Law Commons^™

Are Investors’ Gains And Losses From Securities Fraud Equal Over Time?, Alicia J. Davis

Alicia Davis

Leading securities regulation scholars argue that compensating securities fraud victims is inefficient because diversified investors that trade frequently (generally, institutional investors) are as likely to gain from trading in fraud-tainted stocks as they are to suffer harm from doing so. In other words, institutional investors have no expected net losses from fraud over the long term and are effectively hedged against fraud risk. Moreover, individual investors can protect themselves from fraud, as well, by investing through diversified institutional intermediaries. In this Article, I demonstrate, using both probability theory and observational and computer-simulated trading data, that the argument of the compensation …

The Implications Of Janus On The Liability Of Issuers In Jurisdictions Rejecting Collective Scienter, Neva B. Jeffries

Neva B Jeffries

This article addresses the increasing limitations placed on both the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and private litigants to pursue claims of fraud against wrongdoers under the federal securities laws, specifically for claims of misrepresentation under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC’s Rule 10b-5. The most recent and glaring example of this curtailment occurred in 2011 with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders. For a defendant to be liable for a misrepresentation, Rule 10b-5(b) requires that the defendant be the “maker” of the false statement. …

An Empirical Examination Of Scienter Pleading In Rule 10b-5 Claims Against External Auditors, Robert A. Prentice

Robert A. Prentice

Pleading requirements are the key to access to the courthouse. Nowhere is this more true than with Rule 10b-5 class action securities fraud claims where provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 impose special pleading burdens upon plaintiffs regarding the scienter element and bar them from discovery when defendants file a motion to dismiss. This article begins with a doctrinal history of the scienter element of a Rule 10b-5 claim which indicates that many key legal questions remain unsettled and that application of legal rules to specific factual allegations regarding a particular type of defendant—external auditors—is extraordinarily …

Extraterritoriality As Standing: A Standing Theory Of The Extraterritorial Application Of The Securities Laws, Erez Reuveni

Erez Reuveni

This Article contends that the current treatment of the extraterritorial scope of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act as a question of subject matter jurisdiction is wrong. Although the Act is silent as to its extraterritorial application, for over forty years courts have analyzed the Act’s extraterritorial scope as a question of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the so-called “conduct” and “effects” tests. Because courts apply these tests in an ad hoc, case-by-case manner, they are inherently unpredictable and unnecessarily complicated. This state of affairs has become particularly troublesome in recent years, as so-called “foreign-cubed” securities fraud lawsuits - lawsuits filed …

• The Credit Crisis And Subprime Litigation: How Fraud Without Motive ‘Makes Little Economic Sense’, Peter Hamner

Peter Hamner

The recent collapse of the financial markets spurred numerous lawsuits seeking a faulty party. Many plaintiffs argue that market participants committed securities fraud. They claim that deficient subprime loans caused the financial crisis. These risky loans were allegedly originated by banks to be sold off to third parties. The subprime loans were securitized and spread throughout the financial markets. The risk these loans presented was allegedly not disclosed to the buyers of the loans and securities on the loans. As these deficient loans and securities began to default the financial markets came to a halt. This article argues that securities …

Cooperation With Securities Fraud, Ronald J. Colombo

Ronald J Colombo

Secondary actors, such as lawyers, accountants, and bankers, are oftentimes critical players in securities fraud. The important question of their liability to private plaintiffs has been, and remains, one of considerable confusion. In Stoneridge Inv. Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court could have, but failed to, dispel some of this confusion.

Contrary to the common understanding, Stoneridge did not foreclose liability on the part of secondary actors who manage to remain anonymous participants in securities fraud. Read carefully, Stoneridge instead held that proximity to fraud should drive the liability determination.

Although "proximity" is itself an indefinite concept, …

Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: A Proposal For Restructuring The Relationship Between Public And Private Enforcement Of Rule 10b-5, Amanda M. Rose

Amanda M Rose

Forthcoming in Columbia Law Review, Vol. 108, No. 6 (Oct. 2008)

For years, commentators have debated how to reform the controversial Rule 10b-5 class action, without pausing to ask whether the game is worth the candle. Is private enforcement of Rule 10b-5 worth preserving, or might we be better off with exclusive public enforcement? This fundamental and neglected question demands attention today more than ever. An academic consensus has now emerged that private enforcement of Rule 10b-5 cannot be defended on compensatory grounds, at least in its most common form (a fraud-on-the-market class action brought against a non-trading issuer). That …

“Stoneridge And Scheme Liability Under Rule 10b-5: The Case For Private Enforcement.”, Erica L. Finkelson

Erica L Finkelson

This note examines the issue of scheme liability in securities fraud, which was heard on October 9, 2007 before the Supreme Court in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLS, (Stoneridge) v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and Motorola, Inc. Stoneridge represents shareholders who purchased stock in the cable company Charter Communications, Inc. (Charter). Stoneridge sued Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola for fraud because these companies knowingly agreed to let Charter overpay them for cable boxes and returned those funds to Charter as advertising payments so that Charter could inflate its revenue, misleading investors as to Charter’s book value. This note argues that Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola’s purposeful and …

The Investor Compensation Fund, Alicia J. Davis

Alicia Davis

The prevailing view among securities regulation scholars is that compensating victims of secondary market securities fraud is inefficient. As the theory goes, diversified investors are as likely to be on the gaining side of a transaction tainted by fraud as the losing side. Therefore, such investors should have no expected net losses from fraud because their expected losses will be matched by expected gains. This Article argues that this view is flawed; even diversified investors can suffer substantial losses from fraud, presenting a compelling case for compensation.

The interest in compensation, however, should be advanced by better means than are …