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Re-Envisioning The Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders And Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, Sang Yop Kang
Re-Envisioning The Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders And Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
According to conventional corporate governance scholarship, controlling shareholder regimes exist in jurisdictions where minority shareholders are not well protected by controlling shareholders’ expropriation. However, Professor Ronald Gilson raises a critical point against the conventional view; if laws are inefficient and do not protect investors, as the conventional view explains, why do we observe any minority shareholders at all in such “bad-law” countries? One possible reason is that in response to controlling shareholders’ expropriation, minority shareholders discount severely shares that corporations issue. Then, a related question is: if it is true, why do some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries have many …
Korea’S Financial Regulatory Reforms Responding To The Global Financial Crisis Of 2008: Assessments And Future Prospects, Dong Won Ko
Dong Won Ko
Since the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC), we have seen many reforms, as each country has endeavored to reform its financial regulatory system, including banking and financial regulation. The reforms attempted to respond to the crisis in line with the new global regulatory framework initiated by G-20s and international financial organizations. The Korean Government has also proposed new legislation and financial reforms, in response to the GFC, including reinforcement of protection for financial consumers and strengthening the corporate governance in financial institutions. This article seeks to review the regulatory reform measures, and to analyze whether such measures follow those global …
Korea’S Financial Regulatory Reforms Responding To The Global Financial Crisis Of 2008: Assessments And Future Prospects, Dong Won Ko
Dong Won Ko
Since the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC), we have seen many reforms, as each country has endeavored to reform its financial regulatory system, including banking and financial regulation. The reforms attempted to respond to the crisis in line with the new global regulatory framework initiated by G-20s and international financial organizations. The Korean Government has also proposed new legislation and financial reforms, in response to the GFC, including reinforcement of protection for financial consumers and strengthening the corporate governance in financial institutions. This article seeks to review the regulatory reform measures, and to analyze whether such measures follow those global …
Transplanting A Poison Pill To Controlling Shareholder Regimes: Why It Is So Difficult, Sang Yop Kang
Transplanting A Poison Pill To Controlling Shareholder Regimes: Why It Is So Difficult, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
Recently, the great tide of globalization has caused M&A activities to spill over into controlling shareholder regimes (economies dominated by controlling shareholders). Due to a seismic change arising from an unprecedented takeover wave, transplanting the Delaware pill has been heavily discussed in controlling shareholder regimes. This Article explores how legal and socio-economic conditions of the United States (State of Delaware) and controlling shareholder regimes are different and why transplanting the Delaware pill could create unintended results in controlling shareholder regimes. First, the legitimacy of the Delaware pill is supported by corporate governance institutions, such as a relatively functional board, a …
Do Social Ties Matter In Corporate Governance: The Missing Factor In Chinese Corporate Governance Reform, Yu-Hsin Lin
Do Social Ties Matter In Corporate Governance: The Missing Factor In Chinese Corporate Governance Reform, Yu-Hsin Lin
Yu-Hsin Lin
In the past decade, Asian countries have adopted various corporate governance measures with the hope that good law will facilitate capital market development. One of the measures adopted by Asian countries to revamp corporate boards is to enhance board independence by introducing the institution of the independent director. Empirical studies have shown that social ties could compromise independent directors’ monitoring capacity and, thus, do matter in corporate governance. Using theoretical and empirical studies, this article analyzes the effects that independent directors' social ties to corporate insiders can have on director efficacy and discusses how the United States, where the institution …