Law Commons^™

Signing Statements And Presidentializing Legislative History, John De Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz

Faculty Scholarship

Presidents often attach statements to the bills they sign into law, purporting to celebrate, construe, or object to provisions in the statute. Though long a feature of U.S. lawmaking, the President has avowedly attempted to use these signing statements as tool of strategic influence over judicial decision making since the 1980s — as a way of creating “presidential legislative history” to supplement and, at times, supplant the traditional congressional legislative history conventionally used by the courts to interpret statutes. In this Article, we examine a novel dataset of judicial opinion citations to presidential signing statements to conduct the most comprehensive …

Democratic Rulemaking, John M. De Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz

Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a “democratic” benchmark based on voter preferences, and a “republican” benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research.

Regulatory Exit, J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman

Faculty Scholarship

Exit is a ubiquitous feature of life, whether breaking up in a marriage, dropping a college course, or pulling out of a venture capital investment. In fact, our exit options often determine whether and how we enter in the first place. While legal scholarship is replete with studies of exit strategies for businesses and individuals, the topic of exit has barely been touched in administrative law scholarship. Yet exit plays just as central a role in the regulatory state as elsewhere – welfare support ends; government steps out of rate-setting. In this article, we argue that exit is a fundamental …

Responding To Agency Avoidance Of Oira, Nina A. Mendelson, Jonathan B. Wiener

Faculty Scholarship

Concerns have recently been raised that US federal agencies may sometimes avoid regulatory review by the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). In this article, we assess the seriousness of such potential avoidance, and we recommend a framework for evaluating potential responses. After summarizing the system of presidential regulatory oversight through OIRA review, we analyze the incentives for agencies to cooperate with or avoid OIRA. We identify a wider array of agency avoidance tactics than has past scholarship, and a wider array of corresponding response options available to OIRA, the President, Congress, and the courts. We argue …

Who Can’T Raise Capital? The Scylla And Charybdis Of Capital Formation, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

There has long been complaints that the heavy regulatory hand of Blue Sky Law administrators prevents capital formation by small issuers. Using data recently collected by the SEC, the article reasons that the problems capital starved small issuers encounter is not the state regulator. The problems are elsewhere. The paper explores whether intermediation may ultimately enable more startups to raise needed funds. For this to occur, however, the paper explores the formidable obstacles the broker must overcome in meeting demanding suitability requirements.

The Crucial But (Potentially) Precarious Position Of The Chief Compliance Officer, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

This Article, written for a symposium on compliance issues in financial-services firms, focuses on the role of the chief compliance officer (“CCO”). Contrasting the position with that held by a firm’s general counsel or Chief Legal Officer (CLO), the article argues that a CCO’s position holds distinct challenges. Additionally, although internal compliance systems and personnel may be characterized as functional substitutes for external regulation, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of internal compliance requires a willingness to look deep within firms. The article argues that the law and regulation may enhance firms’ incentives to invest in effective internal compliance but may …

Ring-Fencing, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

“Ring-fencing” is often touted as a regulatory solution to problems in banking, finance, public utilities, and insurance. However, both the precise meaning of ring-fencing, as well as the nature of the problems that ring-fencing regulation purports to solve, are ill defined. This article examines the functions and conceptual foundations of ring-fencing. In a regulatory context, the term can best be understood as legally deconstructing a firm in order to more optimally reallocate and reduce risk. So utilized, ring-fencing can help to protect public-benefit activities performed by private-sector firms, as well as to mitigate systemic risk and the too-big-to-fail problem inherent …

Simplifying The Standard Of Review In North Carolina Administrative Appeals, Sarah H. Ludington

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Regulatory Techniques And Liability Regimes For Asset Managers, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Marginalizing Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

A major focus of finance is reducing risk on investments, a goal commonly achieved by dispersing the risk among numerous investors. Sometimes, however, risk dispersion can cause investors to underestimate and under-protect against risk. Risk can even be so widely dispersed that rational investors individually lack the incentive to monitor it. This Article examines the market failures resulting from risk dispersion and analyzes when government regulation may be necessary or appropriate to limit these market failures. The Article also examines how such regulation should be designed,including the extent to which it should limit risk dispersion in the first instance.

