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Full-Text Articles in Law
Utility Function And Rational Choice As Support Mechanisms To Maximize Mediation And Legal Negotiation Settlement Output, Roberto Kuster
Utility Function And Rational Choice As Support Mechanisms To Maximize Mediation And Legal Negotiation Settlement Output, Roberto Kuster
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal
This article provides a general negotiation background, establishing some basic definitions such as BATNA, interests, and “Shadow of Law.” Then, it works with the two-step process of utility maximization and rational choice to achieve the optimal settlement output within mediation and legal negotiation processes. Lastly, it points out methods to support the theories in ways that a lawyer could understand and apply correctly. Thus, the article offers an idea for an optimal settlement in a legal negotiation/mediation. It takes the complementary views of recognized authors, from Fisher and Ury’s "how to negotiate" manual, Raiffa's lucid explanation of applied game theory, …
The Five-Tool Mediator: Game Theory, Baseball Practices, And Southpaw Scouting, Michael N. Widener
The Five-Tool Mediator: Game Theory, Baseball Practices, And Southpaw Scouting, Michael N. Widener
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal
This essay borrows heavily from the fields of game theory, baseball business strategy and neuropsychology. Knitting these together, the author advocates that mediators become inciters and advocates for an outcome that solves problems, irrespective of the amount in controversy and the initial gap between offer and counter-offers of settlement. This is not an essay on how to do facilitator’s tasks in settlement negotiations; instead, the reader should consider how to think about the mediator’s role in the process, advancing the value proposition in negotiations. This essay does not propose that mediators become group therapists but instead urges them to relentlessly …
Explaining Adversarial Boilerplate Language In The Battle Of The Forms: Are Consequential Damages In The U.C.C. Gap Fillers A Penalty Default Rule?, Ryan Griffee
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
In this article, game theory is applied to the battle of the forms and related scenarios to explain Daniel Keating’s observations, reported in the article “Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action,” 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678 (2000). The first of the two major findings in this article is that there is a game-theoretic reason drafters of boilerplate language should use adversarial, U.C.C. § 2-207(1) proviso-conforming language, namely, to ensure that clients receive terms that are no worse than the default U.C.C. gap fillers. The second major finding is that there is a penalty default rule in contract law. …