Law Commons^™

To Prohibit Free Exercise: A Proposal For Judging Substantial Burdens On Religion, Eric H. Wang

Emory Law Journal

In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court famously held that the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause permits neutral laws of general applicability to incidentally burden religion without offering religious exemptions. Today, many people—including Justice Alito in his concurrence in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia—are calling for Smith to be replaced by a jurisprudence that applies strict scrutiny to neutral, generally applicable laws that place a substantial burden on religion.

Yet, both before and after Smith, what exactly has constituted a “substantial burden” on religion has been far from clear. While some courts indicate that burdens on …

Awakening The Law: Unmasking Free Exercise Exceptionalism, Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol

Emory Law Journal

The U.S. Constitution protects myriad, often intertwined, individual rights. Sometimes, protected fundamental rights collide, yet the Constitution lacks a methodology to resolve such clashes. Indeed, an internal tension exists even within the rights included in the First Amendment, as whenever the government acts to protect Free Exercise it advances religion. Rather than adopt a methodology that respects and considers all constitutional rights at issue in instances when constitutional rights are in collision, the Court has embraced Free Exercise Exceptionalism (“FEE”), a doctrine pursuant to which the Court elevates Free Exercise above all rights, including the prohibition expressed in the Establishment …

In Contracts We Trust (And No One Can Change Their Mind)! There Should Be No Special Treatment For Religious Arbitration, Michael J. Broyde, Alexa J. Windsor

Faculty Articles

The recent article In God We Trust (Unless We Change Our Mind): How State of Mind Relates to Religious Arbitration ("In God We Trust") proposes that those who sign arbitration agreements that consent to a religious legal system as the basis of the rules of arbitration be allowed to back out of such agreements based on their constitutional right to free exercise. This article is a response and is divided into two sections. In the first section, we show that such an exemption would violate the Federal Arbitration Act's (FAA) basic rules preventing the states from heightened regulation of arbitration …