Law Commons^™

Open Sesame: The Myth Of Alibaba’S Extreme Corporate Governance And Control, Yu-Hsin Lin, Thomas Mehaffy

Yu-Hsin Lin

In September 2014, Alibaba Group Holding Limited (Alibaba) successfully launched a $25 billion initial public offering (IPO), the largest IPO ever, on New York Stock Exchange. Alibaba’s IPO success witnessed a wave among Chinese Internet companies to raise capital in U.S capital markets. A significant number of these companies have employed a novel, but poorly understood corporate ownership and control mechanism—the variable interest entity (VIE) structure and/or the disproportional control structure. The VIE structure was created in response to the Chinese restriction on foreign investments; however, it carries the risk of being declared illegal under Chinese law. The disproportional control …

Optimized Theft: Why Some Controlling Shareholders “Generously” Expropriate From Minority Shareholders, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

Although controlling shareholder agency problems have been well studied so far, many questions still remain unanswered. In particular, an important puzzle in a bad-law jurisdiction is: why some controlling shareholders (“roving controllers”) loot the entire corporate assets at once, and why others (“stationary controllers”) siphon a part of corporate assets on a continuous basis. To solve this conundrum, this Article provides analytical frameworks exploring the behaviors and motivations of controlling shareholders. To begin with, I reinterpret Olson’s political theory of “banditry” in the context of corporate governance in developing countries. Based on a new taxonomy of controlling shareholders (“roving controllers” …

Managing Cyberthreat, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

Cyber security is an important strategic and governance issue. However, because most corporate CEOs and directors have no formal engineering or information technology training, it is understandable that their lack of actual cybersecurity knowledge is problematic. Particularly among smaller companies having limited resources, knowledge regarding what their enterprise should actually be doing about cybersecurity can’t be all that good. My goal in this article is to explore the unusually complex subject of cybersecurity in a highly readable manner. First, an examination of recent threats is provided. Next, governmental policy initiatives are discussed. Third, some basic tools that can be used …

The Institutional Appetite For Quack Corporate Governance, Alicia J. Davis

Alicia Davis

This Article offers evidence that higher quality internal corporate governance is associated with higher levels of ownership by institutional investors. This finding is consistent with the idea that institutions have greater reason than individual investors to prefer well-governed firms, but surprising given the substantial empirical evidence that casts doubt on the efficacy of internal governance mechanisms. The study described in this Article also finds that higher quality external governance is associated with lower proportions of ownership by certain types of institutional investors, also a somewhat surprising result given available empirical evidence on the positive relationship between external governance and firm …

Re-Envisioning Investors’ Anti-Director Rights Index: Theory, Criticism, And Implications, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

‘Law and Finance’ theory – which offers analytical frameworks to measure the protection of public investors and the quality of corporate governance – has dominated the comparative corporate governance scholarship in the last decade. So far, many proponents and critics have had debates on the relevance of the theory and the implications of the theory’s empirical studies. Several important points in relation to shareholder protection, however, have been highly neglected in these debates. In particular, the significance of one-share-one-vote (OSOV) rule has been inappropriately underestimated. In response, this Article explores (1) why OSOV is an utmost critical component in corporate …

Iniciativas Legais Para O Desenvolvimento Da Governança Corporativa No Mercado Financeiro E De Capitais Brasileiro, Felipe Chagas Villasuso Lago

Felipe Chagas Villasuso Lago Mr.

The study of Corporate Governance is of utmost importance for the development of transparency and ethics in the conduct of public and private institutions activities. Corporate governance has been important for the development of relations between the shareholder and the senior management of companies, employees, suppliers, customers, banks and other lenders, Regulators and the community as a whole. The study of such practice goes beyond legal issues and also involves economic analysis and policy for discussing the best strategy to ensure the return on investment or consideration, in the case of public service. The Financial and Capital Market are industries …

Activist Compensation Of Board Nominees & The Middle Ground Response, Adam Prestidge

Adam Prestidge

Shareholder activism has taken an increasingly high-profile and polarizing role in investing and corporate governance. Moves by shareholder activists, and the policy behind those moves, constantly appear in corporate headlines. One of shareholder activists’ primary methods of enacting changes in companies is to nominate directors to the board, and often those director nominees are highly-compensated by the shareholder activist itself. Some in the corporate world oppose this practice, arguing that it creates a significant conflict of interest and can damage the company in the short term, while others argue that the practice is a necessary tool for investors that may …