Adaptive Regulation In The Amoral Bazaar, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

Twelfth Oliver Schreiner Memorial Lecture,delivered on 20 October 2010 at the School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. Many gradual changes in science, law and society are crystallizing to shape a significant transformation in administrative law. The doctrinal framework within which Justice Schreiner himself attempted to modernize how law should regulate government and private economic activity seems from our vantage point to be quite antiquated. In explaining why, my examples will come from the world of financial services, but they could easily be found anywhere in the area of law and regulation. First I will outline the …

Leverhulme Lecture: The Future Of Securitization, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Lecture given November 11, 2010, the third of three delivered by Prof. Schwarcz as Leverhulme Visiting Professor of Law, Oxford University.

The securitization of subprime mortgage loans is widely viewed as a root cause of the financial crisis. This lecture balances the costs and benefits of securitization, focusing on what went wrong and on what needs to be fixed to curtail securitization’s abuses and make it viable again as an important financing tool. Finally, the lecture examines alternatives to securitization, focusing on covered bonds and comparing and contrasting covered bonds and securitization.

Leverhulme Lecture: Regulating Complexity In Financial Markets, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Lecture given November 9, 2010, the second of three delivered by Prof. Schwarcz as Leverhulme Visiting Professor of Law, Oxford University.

Complexity is the greatest challenge to 21st Century financial regulation, having the potential to impair markets and investments in several interrelated ways. Furthermore, complexity can cause failures that individual market participants cannot, or will not have incentive to, remedy. These failures are driven by information uncertainty, misalignment of interests and incentives among market participants, and nonlinear feedback and tight coupling that result in sudden unexpected market changes. These are the same types of failures that engineers have long faced …

Price And Pretense In The Baby Market, Kimberly D. Krawiec

Faculty Scholarship

Throughout the world, baby selling is formally prohibited. And throughout the world babies are bought and sold each day. As demonstrated in this Essay, the legal baby trade is a global market in which prospective parents pay, scores of intermediaries profit, and the demand for children is clearly differentiated by age, race, special needs, and other consumer preferences, with prices ranging from zero to over one hundred thousand dollars. Yet legal regimes and policymakers around the world pretend that the baby market does not exist, most notably through prohibitions against “baby selling” – typically defined as a prohibition against the …

Public Choice And Environmental Policy: A Review Of The Literature, Christopher H. Schroeder

Faculty Scholarship

This paper is a draft of a chapter for a forthcoming book, Research Handbook in Public Law and Public Choice, edited by Daniel Farber and Anne Joseph O'Connell, to be published by Elgar. It reviews the public choice literature on environmental policy making, first generally and then with respect to four fundamental environmental policy questions: (1) whether or not government action is warranted; (2) if it is, the scope and stringency of the government action, including the manner in which a bureaucracy will implement and enforce any statutory standards; (3) the level of government that assumes responsibility; and (4) the …

Leverhulme Lecture: The Global Financial Crisis And Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Lecture given November 9, 2010, is the first of three delivered by Prof. Schwarcz as Leverhulme Visiting Professor of Law, Oxford University. Prof. Schwarz examines the causes of the global financial crisis, showing it was triggered by market failures, not by financial institution failures, and arguing that any regulatory framework for managing systemic risk must address markets as well as institutions. The lecture also analyzes how regulation should be designed under that broader framework to mitigate systemic risk and its consequences. Finally, the lecture examines the potential systemic effects of sovereign debt crises, demonstrating how regulation can mitigate those effects.

