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Full-Text Articles in Law
Taking What They Give Us: Explaining The Court’S Federalism Offensive, Keith E. Whittington
Taking What They Give Us: Explaining The Court’S Federalism Offensive, Keith E. Whittington
Duke Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Super-Statutes, William N. Eskridge Jr., John A. Ferejohn
Super-Statutes, William N. Eskridge Jr., John A. Ferejohn
Duke Law Journal
Not all statutes are created equal. Appropriations laws perform important public functions, but they are usually short-sighted and have little effect on the law beyond the years for which they apportion public monies. Most substantive statutes adopted by Congress and state legislatures reveal little more ambition: they cover narrow subject areas or represent legislative compromises that are short-term fixes to bigger problems and cannot easily be defended as the best policy result that can be achieved. Some statutes reveal ambition but do not penetrate deeply into American norms or institutional practice. Even fewer statutes successfully penetrate public normative and institutional …
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, Louis Kaplow
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, Louis Kaplow
Duke Law Journal
This Article offers an economic analysis of the extent to which legal commands should be promulgated as rules or standards. Two dimensions of the problem are emphasized. First, the choice between rules and standards affects costs: Rules typically are more costly than standards to create, whereas standards tend to be more costly for individuals to interpret when deciding how to act and for an adjudicator to apply to past conduct. Second, when individuals can determine the application of rules to their contemplated acts more cheaply, conduct is more likely to reflect the content of previously promulgated rules than of standards …
Liberalism, Community, And State Borders, Lea Brilmayer
Liberalism, Community, And State Borders, Lea Brilmayer
Duke Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Congressional Delegation Of Adjudicatory Power To Federal Agencies And The Right To Trial By Jury, Paul K. Sun Jr.
Congressional Delegation Of Adjudicatory Power To Federal Agencies And The Right To Trial By Jury, Paul K. Sun Jr.
Duke Law Journal
The continued growth of the administrative bureaucracy and its increased impact on the rights and duties of citizens is a well-documented phenomenon of the twentieth century. 1 At the federal level, bureaucracy flourishes as Congress delegates ever more responsibility to agencies. 2 Within their statutorily defined fields, federal agencies typically perform the functions of rulemaking, enforcement and adjudication. 3 This note focuses on the adjudicatory function 4 and considers whether, when Congress creates a new statutory cause of action, 5 the seventh amendment 6 limits Congress's ability to delegate responsibility for adjudicating cases under that statute to a federal administrative …