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Articles 1 - 16 of 16
Full-Text Articles in Law
Elections, Ideology, And Turnover In The U.S. Federal Government, Alexander D. Bolton, John De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis
Elections, Ideology, And Turnover In The U.S. Federal Government, Alexander D. Bolton, John De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis
Faculty Scholarship
A defining feature of public sector employment is the regular change in elected leadership. Yet, we know little about how elections influence public sector careers. We describe how elections alter policy outputs and disrupt the influence of civil servants over agency decisions. These changes shape the career choices of employees motivated by policy, influence, and wages. Using new Office of Personnel Management data on the careers of millions of federal employees between 1988 and 2011, we evaluate how elections influence employee turnover decisions. We find that presidential elections increase departure rates of career senior employees, particularly in agencies with divergent …
Quitting In Protest: A Theory Of Presidential Policy Making And Agency Response, Charles M. Cameron, John M. De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis
Quitting In Protest: A Theory Of Presidential Policy Making And Agency Response, Charles M. Cameron, John M. De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis
Faculty Scholarship
This paper examines the effects of centralized presidential policy-making, implemented through unilateral executive action, on the willingness of bureaucrats to exert effort and stay in the government. Extending models in organizational economics, we show that policy initiative by the president is a substitute for initiative by civil servants. Yet, total effort is enhanced when both work. Presidential centralization of policy often impels policy-oriented bureaucrats ("zealots") to quit rather than implement presidential policies they dislike. Those most likely to quit are a range of moderate bureaucrats. More extreme bureaucrats may be willing to wait out an opposition president in the hope …
The Dual Path Initiative Framework, Elizabeth Garrett, Mathew D. Mccubbins
The Dual Path Initiative Framework, Elizabeth Garrett, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation And Political Institutions, Stuart Minor Benjamin
Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation And Political Institutions, Stuart Minor Benjamin
Duke Law Journal
Proponents of electronic rulemaking proposals designed to enhance ordinary citizens' involvement in the rulemaking process have debated with skeptics the question of whether such initiatives will actually increase citizens' involvement. In the debate thus far, however, proponents have largely assumed the desirability of such involvement, and skeptics have usually not challenged that assumption. In addition, proponents and skeptics have focused on the relationship between agencies and individuals, failing to consider the larger administrative law context-and in particular the role played by Congress and the courts. This Article considers e-rulemaking in a broader institutional context and directly addresses the desirability of …
Citizen Participation In Rulemaking: Past, Present, And Future, Cary Coglianese
Citizen Participation In Rulemaking: Past, Present, And Future, Cary Coglianese
Duke Law Journal
Administrative law scholars and governmental reformers argue that advances in information technology will greatly expand public participation in regulatory policymaking. They claim that e-rulemaking, or the application of new technology to administrative rulemaking, promises to transform a previously insulated process into one in which ordinary citizens regularly provide input. With the federal government having implemented several e-rulemaking initiatives in recent years, we can now begin to assess whether such a transformation is in the works-or even on the horizon. This paper compares empirical observations on citizen participation in the past, before e-rulemaking, with more recent data on citizen participation after …
Courts, Congress, And Public Policy, Part Ii: The Impact Of The Reapportionment Revolution On Congress And State Legislatures, Jeffrey R. Lax, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Courts, Congress, And Public Policy, Part Ii: The Impact Of The Reapportionment Revolution On Congress And State Legislatures, Jeffrey R. Lax, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Conditions For Judicial Independence, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger Noll, Barry R. Weingast
Conditions For Judicial Independence, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger Noll, Barry R. Weingast
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Social Choice, Crypto-Initiaives, And Policymaking By Direct Democracy, Thad Kousser, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Social Choice, Crypto-Initiaives, And Policymaking By Direct Democracy, Thad Kousser, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
When Does Government Limit The Impact Of Voter Initiatives?, Elisabeth R. Gerber
When Does Government Limit The Impact Of Voter Initiatives?, Elisabeth R. Gerber
Faculty Scholarship
Citizens use the initiative process to make new laws. Many winning initiatives, however, are altered or ignored after Election Day. We examine why this is, paying particular attention to several widely-ignored properties of the post-election phase of the initiative process. One such property is the fact that initiative implementation can require numerous governmental actors to comply with an initiative’s policy instructions. Knowing such properties, the question then becomes: When do governmental actors comply with winning initiatives? We clarify when compliance is full, partial, or not at all. Our findings provide a template for scholars and observers to better distinguish cases …
Strengthening Science’S Voice At Epa, E. Donald Elliott
Strengthening Science’S Voice At Epa, E. Donald Elliott
Law and Contemporary Problems
Elliott considers the problem of institutional reforms to enhance the role of science in EPA decisionmaking. He asserts that science is underrepresented in policymaking at the EPA and that the quality of decisions at the margins would be improved by giving science somewhat greater influence.