Book Review, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

Reviewing, N. Scott Arnold, Imposing Values: An Essay on Liberalism and Regulation (2009)

Administrative Law Agonistes, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger Noll, Barry R. Weingast, Daniel B. Rodriguez

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Foreword: Making Sense Of Information For Environmental Protection, James Salzman, Douglas A. Kysar

Faculty Scholarship

Despite the ubiquity of information, no one has proposed calling the present era the Knowledge Age. Knowledge depends not only on access to reliable information, but also on sound judgment regarding which information to access and how to situate that information in relation to the values and purposes that comprise the individual's or the social group's larger projects. This is certainly the case for wise and effective environmental governance. A regulator needs accurate information to understand the nature of a problem and the consequences of potential responses. Likewise, the regulated community needs information to decide how best to comply with …

Who’S Afraid Of The Apa? What The Patent System Can Learn From Administrative Law, Stuart M. Benjamin, Arti K. Rai

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, widespread dissatisfaction with the perceived poor quality of issued patents has spurred a diverse range of groups to call for reform of administrative procedures. Strikingly, however, most calls for reform pay little attention to principles of administrative law. Similarly, judges (in particular the judges of the Federal Circuit) have treated patent law as an exception to the Administrative Procedure Act, and to administrative law more generally. In this Article, Professors Benjamin and Rai contend that this treatment is doctrinally incorrect and normatively undesirable. Standard principles of administrative law provide the appropriate approach for judicial review in the …

Regulating Section 527 Organizations, Guy-Uriel Charles, Gregg D. Polsky

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Three Generations Of Participation Rights In European Administrative Proceedings, Francesca E. Bignami

Faculty Scholarship

This paper develops a conceptual framework for analyzing the development of participation rights in Community administration from the early 1970's to the present day. Procedural rights can be divided into three categories, each of which is associated with a distinct phase in Community history and a particular set of institutional actors. The first set of rights, the right to a fair hearing when the Commission inflicts sanctions or other forms of hardship on individuals, first emerged in the 1970's in the context of competition proceedings and later in areas such as anti-dumping and structural funds. This phase was driven by …

Beyond Efficiency And Procedure: A Welfarist Theory Of Regulation, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

Normative scholarship about regulation has been dominated by two types of theories, which I term "Neoclassical" and "Proceduralist." A Neoclassical theory has the following features: it adopts a simple preference-based view of well-being, and it counts Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as one of the basic normative criteria relevant to the evaluation of regulatory programs. A Proceduralist theory is concerned, not solely with the quality of regulatory outcomes, but also with the governmental procedures that produce these outcomes: it gives intrinsic significance to the procedures that regulatory bodies follow. (One example of a Proceduralist theory is the civic republican theory of regulation advanced …

The Democratic Deficit In European Community Rulemaking: A Call For Notice And Comment In Comitology, Francesca E. Bignami

Faculty Scholarship

Parliamentary democracy is the dominant paradigm in the European Community's democratic deficit debate.

Law And Economics In The Creation Of Federal Administrative Law: Thomas Cooley, Elder To The Republic, Paul D. Carrington

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Politics, Institutions, And Outcomes: Electricity Regulation In Argentina And Chile, William B. Heller, Mathew D. Mccubbins

Faculty Scholarship

Risk, whether market or political, is an important determinant of private investment decisions. One important risk, subject to control by the government, is the risk associated with the hold-up problem: governments can force utilities to shoulder burdensome taxes, to use input factors ineffectively, or to charge unprofitable rates for their service. To attract private investment governments must be able to make commitments to policies that are nonexpropriative (either to contracts that guarantee very high rates of return or to favorable regulatory policies). These commitments, of course, must be credible.

Judgments about the credibility of commitments to regulatory policies are based …

Administrative And Judicial Review Of Prompt Corrective Action Decisions By The Federal Banking Regulators, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Rule-Making And Policy Formulation In South African Administrative-Law Reform, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Developments In The Regulation Of The Close Corporation, F. Hodge O'Neal

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

To What Extent Should The Decisions Of Administrative Bodies Be Reviewable By The Courts, Malcolm Mcdermott

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.