De-Mystifying An Ancient Concept, Leon E. Trakman

Leon E Trakman Dean

The ancient concept, ex aequo et bono, holds that adjudicators should decide disputes according to that which is “fair,” and in “good conscience”. Despite its long history in international adjudication and even though it is enshrined in the Charter of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the concept of ex aequo et bono is often avoided on grounds that it operates outside of law, or is deemed to be contrary to law. This article argues that the concept has a valuable and emerging significance in modern law. It is ideally suited to resolving disputes between parties who are engaged in …

Canons, The Plenary Power Doctrine And Immigration Law, Brian G. Slocum

Brian G. Slocum

There is a fundamental dichotomy in immigration law. On one hand, courts have consistently maintained that Congress has “plenary power” over immigration and reject most constitutional challenges on that basis. On the other hand, courts frequently use canons of statutory construction in an aggressive fashion to help interpret immigration statutes in favor of aliens. Immigration scholars have almost exclusively focused on the plenary power doctrine. They have either ignored the important role that canons have played in immigration law or have viewed canons as serving only a temporary and marginally legitimate role as substitutes for the lack of constitutional rights …

Plain Meaning Vs. Broad Interpretation: How The Risk Of Opportunism Defeats A Unitary Default Rule For Interpretation, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for Interpretation Juliet P. Kostritsky, Case Western Reserve Abstract This essay argues that it is the wrong to think that courts must make a dichotomous choice always to prefer extrinsic evidence or always to exclude it. Sometimes the appropriate interpretive methodology should explicitly forego extrinsic evidence while at other times it should embrace extrinsic evidence. The choice between the two methodologies should depend upon an assessment in each case about which interpretive methodology is most likely to (1) curb opportunistic behavior; and (2) and implement …

Contra Proferentem: The Allure Of Ambiguous Boilerplate, Michelle Boardman

Michelle Boardman

No abstract provided.

Presidential Signing Statements: How To Find Them, How To Use Them, And What They Might, Steve Sheppard

Steve Sheppard

Lawyers should be cautious when seeking guidance in statutory interpretation from presidential signing statements. Reliance on signing statements as a source of statutory interpretation is controversial, as deference to the president’s interpretation, rather than interpretations of the legislature or judiciary, can lead to unlimited executive power. Signing statements can be retrieved from government resources or private vendors, and they are useful for advising clients how to interact with government agencies. In effect, signing statements act as orders from the president, which agencies under the executive chain of command follow.

Signing statements are also useful as sources of statutory interpretation when …

The Constitution And The Public Trust, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

The American Founders believed that public officials were bound by fiduciary obligations, and they wrote that view into the Constitution. This article copiously documents their position.

Running Backs, Wolves, And Other Fatalities: How Manipulations Of Coherence In Legal Opinions Marginalize Violent Death, Jonathan Yovel

Jonathan Yovel

By examining legal cases that involve violent death and its marginalization by the courts, this essay looks into the relations between narrative coherence and narrative absurd in judicial opinions. Coherence, rather than a static, unequivocal characteristic of legal narratives, is studied here as a highly manipulable narrative and rhetorical performance. Giving a performative twist to reader-response approaches I do not really ask what is the meaning of this text (as construed by its reading)? but rather, working from the position of the text's discursive community, what does this text do? The reading of these cases explores how judicial narration and …