Law Commons^™

Dysfunction, Deference, And Judicial Review, Barry Friedman, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

This symposium poses a provocative question: Should judges exercising the power of judicial review defer to the political branches as a means of giving voice to the “will of the people”? The inquiry assumes a connection between majority will and the outputs of the political branches—a connection we argue is frayed, at best, in the current political context.

In the first part of this Essay, we highlight how well-known aspects of our political system—ranging from representational distortions in federal and state governments to the relationship between partisan polarization and the behavior of elected officials—call into question whether political outcomes reliably …

Race And Guns, Courts And Democracy, Joseph Blocher, Reva B. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

Is racism in gun regulation reason to look to the Supreme Court to expand Second Amendment rights? While discussion of race and guns recurs across the briefs in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen, it is especially prominent in the brief of legal aid attorneys and public defenders who employed their Second Amendment arguments to showcase stories of racial bias in the enforcement of New York’s licensing and gun possession laws. Because this Second Amendment claim came from a coalition on the left, it was widely celebrated by gun rights advocates.

In this Essay we address issues …

Packing And Unpacking State Courts, Marin K. Levy

Faculty Scholarship

When it comes to court packing, questions of “should” and “can” are inextricably intertwined. The conventional wisdom has long been that federal court packing is something the President and Congress simply cannot do. Even though the Constitution’s text does not directly prohibit expanding or contracting the size of courts for political gain, many have argued that there is a longstanding norm against doing so, stemming from a commitment to judicial independence and separation of powers. And so (the argument goes), even though the political branches might otherwise be tempted to add or subtract seats to change the Court’s ideological makeup, …

The Paradoxical Impact Of Scalia's Campaign Against Legislative History, Stuart Minor Benjamin, Kristen M. Renberg

Faculty Scholarship

Beginning in 1985, Judge and then Justice Antonin Scalia advocated forcefully against the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia’s position, in line with his textualism, was that legislative history was irrelevant and judges should avoid invoking it. Reactions to his attacks among Justices and prominent circuit judges had an ideological quality, with greater support from ideological conservatives. In this Article, we consider the role that political party and timing of judicial nomination played in circuit judges’ use of legislative history. Specifically, we hypothesize that Republican circuit judges were more likely to respond to the attacks on legislative …

The Well-Intentioned Purpose But Weak Epistemological Foundation Of Originalism, George C. Christie

Faculty Scholarship

The attraction of an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation is understandable. It is maintained that only that method can provide the judicial objectivity and certainty that constitutional adjudication requires. They claim that the traditional common-law evolutionary approach leads Supreme Court Justices to succumb to the temptation to fill in gaps in constitutional law and thereby ignore that major expansions in constitutional meaning and should be made in the way the Founders envisioned, namely by amendment of the Constitution. However difficult or impractical that process may be, it is the only way to avoid the politicization of the Court. Whether that …

Judicial Intervention As Judicial Restraint, Guy-Uriel Charles, Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer

Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines the Court's decision in Gil v. Whitford. It advances two claims. First, it provides a comprehensive account of the Court's skepticism of judicial supervision of democratic politics, an account that we call the narrative of nonintervention. It situates Gill within that account and argues that the Court's reluctance to intervene is a function of the Court's institutional calculus that it ought to protect its legitimacy and institutional capital when it engages in what look like political fights. Second, the paper provides an instrumentalist account for judicial intervention. It argues that the Court should intervene to prevent partisan …

Reynolds Reconsidered, Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The National Security State: The End Of Separation Of Powers, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Plenary Power Preemption, Kerry Abrams

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Public Funding Of Judicial Campaigns: The North Carolina Experience And The Activism Of The Supreme Court, Paul D. Carrington

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, the problem of selecting judges to sit on the highest state courts has become a national crisis. North Carolina remains among the states whose constitutions require competitive elections of all its judges. Presently, all candidates for its judicial offices must first compete for election in a non-partisan primary, a system motivated by the desire to maximize the power of the state’s citizen-voters to choose their judges and hold them accountable for their fidelity to the law. Some observers have continued to celebrate such judicial elections as an honorable democratic empowerment, while others have not. The disagreement has …

All Rise - Standing In Judge Betty Fletcher’S Court, Thomas D. Rowe Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Interring The Rhetoric Of Judicial Activism, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

For decades, leaders of the Republican Party have decried “judicial activism” and championed “judicial restraint.” For much of that time, Republican politicians have equated judicial restraint with a commitment to judicial deference, asserting that “activist” judges disrespect the will of popular majorities. More recently, as the Republican Party has solidified its control of the federal courts and made its own claims on the Constitution, Republican politicians have tended to define judicial activism in potentially conflicting ways, mixing deference frames with claims about the autonomy of law from mere politics or personal beliefs.

In this Article, I examine these two ways …

A System Of Wholesale Denial Of Rights, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Marshall’S Questions, Walter E. Dellinger Iii, H. Jefferson Powell

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Rehnquist Court & Justice: An Oxymoron?, Erwin Chemerinsky

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Judicial Restraint In The Administrative State: Beyond The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

Arguments for judicial restraint point to some kind of judicial deficit (such as a democratic or an epistemic deficit) as grounds for limiting judicial review. ("Judicial review" is used in this Article to mean, essentially, the judicial invalidation of statutes, rules, orders and actions in virtue of the Bill of Rights, or similar unwritten criteria.). The most influential argument for judicial restraint has been the Countermajoritarian Difficulty. This is a legislature-centered argument: one that points to features of *legislatures*, as grounds for courts to refrain from invalidating *statutes*. This Article seeks to recast scholarly debate about judicial restraint, and to …

Judicial Responses To The Recent Enforcement Activities Of The Federal Banking Regulators, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

What The Constitution Means By Executive Power, Charles J. Cooper, Orrin Hatch, Eugene V. Rowstow, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Wrong Questions Get Wrong Answers: An Analysis Of Professor Carter’S Approach To Judicial Review, Erwin Chemerinsky

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Price Of Asking The Wrong Question: An Essay On Constitutional Scholarship And Judicial Review, Erwin Chemerinsky

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Judicial Power, The “Political Question Doctrine,” And Foreign Relations, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.