Law Commons^™

New Powers- New Vulnerabilities? A Critical Analysis Of Market Inquiries Performed By Competition Authorities, Tamar Indig, Michal Gal

Michal Gal

In the past two decades the number of jurisdictions which have empowered their Competition Authorities to engage in market inquiries (MIs) has grown substantially. Although jurisdictions differ in the scope and procedure adopted for such studies, they all share an important common trait: attempting to allocate the roots of limited competition in the studied market. Market studies differ from traditional competition law tools in their triggers, range, object, and the level of pro-activity of the Competition Authority. They are not triggered by a suspicion of anti-competitive conduct of specific firm(s), but rather allow the Authority to use a broad prism …

Viral Open Source: Competition Vs. Synergy, Michal Gal

Michal Gal

The creation of free and open source software (FOSS) through social networks has been celebrated as one of the most interesting and inspiring developments of the information age. The main legal platform selected for facilitating this collaborative creation is the GNU General Public License (GPL). Software released under the GPL enables anyone to use, modify, and distribute the code. Yet, these rights are contingent upon virality: every copy or work based on the original code must also be subject to such terms and conditions. This article analyzes the interesting and intricate effects of virality on welfare and innovation. Virality increases …

The Dearth Of Antitrust Sanctions (In Hebrew), Michal Gal, Amir Israeli

Michal Gal

No abstract provided.

The Bagel And Its Hole: Changes In Competition Law (In Hebrew), Michal Gal

Michal Gal

No abstract provided.

Regional Competition Law Agreements: An Important Step For Antitrust Enforcement, Michal Gal

Michal Gal

This essay argues that regional competition law agreements on joint enforcement and advocacy (RJCAs) hold an important potential to solve many of the enforcement problems that small and developing jurisdictions face and can provide additional benefits that go beyond such solutions. It also argues that the costs involved in such agreements are not prohibitive and that many of these costs can be overcome by structuring appropriate solutions. Accordingly, RJCAs have the potential to create Pareto superior solutions to enforcement problems relative to unilateral enforcement. The essay then broadens the analysis to the potential effects of RJCAs on non-member states. It …

Expansion And Contraction In Monopolization Law, Michal Gal, Spencer Waller Weber, Avishalom Tor

Michal Gal

This article introduces a special symposium issue of the Antitrust Law Journal based on a conference on monopolization. It argues that monopolization law has been experiencing simultaneous expansion and contraction processes that are not wholly contradictory but at least partly complementary. Specifically, the authors suggest that the contraction of monopolization law in the United States and the EU might serve to facilitate its expansion and increased importance worldwide, providing other antitrust regimes with more focused and effective tools to address the challenges involved in regulating dominant firms. Moreover, monopolization law's increased reach internationally also has made its refinement and rationalization …

The Follower Phenomenon: Implications For The Design Of Monopolization Rules In A Global Economy, Michal Gal, Jorge A. Padilla

Michal Gal

Laws are oftentimes modeled, at least in part, on those of jurisdictions with established antitrust regimes, a trend we call “the follower phenomenon.” Follower behavior might involve a transplant of a legal rule, its interpretation, or both.

This article analyzes the main causes of the follower phenomenon in antitrust and its welfare effects, both on the following jurisdiction and on the followed one. It argues that the proliferation of one's antitrust prohibitions can sometimes act as a boomerang, negatively affecting the welfare of the followed jurisdiction as well as third jurisdictions. This boomerang effect can result from three main causes: …

When The Going Gets Tight: Institutional Solutions When Antitrust Enforcement Resources Are Scarce, Michal Gal

Michal Gal

This article seeks to explore whether institutional solutions to antitrust enforcement problems can be transported from one jurisdiction to another. It does so by focusing on the effects of scarce enforcement resources (both financial and human) on optimal institutional design. The prevalence of this characteristic in small, developing and transition economies makes it an interesting and important subject to study. Accordingly, the following question is raised: if a country has a small institutional endowment, can it transplant the institutional structure of another jurisdiction with a large resource endowment and simply shrink it to fit its budget - like the shrinking …