Accounting For Science: The Independence Of Public Research In The New, Subterranean Administrative Law, Donald T. Hornstein
Accounting For Science: The Independence Of Public Research In The New, Subterranean Administrative Law, Donald T. Hornstein
Law and Contemporary Problems
The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is putting the final touches on a system designed to account for the science used by federal agencies in their administrative missions. There are reasons for concern that OMB's new programs could be used to skew the system by which regulatory science is generated in the first place.
The “Bad Science” Fiction: Reclaiming The Debate Over The Role Of Science In Public Health And Environmental Regulation, Wendy E. Wagner
The “Bad Science” Fiction: Reclaiming The Debate Over The Role Of Science In Public Health And Environmental Regulation, Wendy E. Wagner
Law and Contemporary Problems
Wagner argues that the good-science reforms miss the mark and have the potential to cause significant damage to already crippled administrative processes. Background information is presented relating to the sources of dissatisfaction with regulatory science and how the three most popular reforms purport to address these concerns.
Politcs And The Courts: A Positive Theory Of Judicial Doctrine And The Rule Of Law, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger G. Noll, Barry R. Weingast
Politcs And The Courts: A Positive Theory Of Judicial Doctrine And The Rule Of Law, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger G. Noll, Barry R. Weingast
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Bonding, Structure And The Stability Of Political Parties: Party Government In The House, Gary W. Cox, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Bonding, Structure And The Stability Of Political Parties: Party Government In The House, Gary W. Cox, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Faculty Scholarship
The public policy benefits that parties-deliver are allocated by democratic procedures that devolve ultimately to majority rule. Majority-rule decision making, however, does not lead to consistent policy choices; it is "unstable." In this paper, we argue that institutions - and thereby policy coalitions -- can be stabilized by extra-legislative organization. The rules of the Democratic Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives dictate that a requirement for continued membership is support on the floor of Caucus decisions for a variety of key structural matters. Because membership in the majority party’s caucus is valuable, it constitutes a bond, the posting of …
A Theory Of Political Control And Agency Discretion, Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Barry R. Weingast
A Theory Of Political Control And Agency Discretion, Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Barry R. Weingast
Faculty Scholarship
A major issue in the study of American politics is the extent to which electoral discipline also constrains bureaucrats. In practice, executive agencies operate with considerable independence from elected officials. However,the entire process of policy execution is a game among legislators.the chief executive. and bureaucratic agents. It includes the initial delegation of authority, the choice of policy alternatives,and opportunities for oversight and control. A simple model of this process demonstrates an important distinction between bureaucratic authority and bureaucratic discretion. Indeed.in its simplest form, the model predicts a world in which bureaucrats are the sole active participants in policymaking, but in …
Regulation Of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, Neal E. Devins
Regulation Of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, Neal E. Devins
Duke Law Journal
Congress often attaches limitation riders to appropriations bills to establish its policy directives. Professor Devins argues that the appropriations process is not the proper vehicle for substantive policymaking. In this article, he analyzes institutional characteristics that prevent the full consideration or articulation of policy in appropriations bills. Professor Devins also considers the extent to which Congress's use of limitation riders inhibits the effectiveness of the other branches of the federal government. Professor Devins concludes that, while Congress's use of limitation riders is sometimes necessary, Congress should be aware of the significant risks associated with policymaking through the appropriations process.