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Full-Text Articles in Law
Agents And Advisors, Deborah A. Demott
The Domains Of Loyalty: Relationships Between Fiduciary Obligation And Intrinsic Motivation, Deborah A. Demott
The Domains Of Loyalty: Relationships Between Fiduciary Obligation And Intrinsic Motivation, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
Recent scholarly inquiry into fiduciary law predominantly focuses on whether the subject is a coherent field and not a piecemeal assortment of doctrinal detail. This Article looks to the future and to relationships between the formal domain of fiduciary law and other factors that shape conduct. These include intrinsic motivation, markets for professional services, and forces like the operation of reputation. The Article demonstrates that looking across domains, from the legal to the extralegal, casts in sharp relief the reasons why fiduciary law is distinctive. These stem from the specific qualities of relationships to which fiduciary law applies, as well …
Tepoel Lecture: Bond Trustees And The Rising Challenge Of Activist Investors, Steven L. Schwarcz
Tepoel Lecture: Bond Trustees And The Rising Challenge Of Activist Investors, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Fiduciary Duties On The Temporal Edges Of Agency Relationships, Deborah A. Demott
Fiduciary Duties On The Temporal Edges Of Agency Relationships, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
The duties that principals and agents owe each other are typically coterminous with the agency relationship itself. But sometimes temporal lines of clean demarcation do less work. The Chapter identifies situations in which an agent may owe duties—including fiduciary duties—to the principal prior to the formal start of their relationship, including any enforceable contract between the parties. Likewise, not all duties that agents and principals owe each other end with the relationship. The Chapter explores the rationales for duties at the temporal peripheries for an agency relationship and the extent to which they are derived from doctrines distinct from agency …
The Conflicted Advice Problem: A Response To Conflicts & Capital Allocation, Gina-Gail S. Fletcher
The Conflicted Advice Problem: A Response To Conflicts & Capital Allocation, Gina-Gail S. Fletcher
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Fiduciary Principles In Agency Law, Deborah A. Demott
Fiduciary Principles In Agency Law, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Corporate Officers As Agents, Deborah A. Demott
Corporate Officers As Agents, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
Although officers are crucial to corporate operations, scholarly and theoretical accounts tend to slight officers and amalgamate them with directors into a single category, "managers." This essay anchors officers within the common law of agency-as does black-letter law-which crisply differentiates officers from directors. Understanding that agency is central of the legal account of officers' positions and responsibilities is crucial to seeing why, like directors, officers are fiduciaries, but distinctively so, not as instances of generic "corporate fiduciaries." Officers, like directors, owe duties of loyalty, but also particularized duties of care, competence, and diligence. Additionally, officers' duties of performance encompass two …
Fiduciary Contours: Perspectives On Mutual Funds And Private Funds, Deborah A. Demott
Fiduciary Contours: Perspectives On Mutual Funds And Private Funds, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
The thesis of this essay, written as a chapter in a forthcoming book, is that in the mutual fund context, the specifics of fiduciary duty reflect the distinctive qualities of this form of investment in securities. The particular contours that shape fiduciary duty reflect many factors, including the highly prescriptive regulatory context distinctively applicable to mutual funds. To sharpen its depiction of the fiduciary distinctiveness of mutual funds, I draw contrasts with two other avenues through which an investor may delegate investment choice: (1) "private" funds, that is, vehicles for pooled investments that are not subject to the full regulatory …
Culpable Participation In Fiduciary Breach, Deborah A. Demott
Culpable Participation In Fiduciary Breach, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
This essay makes a case for the salience of tort law to fiduciary law, focusing on actors who culpably participate in a fiduciary's breach of duty, whether by inducing the breach or lending substantial assistance to it. Although the elements of this accessory tort are relatively settled in the United States, how the tort applies to particular categories of actors-most recently investment bankers who serve as M&A advisors-provokes controversy. The paper also explores the less developed terrain of primary actors who breach governance duties that are not fiduciary obligations because the entity's organizational documents eliminate fiduciary duties, as Delaware law …
Accessory Disloyalty: Comparative Perspectives On Substantial Assistance To Fiduciary Breach, Deborah A. Demott
Accessory Disloyalty: Comparative Perspectives On Substantial Assistance To Fiduciary Breach, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
Culpable participation in a fiduciary's breach of duty is independently wrongful. Much about this contingent form of liability is open to dispute. In the United States, well-established general doctrine defines the elements requisite to establishing accessory liability, which is categorized as a tort and often referred to as "aiding-and abetting" liability. What's controversial is how the tort applies to particular categories of actors, most recently investment banks that advise boards of target companies in M&A transactions. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, accessory liability in connection with a breach of trust or fiduciary duty is controversial because the law is …
Fiduciary Breach, Once Removed, Deborah A. Demott
Fiduciary Breach, Once Removed, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Relationships Of Trust And Confidence In The Workplace, Deborah A. Demott
Relationships Of Trust And Confidence In The Workplace, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Fiduciary Character Of Agency And The Interpretation Of Instructions, Deborah A. Demott
The Fiduciary Character Of Agency And The Interpretation Of Instructions, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter in a forthcoming book justifies the conventional characterization of common-law agency as a fiduciary relationship. An agent serves as the principal’s representative in dealings with third parties and facts about the world, situating the agent as an extension of the principal for legally-salient purposes. A principal’s power to furnish instructions to the agent is the fundamental mechanism through which the principal exercises control over the agent, a requisite for an agency relationship. The agent’s fiduciary duty to the principal provides a benchmark for the agent’s interpretation of those instructions. The chapter draws on philosophical literature on the identity …
Causation In The Fiduciary Realm, Deborah A. Demott
Causation In The Fiduciary Realm, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Fiduciaries With Conflicting Obligations, Steven L. Schwarcz
Fiduciaries With Conflicting Obligations, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This Article examines the dilemma of a fiduciary acting for parties who, as among themselves, have conflicting commercial interests - an inquiry fundamentally different from that of the traditional study of conflicts between fiduciaries and their beneficiaries. Existing legal principles do not fully capture this dilemma because agency law focuses primarily on an agent’s duty to a given principal, not on conflicts among principals; trust law focuses primarily on gratuitous transfers; and commercial law generally addresses arm’s length, not fiduciary, relationships. The dilemma has become critically important, however, as defaults increase in the multitude of conflicting securities (e.g., classes of …
Responsible Sovereign Lending And Borrowing, Mitu Gulati, Lee C. Buchheit
Responsible Sovereign Lending And Borrowing, Mitu Gulati, Lee C. Buchheit
Faculty Scholarship
There are three reasons for attempting to reach a common understanding of the responsibilities of sovereign borrowers and their lenders. First, the flow of capital to sovereign debtors is exceptionally important to the world economy. Industrialized countries rely on it to finance their budget deficits, these days to a breathtaking extent. Developing countries need it to develop. Misbehaviour, either by the sovereign debtors or by the creditors, destabilizes this key component of the international financial system, making credit less available and more costly.
Second, sovereign finance is uniquely unforgiving of mistakes. Unlike corporate or personal debtors, sovereigns do not have …
Keynote Address: The Conflicted Trustee Dilemma, Steven L. Schwarcz
Keynote Address: The Conflicted Trustee Dilemma, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
A Quarter-Century Of Transition In The New York Law Of Trusts And Estates, Bertel M. Sparks
A Quarter-Century Of Transition In The New York Law Of Trusts And Estates, Bertel M. Sparks
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Developments In Contract Liability Of Trusts And Trustees, John D. Johnston Jr.
Developments In Contract Liability Of Trusts And Trustees, John D. Johnston Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.