Law Commons^™

Not The Power To Destroy: An Effects Theory Of The Tax Power, Neil S. Siegel, Robert D. Cooter

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s “new federalism” decisions impose modest limits on the regulatory authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause. According to those decisions, the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to use penalties to regulate interstate commerce, but not to regulate noncommercial conduct. What prevents Congress from penalizing non-commercial conduct by calling a penalty a tax and invoking the Taxing Clause? The only obstacle is the distinction between a penalty and a tax for purposes of Article I, Section 8. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB), the Court considered whether the minimum coverage provision in the Patient …

On The Constitutionality Of Health Care Reform, Barak D. Richman

Faculty Scholarship

This commentary describes the legal challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory Of Article I, Section 8, Neil S. Siegel, Robert D. Cooter

Faculty Scholarship

The Framers of the United States Constitution wrote Article I, Section 8 in order to address some daunting collective action problems facing the young nation. They especially wanted to protect the states from military warfare by foreigners and from commercial warfare against one another. The states acted individually when they needed to act collectively, and Congress lacked power under the Articles of Confederation to address these problems. Section 8 thus authorized Congress to promote the “general Welfare” of the United States by tackling many collective action problems that the states could not solve on their own.

Subsequent interpretations of Section …