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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
Unification Of Standards In Discrimination Law: The Conundrum Of Causation And Reasonable Accommodation Under The Ada, Cheryl L. Anderson
Unification Of Standards In Discrimination Law: The Conundrum Of Causation And Reasonable Accommodation Under The Ada, Cheryl L. Anderson
Cheryl L Anderson
Causation continues to be one of the most confounding issues in antidiscrimination law. Despite having rejected the position over two decades ago in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., recently asserted that the “ordinary default rule” in disparate treatment claims requires a plaintiff to prove but-for causation when a statute prohibits discrimination “because of” a protected characteristic. Gross threw disparate treatment law into disarray. Title VII has been statutorily modified to require only proof of motivating factor causation before the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show it would have made …
Unification Of Standards In Discrimination Law: The Conundrum Of Causation And Reasonable Accommodation Under The Ada Unification Of Standards In Discrimination Law: The Conundrum Of Causation And Reasonable Accommodation Under The Ada Unification Of Standards In Discrimination Law: The Conundrum Of Causation And Reasonable Accommodation Under The Ada, Cheryl L. Anderson
Cheryl L Anderson
Causation continues to be one of the most confounding issues in antidiscrimination law. Despite having rejected the position over two decades ago in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., recently asserted that the “ordinary default rule” in disparate treatment claims requires a plaintiff to prove but-for causation when a statute prohibits discrimination “because of” a protected characteristic. Gross threw disparate treatment law into disarray. Title VII has been statutorily modified to require only proof of motivating factor causation before the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show it would have made …
Ideological Dissonance, Disability Backlash, And The Ada Amendments Act, Cheryl L. Anderson
Ideological Dissonance, Disability Backlash, And The Ada Amendments Act, Cheryl L. Anderson
Cheryl L Anderson
The ADA Amendments Act disappointed many disability advocates who argued “disability” should be determined solely upon a showing that an individual has a physical or mental impairment. This article argues that adopting an open-ended protected class would have exacerbated rather than eliminated judicial backlash against the ADA. The judiciary adopted an excessively narrow protected class to resolve the ideological dissonance between judges' belief that the right of reasonable accommodation is a special right and their desire to avoid granting “windfall protection” where there has been no systemic disadvantage. An open-ended protected class would lead courts to narrow the right of …
Comparative Evidence Or Common Experience: When Does “Substantial Limitation” Require Substantial Proof Under The Americans With Disabilities Act?, Cheryl L. Anderson
Comparative Evidence Or Common Experience: When Does “Substantial Limitation” Require Substantial Proof Under The Americans With Disabilities Act?, Cheryl L. Anderson
Cheryl L Anderson
This article examines the “average person” comparison posited by the Americans with Disabilities Act’s definition of “disability.” The first part of the article looks at the judicial treatment of that comparison. Courts use the standard in some cases to require plaintiffs to present specific evidence comparing the extent of their limitations to the abilities of the so-called average person in the general population, as set out in the EEOC regulations. Courts also use the standard to de-individualize the factual evaluation of “substantially limits, frequently finding insufficient deviation from the average person’s abilities as a matter of law. A doctrinal creep …