The Effects Of Smallness And Remoteness On Competition Law - The Case Of New Zealand, Michal Gal

Michal Gal

The economic characteristics of an economy — most notably its size, its openness to trade and its remoteness from its trading partners — greatly affect the competitiveness and performance of its markets by reducing internal and external competitive pressures. Accordingly, small, insulated economies should devise appropriate policies that offset at least some of these effects. This article analyses some of the effects of smallness and remoteness on optimal competition law. The first part provides a basis for the discussion by surveying the basic economic effects of small market size. The second part builds upon these observations to analyse some of …

Necessary Reforms Of The Israeli Competition Law (In Hebrew), Michal Gal

Michal Gal

No abstract provided.

50 Colors Of Formica: Legal Realism In The Israeli Competition Law (In Hebrew), Michal Gal

Michal Gal

No abstract provided.

Concentrated Monopolies (In Hebrew), Michal Gal, Menachem Perlman, Talya Solomon

Michal Gal

No abstract provided.

Monopolies In Competition: The Balance Between Innovativeness And Competition In The Israeli Competition Law (In Hebrew), Michal Gal

Michal Gal

No abstract provided.

Separating The Wheat From The Chaff: Restrictive Agreement In Light Of The Supreme Court’S Recent Decisions (In Hebrew), Michal Gal

Michal Gal

No abstract provided.

The Ecology Of Antitrust: Preconditions For Competition Law Enforcement In Developing Countries, Michal Gal

Michal Gal

The number of developing countries that have adopted a competition law has grown exponentially over the past two decades. Yet the mere adoption of a competition law is a necessary but not sufficient condition for it to be part of market reform. Just as ecological conditions determine the ability of a flower to bloom, so do some preconditions affect the ability to apply a competition law effectively. This study seeks to identify the ecology of antitrust in developing countries: the soil, sun, water and pesticides of competition law adoption and enforcement. In particular, it analyzes the socio-economic ideology (soil), the …

Size Does Matter: General Policy Prescriptions For Optimal Competition Rules In Small Economies, Michal Gal

Michal Gal

For the most part, competition policy literature focuses on large economies. Yet the economic paradigms on which such competition policies are based do not necessarily apply to the many small market economies that exist around the world. As this paper argues, the size of an economy necessarily affects the optimal competition policy that should be adopted by it. The paper demonstrates the effects of market size both on rules of thumb used in competition policy as well as on more general policy prescriptions, such as policy goals, trade-offs and remedial tools. The implications of this article extend beyond domestic competition …

Reducing Rivals Prices: Government-Supported Mavericks As New Solutions For Oligopoly Pricing, Michal Gal

Michal Gal

One of the most important market imperfections in modern capitalism and surprisingly one of the most under-regulated is oligopoly pricing (conscious parallelism). Only few suggestions have been made over the years to regulate oligopoly pricing. All suggestions pose serious obstacles to their efficient application. Accordingly, oligopoly pricing is not regulated. It is left to the workings of the market (or pure luck), while acknowledging the marketis limited regulatory force. This article proposes a novel method for regulating oligopoly pricing by way of introducing a government-supported maverick into an oligopolistic industry for a limited time. The maverick will price its products …

Harmful Remedies: Optimal Reformation Of Anti-Competitive Contracts, Michal Gal

Michal Gal

Current law and economics literature identifies two main types of errors courts can make in applying antitrust law. Courts may erroneously label a conduct as anti-competitive although competition is not harmed. Alternatively, courts may fail to identify anti-competitive conduct and thus fail to attack it. This article focuses on a third possible error where a court identifies, correctly, anti-competitive conduct but its mode of interference, its proscribed remedy, harms competition. It analyzes such error in the context of anti-competitive contract reformation. Such error occurs, for example, where a court has chosen a reformation option that is less efficient and effective …