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Conventional theories of constitutional design suggest that frequent formal amendment of a constitution’s text likely has a restraining effect on the practice of judicial review. On these theories, courts are more likely to favor the status quo when construing a constitution that is amended frequently, and more likely to issue transformative rulings when a constitution is difficult to amend. This Article investigates these claims by analyzing an original data-set of hand-coded opinions from state high courts in the United States. Because state constitutional amendment rates vary widely, these data provide a meaningful opportunity to explore how judges practice judicial review …

State constitutions in the United States serve various important political functions that may be relevant and helpful to constitutional designers in other political systems. This paper explores two striking features of contemporary state constitutionalism with an eye towards their value for those considering a written Quebec constitution. First, state constitutionalism is characterized by frequent formal amendment through popular political processes. This has resulted in a form of constitutionalism that often prioritizes swift democratic responsiveness over entrenched prior commitments. Because recent empirical scholarship suggests that this is a broader phenomenon often occurring in federal countries with written subnational constitutions, Quebec reformers …