Corporate Boardroom Diversity: Why Are We Still Talking About This?, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

What exactly is board diversity and why does it matter? How does diversity fit in an attempt to build the best board for any organization? What attributes and skills are required by law and what mix of experiences and talents provide the best corporate governance? Even though most companies say they are looking for diversity, why has there been such little progress? Are required director attributes, which are a must for all boards, consistent with future diversity gains and aligned with achieving high performance and optimal board composition? My goal is to provide answers to these questions, and to discuss …

Shareholder Activism As A Corrective Mechanism In Corporate Governance, Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

No abstract provided.

The Riddle Of Shareholder Rights And Corporate Social Responsibility, Dan Morrissey

Dan Morrissey

Morrissey—Abstract

The Riddle of Shareholder Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility

Shareholders own the entrepreneurial interests in corporations. As such, the law has historically held that they must be run primarily to generate profit for those investors. Progressives and some enlightened business leaders however have long claimed that this “shareholder primacy” rule is inadequate and urged that the larger needs of the community must also be a concern of business decision-makers. This corporate social responsibility movement (CSR) has gained legal traction during the last several decades with legislative initiatives like constituency statutes and the benefit corporation. In recent years reformers have …

The Riddle Of Shareholder Rights And Corporate Social Responsibility, Dan Morrissey

Dan Morrissey

Morrissey—Abstract

The Riddle of Shareholder Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility

Shareholders own the entrepreneurial interests in corporations. As such, the law has historically held that they must be run primarily to generate profit for those investors. Progressives and some enlightened business leaders however have long claimed that this “shareholder primacy” rule is inadequate and urged that the larger needs of the community must also be a concern of business decision-makers. This corporate social responsibility movement (CSR) has gained legal traction during the last several decades with legislative initiatives like constituency statutes and the benefit corporation. In recent years reformers have …

Controlling Shareholders: Benevolent “King” Or Ruthless “Pirate”, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

Unfair self-dealing and expropriation of minority shareholders by a controlling shareholder are common business practices in developing countries (“bad-law countries”). Although controlling shareholder agency problems have been well studied so far, there are many questions unanswered in relation to behaviors and motivations of controlling shareholders. For example, a puzzle is that some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries voluntarily extract minority shareholders less than other controlling shareholders. Applying Mancur Olson’s framework of political theory of “banditry” to the context of corporate governance, this Article proposes that there are at least two categories of controlling shareholders. “Roving controllers” are dominant shareholders with …

Shareholder Derivative Litigation And The Preclusion Problem, George Geis

George Geis

No abstract provided.

Re-Envisioning The Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders And Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

According to conventional corporate governance scholarship, controlling shareholder regimes exist in jurisdictions where minority shareholders are not well protected by controlling shareholders’ expropriation. However, Professor Ronald Gilson raises a critical point against the conventional view; if laws are inefficient and do not protect investors, as the conventional view explains, why do we observe any minority shareholders at all in such “bad-law” countries? One possible reason is that in response to controlling shareholders’ expropriation, minority shareholders discount severely shares that corporations issue. Then, a related question is: if it is true, why do some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries have many …

Do Social Ties Matter In Corporate Governance: The Missing Factor In Chinese Corporate Governance Reform, Yu-Hsin Lin

Yu-Hsin Lin

In the past decade, Asian countries have adopted various corporate governance measures with the hope that good law will facilitate capital market development. One of the measures adopted by Asian countries to revamp corporate boards is to enhance board independence by introducing the institution of the independent director. Empirical studies have shown that social ties could compromise independent directors’ monitoring capacity and, thus, do matter in corporate governance. Using theoretical and empirical studies, this article analyzes the effects that independent directors' social ties to corporate insiders can have on director efficacy and discusses how the United States, where the institution …

La Experiencia Chilena Disuadiendo Ilícitos Corporativos, Diego G. Pardow

Diego G. Pardow

This paper analyzes the investigations on potential misconducts conducted by the Chilean public enforcer (Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros, “SVS”) between 1990 and 2012. The evidence reveals two groups of problems: on the one hand, the SVS has leaved a substantial region of the market unmonitored; on the other hand, the level of specific deterrence is generally low and relies greatly on indirect mechanisms of punishment. Such results suggest that future reforms should facili- tate private enforcement on both the extensive and the intensive margin. Whereas improving the performance of the SVS on the extensive margin should mitigate its monitoring …

