Law Commons^™

Collective Wisdom: One Bit Of Advice, Gary Gildin, Jules Epstein, Robert Little, Kenneth S. Klein, Jim Roberts, Rachel Brockl, H. Scott Fingerhut, Ramona Albin, Charles H. Rose Iii, Kaelyn J. Romey, Catherine E. Stahl, John Singer, Marian Braccia, Elizabeth Lippy, Laura Rosed

Faculty Scholarly Works

Lawyers make mistakes. Read a transcript (your own or that of someone else) or a news media account, go to court and watch, or just learn about it when a colleague describes a trial—with insight and an acknowledgment of missteps or hubris and a peacock display of self-adjudged skill. They are mistakes of omission or commission, but they occur every day. The checklist movement—adapting the checklist model used by surgeons and airplane pilots—is a critical tool for error reduction and elimination and has its place in law.* But beyond granular details that must be checked and double-checked for a particular …

Mirror, Mirror, On The Wall—Biased Impartiality, Appearances, And The Need For Recusal Reform, Zygmont A. Pines

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

The article focuses on a troubling aspect of contemporary judicial morality.

Impartiality—and the appearance of impartiality—are the foundation of judicial decision-making, judicial morality, and the public’s trust in the rule of law. Recusal, in which a jurist voluntarily removes himself or herself from participating in a case, is a process that attempts to preserve and promote the substance and the appearance of judicial impartiality. Nevertheless, the traditional common law recusal process, prevalent in many of our state court systems, manifestly subverts basic legal and ethical norms.

Today’s recusal practice—whether rooted in unintentional hypocrisy, wishful thinking, or a pathological cognitive dissonance— …

Judges Do It Better: Why Judges Can (And Should) Decide Life Or Death, Andrew R. Ford

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Following its decision in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court of the United States has attempted to standardize procedures that states use to subject offenders to the ultimate penalty. In practice, this attempt at standardization has divided capital sentencing into two distinct parts: the death eligibility decision and the death selection decision. The eligibility decision addresses whether the sentencer may impose the death penalty, while the selection decision determines who among that limited subset of eligible offenders is sentenced to death. In Ring v. Arizona, the Court held for the first time that the Sixth Amendment right to …