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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Conscious Parallelism Of Wolf Packs: Applying The Antitrust Conspiracy Framework To Section 13(D) Activist Group Formation, William R. Tevlin
The Conscious Parallelism Of Wolf Packs: Applying The Antitrust Conspiracy Framework To Section 13(D) Activist Group Formation, William R. Tevlin
Fordham Law Review
Section 13(d) of the Williams Act requires all persons and groups that acquire 5 percent or more of an issuer’s outstanding stock to disclose their holdings to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Whether a group is formed under section 13(d) often is unclear. The legal precedent is ambiguous; courts give more weight to certain forms of circumstantial evidence than others without explaining why. With the substantial increase of hedge fund activism—in particular, the wolf pack tactic—further clarity or uniformity is necessary. A “wolf pack” is a loose association of hedge funds that employs parallel activist strategies toward a target corporation …
Helping Yourself While Serving Two Masters: Do Specialists Violate Rule 10b-5 When They Interposition?, Roman Asudulayev
Helping Yourself While Serving Two Masters: Do Specialists Violate Rule 10b-5 When They Interposition?, Roman Asudulayev
Fordham Urban Law Journal
The decision of the Second Circuit in United States v. Finnerty (Finnerty III) was the culmination of a number of District Court decisions that found that specialists on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) could not be held liable for fraud under Rule 10b-5 for interpositioning, whereby they put themselves between buy and sell limit orders, in violation of NYSE rules, and profited on the spread. Finnerty III and its District Court sibling decisions were wrongly decided. Specialists presented a uniquely thorny issue of agency law to the Federal Courts in New York. This issue was under-analyzed by the Federal …
Misconduct Risk, Christina Parajon Skinner
Misconduct Risk, Christina Parajon Skinner
Fordham Law Review
Financial misconduct and systemic risk are two critical issues in financial regulation today. However, for the past several years, financial misconduct and systemic risk have received markedly different treatment. After the global financial crisis, regulators responded to the traditional quantitative risks that banks pose—those found on their balance sheets and in their business models—with sweeping reforms on an internationally coordinated scale. Meanwhile, with respect to misconduct, regulators have reacted with a traditional enforcement approach—imposing fines and, in some cases, prosecuting individual malefactors. Yet misconduct is not only an isolated or idiosyncratic risk that can be spot treated with enforcement: misconduct …
One Time To Sue: The Case For A Uniform Statute Of Limitations For Consumers To Sue Under The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Brianna Gallo
One Time To Sue: The Case For A Uniform Statute Of Limitations For Consumers To Sue Under The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Brianna Gallo
Fordham Law Review
In 1977, Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in an effort to provide injured consumers with uniform protection against the systematically abusive practices of the debt collection industry. The FDCPA created a private right of action for victims to sue; however, an individual who wishes to bring a private suit under the FDCPA must do so “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” The effectiveness of this private right of action has been unsettled due to the circuit split over the meaning of this provision. For many FDCPA violations, the debt collector might …
Citizens Versus Bondholders, Richard C. Schragger
Citizens Versus Bondholders, Richard C. Schragger
Fordham Urban Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Bondholders And Financially Stressed Municipalities, Clayton P. Gillette
Bondholders And Financially Stressed Municipalities, Clayton P. Gillette
Fordham Urban Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Resetting The Baseline Of Ownership: Takings And Investor Expectations After The Bailouts, Nestor M. Davidson
Resetting The Baseline Of Ownership: Takings And Investor Expectations After The Bailouts, Nestor M. Davidson
Faculty Scholarship
During the economic crisis that began in 2008, the federal government nationalized several of the nation’s most significant private companies as part of a broad effort to forestall a global depression. Shareholders in those companies later filed suit, alleging that the federal government in so doing—and in subsequent actions while in control of the firms—took their property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. To date, those claims have not succeeded. If these cases continue on their current trajectory, with courts rejecting arguments that the rescue of systematically important firms on the brink of collapse requires compensation for shareholders, …