Law Commons^™

Wasting The Corporate Waste Doctrine: Why Waste Claims Are Obsolete In Delaware Corporate Law And Why The Waste Doctrine Is The Wrong Solution To The Problem Of Executive Compensation, Kris S. Swift

Kris S. Swift

Abstract

Kristen S. Swift

This Note makes several points, drawn from Delaware litigation history, on the futility of pleading corporate waste in Delaware. At inception, the waste doctrine was a tool for shareholder protection and empowerment; however, as calculated business risk became encouraged and later formally protected by the business judgment rule, the waste doctrine evolved to protect officers and boards and now sets a nearly impossible benchmark for misconduct that would allow shareholders to recover on a waste claim. The waste doctrine is inextricably tied to how business risk-taking is perceived by Delaware courts and shifting attitudes toward risk …

Damning Dictum: The Default Duty Debate In Delaware, Mohsen Manesh

Mohsen Manesh

Bizarrely, today even the most sophisticated business lawyer cannot answer a seemingly simple question: whether, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, the manager of a Delaware limited liability company (LLC) owes traditional fiduciary duties to its members as a default matter? This was not always the case. Until recently, this question was settled—settled at least in the Delaware Court of Chancery. But in November 2012, the Delaware Supreme Court cast doubt on a long line of chancery court precedent in Gatz Properties v. Auriga Capital. Given the broad freedom of contract available under LLC law, it …

How To Sufficiently Consider Efficiency, Competition, And Capital Formation In The Wake Of Business Roundtable, Ian D. Ghrist

Ian D. Ghrist

This article applies ideas from the Law and Economics movement to the D.C. Circuit's 2011 decision in Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission. The article lays out a framework for cost-benefit analysis that, if followed, should increase new rules' chances of surviving the heightened arbitrary and capricious review standard imposed by the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996.

The Dodd-Frank Act comprises the broadest financial reforms since the 1930s. The Act, however, makes surprisingly few important decisions and instead, almost exclusively defers to agency rulemaking or the creation of a new organization. The Act mandates the promulgation of …

Delaware’S Relevance In Chapter 22: Who Is “Courting Failure” Now?, Ruth S. Lee

Ruth S Lee

This study presents surprising new statistical evidence that contributes to the current “over-heated” academic debate about the Delaware courts’ role in Chapter 11 failure. In 2001, Professor LoPucki published an influential article suggesting that when large corporations file for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, they fail at a dramatically higher rate in Delaware courts than in other jurisdictions. He attributed this to corruption. His article enraged many academics and practitioners, and ignited many articles in the past two decades. This study presents startling evidence that while Chapter 11s filed in Delaware courts did have much higher failure rates from 1991-1996, after …

The Availability Of Takeover Defenses And Deal Protection Devices For Anglo-American Target Companies, Albert "Chip" Saulsbury Iv

Albert "Chip" Saulsbury IV

On July 21, 2011 the U.K.’s Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the “Panel”) released amendments to the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the “Takeover Code”). These amendments, which take effect on September 19, 2011, will have a significant impact on the manner in which companies in the U.K. engage in mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) and will amplify the differences between British and American deal activity. Because of these amendments to the Takeover Code within the last month, the following Article, The Availability of Takeover Defenses and Deal Protection Devices for Anglo-American Target Companies, is especially timely and will provide …

Defending Against Shareholder Proxy Access: Delaware's Future Reviewing Company Defenses In The Era Of Dodd-Frank, J.W. Verret

John W Verret

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 has ensured that a shareholder’s ability to place nominees to the board onto the corporate ballot, an objective long advocated by the institutional investor community, will soon be implemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Advocates of proxy access urge that it will help hold boards of directors accountable to their owners. Critics argue that it will give conflicted shareholders, like unions and state pensions, power they will use to facilitate their political objectives at the expense of ordinary shareholders. The shareholder primacy and director primacy theories of corporate …

Hedge Funds’ Empty Voting In Mergers And Acquisitions: A Fiduciary Duties Perspective, Andrea Zanoni

Andrea Zanoni

Hedge funds have become lately active also in the market for corporate control. Their active involvement has been propelled by a tactic allowing them to decouple voting rights from economic ownership and labelled in the literature as “encumbered shares” or “empty voting”.

The aim of this Article is twofold. On the one hand, I address the impact of hedge funds’ activism on the financial markets and on the portfolio companies. In general terms, hedge funds’ activism should be seen as a neutral element. After a cost-benefit analysis, I show that the costs implied by hedge funds’ activism are at least …

The Love Song Of The Delaware Court Of Chancery, David K. Kessler

David K Kessler

Though corporate law can often seem dry and uninteresting, it is full of wonderful stories, complex characters, and powerful language. As such, the field of corporate law lends itself to the medium that has long best captured those elements: poetry. The attached document is an adaptation of T.S. Eliot’s The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock to the theme of corporate law. It has been enthusiastically received on the Harvard campus by former Law School Dean (and Corporations guru) Robert Clark and the Vice-Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery, Leo Strine. I understand that this submission is far more …

The Fetishization Of Independence, Usha Rodrigues

Usha Rodrigues

According to conventional wisdom, a supermajority independent board of directors is the ideal corporate governance structure. Debate nevertheless continues: empirical evidence suggests that independent boards do not improve firm performance. Independence proponents respond that past studies reflect a flawed definition of independence. Remarkably, neither side in the independence debate has looked to Delaware, the preeminent state source for corporate law. Comparing Delaware’s notions of independence with those of Sarbanes-Oxley and its attendant reforms reveals two fundamentally different conceptions of independence. Sarbanes-Oxley equates independence with outsider status: an independent director is one who lacks financial ties to the corporation and is …

The Sec And The Failure Of Federal Takeover Law, Steven Davidoff

Steven Davidoff Solomon

In this Article, I argue that the current federal takeover law is a failure. I do this by first exploding the commonly accepted academic myth of the federal government as an active regulator of takeovers. Rather, since the twilight of the 1980s, the SEC has abandoned its earlier presence as the nation's primary takeover regulator. The consequence of this abstention is that the federal takeover code has become obsolete. It oftentimes regulates incongruously, does not regulate important areas, or regulates in a manner inconsistent with the welfare of its relevant parties. Moreover, in the SEC absence the Delaware courts have …