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SelectedWorks

Comparative and Foreign Law

Law and Economics

2013

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

Efficient Breach In The Common European Sales Law (Cesl), Wenqing Liao Oct 2013

Efficient Breach In The Common European Sales Law (Cesl), Wenqing Liao

Wenqing Liao

In the classic economic theory, it is suggested that contract law should be structured in such a way that efficient breaches (i.e. those increasing social welfare) would be promoted. The default remedy of expectation damages was justified on this cognition. Nowadays, more and more suspects and critiques are raised against the so called simple efficient breach model. The aim of this paper is to re-sketch the theory of efficient breach and to compare the consequences resulting from economic analysis with the remedy rules of the Common European Sales Law (CESL). It is proposed that the doctrine of efficient breach has …


Re-Envisioning The Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders And Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, Sang Yop Kang Jul 2013

Re-Envisioning The Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders And Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

According to conventional corporate governance scholarship, controlling shareholder regimes exist in jurisdictions where minority shareholders are not well protected by controlling shareholders’ expropriation. However, Professor Ronald Gilson raises a critical point against the conventional view; if laws are inefficient and do not protect investors, as the conventional view explains, why do we observe any minority shareholders at all in such “bad-law” countries? One possible reason is that in response to controlling shareholders’ expropriation, minority shareholders discount severely shares that corporations issue. Then, a related question is: if it is true, why do some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries have many …


The Separation Of Powers, Constitutionalism And Governance In Africa: The Case Of Modern Cameroon, John Mukum Mbaku Mar 2013

The Separation Of Powers, Constitutionalism And Governance In Africa: The Case Of Modern Cameroon, John Mukum Mbaku

JOHN MUKUM MBAKU

The Separation of Powers, Constitutionalism and Governance in Africa: The Case of Modern Cameroon

John Mukum Mbaku, Esq.

Abstract

Countries incorporate the principle of the separation of powers in their constitutions in an effort to meet several goals, the most important of which is to minimize government-induced tyranny. Specifically, countries that make this principle part of their constitutional practice intend to limit public servants by national laws and institutions, enhance government accountability, minimize opportunistic behaviors by civil servants and politicians, provide for checks and balances, and generally improve government efficiency. Cameroon, like many other African countries that transitioned to democratic …


The Regulation Of U.S. Money Market Funds: Lessons From Europe, Latoya C. Brown Jan 2013

The Regulation Of U.S. Money Market Funds: Lessons From Europe, Latoya C. Brown

Latoya C. Brown, Esq.

The recent financial crisis challenged long held perceptions of money market funds (“MMFs”) as stable and highly liquid instruments. Regulators in the US and in Europe now seek to impose additional rules on MMFs to avoid another significant failure as happened to the Reserve Fund. In the US, the debate is drawing even more media attention as question of which regulatory body - such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Treasury Department, and the Financial Stability Oversight Council – should lead the way has taken interesting twists and turns. This paper examines primary reform options being proposed in the …


Ending Judgment Arbitrage: Jurisdictional Competition And The Enforcement Of Foreign Money Judgments In The United States, Gregory Shill Jan 2013

Ending Judgment Arbitrage: Jurisdictional Competition And The Enforcement Of Foreign Money Judgments In The United States, Gregory Shill

Gregory Shill

Recent multi-billion-dollar damage awards issued by foreign courts against large American companies have focused attention on the once-obscure, patchwork system of enforcing foreign-country judgments in the United States. That system’s structural problems are even more serious than its critics have charged. However, the leading proposals for reform overlook the positive potential embedded in its design.

In the United States, no treaty or federal law controls the domestication of foreign judgments; the process is instead governed by state law. Although they are often conflated in practice, the procedure consists of two formally and conceptually distinct stages: foreign judgments must first be …