Law Commons^™

Tortifying Employment Discrimination, Charles A. Sullivan

Charles A. Sullivan

Although Title VII is often described as a “statutory tort,” that label has, until recently, been mostly metaphorical. In Staub v. Proctor Hospital Corp., however, the Supreme Court took an important first step in incorporating concepts from tort law into the antidiscrimination statutes. Although Staub received some attention as a “cat’s paw” (or subordinate bias) liability decision, it will have broader significance for two reasons.

First, the Court explicitly adopted tort law’s definition of “intent” for statutory discrimination cases, thus raising a threshold question of the what it means to “intend to discriminate.” This Article suggests that, rather than widening …

The Phoenix From The Ash: Proving Discrimination By Comparators, Charles A. Sullivan

Charles A. Sullivan

Hidden beneath judicial and scholarly obsession with formal proof structures for individual disparate treatment cases is a simpler, more direct method of establishing discrimination. Taking the “disparate treatment” label seriously, I argue that “comparator” proof requires merely that the plaintiff identify a similarly situated person of another race or the opposite sex who was treated more favorably than plaintiff. Such proof is increasingly driving litigation in the lower courts, which suggests that comparators should be moved to center stage in the antidiscrimination project However, like other efforts, the comparator approach risks falling victim to the general hostility of the courts …