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Full-Text Articles in Law

Financial Hospitals: Defending The Fed’S Role As A Market Maker Of Last Resort, José Gabilondo Aug 2016

Financial Hospitals: Defending The Fed’S Role As A Market Maker Of Last Resort, José Gabilondo

José Gabilondo

During the last financial crisis, what should the Federal Reserve (the Fed) have done when lenders stopped making loans, even to borrowers with sterling credit and strong collateral? Because the central bank is the last resort for funding, the conventional answer had been to lend freely at a penalty rate against good collateral, as Walter Bagehot suggested in 1873 about the Bank of England. Acting thus as a lender of last resort, the central bank will keep solvent banks liquid but let insolvent banks go out of business, as they should. The Fed tried this, but when the conventional wisdom …


Standard Oil And U.S. Steel: Predation And Collusion In The Law Of Monopolization And Mergers, William H. Page Nov 2014

Standard Oil And U.S. Steel: Predation And Collusion In The Law Of Monopolization And Mergers, William H. Page

William H. Page

The Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Standard Oil gave us embryonic versions of two foundational standards of liability under the Sherman Act: the rule of reason under Section 1 and the monopoly power/exclusionary conduct test under Section 2. But a case filed later in 1911, United States v. United States Steel Corporation, shaped the understanding of Standard Oil’s standards of liability for decades. U.S. Steel, eventually decided by the Supreme Court in 1920, upheld the 1901 merger that created "the Corporation," as U.S. Steel was known. The majority found that the efforts of the Corporation and its rivals to control …


Antitrust Analysis After Actavis: Applying The Rule Of Reason To Reverse Payments, Benjamin Miller Aug 2014

Antitrust Analysis After Actavis: Applying The Rule Of Reason To Reverse Payments, Benjamin Miller

Benjamin Miller

Abstract In F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc. the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split regarding the proper evaluation of reverse payment settlements under federal antitrust law, holding that they must be evaluated under a rule of reason analysis. However, the Court simultaneously created significant uncertainty by declaring that the lower courts were responsible for structuring the analysis. While a few cases are currently in the pre-trial phase, the only decisions relating to reverse payments since Actavis have been rulings on pre-trial motions—there have been no decisions on the merits. Given the intricate intersection between antitrust and intellectual property principles in these …


Limits Of Disclosure, Steven M. Davidoff, Claire A. Hill Jul 2014

Limits Of Disclosure, Steven M. Davidoff, Claire A. Hill

Steven Davidoff Solomon

One big focus of attention, criticism, and proposals for reform in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis has been securities disclosure. Many commentators have emphasized the complexity of the securities being sold, arguing that no one could understand the disclosure. Some observers have noted that disclosures were sometimes false or incomplete. What follows these issues, to some commentators, is that, whatever other lessons we may learn from the crisis, we need to improve disclosure. How should it be improved? Commentators often lament the frailties of human understanding, notably including those of everyday retail investors—people who do not understand or …


Dodd-Frank’S Confict Minerals Rule: The Tin Ear Of Government-Business Regulation, Henry Lowenstein Mar 2013

Dodd-Frank’S Confict Minerals Rule: The Tin Ear Of Government-Business Regulation, Henry Lowenstein

Henry Lowenstein

This paper examines an unusual provision included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010), Section 1502 known as the Conflict Minerals Rule. This provision, having nothing to do with the subject matter of the act itself, attempts to place a chilling effect on the trade of four identified minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo. The provision and its subsequent rule, surprisingly delegated to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (an agency lacking subject matter expertise in minrals) presents a case and object lession of almost every cost, procedural and legal error that can take place …


The Moral Hazard Problem In Global Economic Regulation, Frank J. Garcia Oct 2011

The Moral Hazard Problem In Global Economic Regulation, Frank J. Garcia

Frank J. Garcia

Global regulation of international business transactions presents a particular form of the moral hazard problem. Global firms use economic and political power to manipulate state and state-controlled multilateral regulation to preserve their opportunity to externalize the social costs of global economic activity with impunity. Unless other actors can effectively counter this at the national and global regulatory levels, globalization re-creates the conditions for under-regulated or “robber baron” capitalism at the global level. This model of economic activity has been rejected at the national level by the same modern democratic capitalist states which currently dominate globalization, creating a crisis of legitimacy …