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Duke Law

Faculty Scholarship

Series

2013

Freedom of speech

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

Algorithms And Speech, Stuart M. Benjamin Jan 2013

Algorithms And Speech, Stuart M. Benjamin

Faculty Scholarship

One of the central questions in free speech jurisprudence is what activities the First Amendment encompasses. This Article considers that question in the context of an area of increasing importance – algorithm-based decisions. I begin by looking to broadly accepted legal sources, which for the First Amendment means primarily Supreme Court jurisprudence. That jurisprudence provides for very broad First Amendment coverage, and the Court has reinforced that breadth in recent cases. Under the Court’s jurisprudence the First Amendment (and the heightened scrutiny it entails) would apply to many algorithm-based decisions, specifically those entailing substantive communications. We could of course adopt …


Analogies And Institutions In The First And Second Amendments: A Response To Professor Magarian, Darrell A.H. Miller Jan 2013

Analogies And Institutions In The First And Second Amendments: A Response To Professor Magarian, Darrell A.H. Miller

Faculty Scholarship

In this essay, Professor Darrell Miller responds to Professor Gregory Magarian's criticism of the manner in which judges, advocates, and scholars have used the First Amendment to frame Second Amendment interpretive questions.


Implementing First Amendment Institutionalism, Joseph Blocher Jan 2013

Implementing First Amendment Institutionalism, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Nonsense And The Freedom Of Speech: What Meaning Means For The First Amendment, Joseph Blocher Jan 2013

Nonsense And The Freedom Of Speech: What Meaning Means For The First Amendment, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

A great deal of everyday expression is, strictly speaking, nonsense. But courts and scholars have done little to consider whether or why such meaningless speech, like nonrepresentational art, falls within “the freedom of speech.” If, as many suggest, meaning is what separates speech from sound and expression from conduct, then the constitutional case for nonsense is complicated. And because nonsense is so common, the case is also important — artists like Lewis Carroll and Jackson Pollock are not the only putative “speakers” who should be concerned about the outcome.

This Article is the first to explore thoroughly the relationship between …


La Interseccion De La Responsabilidad Extracontractual Y El Derecho Constitucional Y Los Derechos Humanos, George C. Christie Jan 2013

La Interseccion De La Responsabilidad Extracontractual Y El Derecho Constitucional Y Los Derechos Humanos, George C. Christie

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.