Threats Escalate: Corporate Information Technology Governance Under Fire, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

In a previous publication The Board’s Responsibility for Information Technology Governance, (with Kara Altenbaumer-Price) we examined: The IT Governance Institute’s Executive Summary and Framework for Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology 4.1 (COBIT®); reviewed the Weill and Ross Corporate and Key Asset Governance Framework; and observed “that in a survey of audit executives and board members, 58 percent believed that their corporate employees had little to no understanding of how to assess risk.” We further described the new SEC rules on risk management; Congressional action on cyber security; legal basis for director’s duties and responsibilities relative to IT governance; …

How Public Regulation Changes Corporate Governance Practice – Corporate Board Reform In Taiwan, Yu-Hsin Lin

Yu-Hsin Lin

No abstract provided.

Midwest Corporate Law Scholars Conference Presentation: Mitigating The Harmful Effects Of Proxy Access (Sec Rule 14a-11), Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

Presentation given at the Midwest Corporate Law Scholars Conference (June 15, 2011)

Llcs And Corporations: A Fork In The Road In Delaware?, Joshua P. Fershee

Joshua P Fershee

As Vice Chancellor Laster explained in CML V, LLC v. Bax, 6 A.3d 238 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2010): '[T]here is nothing absurd about different legal principles applying to corporations and LLCs.'" This short paper argues that courts should respect the LLC as a business form distinct from corporations and that Delaware courts have taken the first step toward doing just that.

Where legislatures have decided that distinctly corporate concepts should apply to LLCs—such as allowing piercing the veil or derivative lawsuits—those wishes (obviously) should be honored by the courts. But where state LLC laws are silent, courts should carefully …

Innkeepers: A Unifying Theory Of The In-House Counsel Role, Omari S. Simmons

Omari Scott Simmons

The emergence of the in-house counsel role, or “innkeepers” in the terminology of this Article, is one of the most significant shifts in the legal profession over the past half century and this development inevitably has implications for legal scholars, policymakers, and practitioners. A concise, all encompassing, theory of the in-house counsel role has proven elusive for legal scholars, as well as a comprehensive analysis of in-house counsel impact on business enterprises. In order to fill this significant gap in the legal literature, this Article articulates a unifying theory of in-house counsel value creation positing that the strategic in-house counsel …

Choice, Progressive Values, And Corporate Law: A Reply To Greenfield, Harry G. Hutchison

Harry G. Hutchison

In his recent book chapter, CORPORATE LAW AND THE RHETORIC OF CHOICE, Professor Kent Greenfield rejects contractarian justifications for existing corporate governance arrangements. Greenfield advances this critique on two grounds. First, relying on behavioralist scholars, he accepts the demise of the rational actor model and, accordingly, opposes the contemporary use of choice as a construct that legitimates current corporate governance approaches. Second, Greenfield refracts his analysis through the prism of Progressive thought and values.

Greenfield’s approach is disturbing for two reasons. First, he fails to notice that behavioralist scholars often rely on experimental data, while law and economics scholars rely …

The Credence Characteristics Of Corporate Reform, Omari S. Simmons

Omari Scott Simmons

No abstract provided.

Taking The Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact Of Executive Compensation Reform, Omari S. Simmons

Omari Scott Simmons

No abstract provided.

Fiscalizacion Y Transparencia En Las Empresas Del Estado, Diego G. Pardow, Rodrigo Vallejo

Diego G. Pardow

This note is a comment on Chilean precedents about the political mechanisms to control state-owned enterprises.

Branding The Small Wonder: Delaware's Dominance And The Market For Corporate Law, Omari S. Simmons

Omari Scott Simmons

No abstract provided.

The North Dakota Publicly Trade Corporations Act: A Branding Initiative Without A (North Dakota) Brand, Joshua P. Fershee

Joshua P Fershee

Any time a new market is entered and a new brand is created, whether it is the market for corporate governance laws or consumer electronics, it is essential to understand the market and have a clear vision of what the brand is supposed to be. When the North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act (Act) became law on July 2, 2007, the state of North Dakota officially entered (or tried to enter) the corporate governance market. Rather than adding to the already significant debate about the value of increased shareholder rights or arguing that the Act was bad (or good) for …