Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Cornell University Law School

Business Organizations Law

Articles 1 - 30 of 122

Full-Text Articles in Law

Chimanga Changa Limited V Export Trading Limited (Scz Appeal No. 3 Of 2022), Ntemena Mwanamwambwa, Chenela Mwale-Simbotwe Nov 2022

Chimanga Changa Limited V Export Trading Limited (Scz Appeal No. 3 Of 2022), Ntemena Mwanamwambwa, Chenela Mwale-Simbotwe

SAIPAR Case Review

The Supreme Court’s decision in Chimanga Changa has set a clear and resounding tone as well as a sound precedent in the Jurisprudence of Zambian Corporate Insolvency law, specifically in relation to how voluntary business rescue proceedings should be commenced, when they commence and most importantly that an application objecting to the commencement of business rescue proceedings pursuant to section 22(1), does not answer to the definition of a legal proceeding for purposes of effecting a moratorium within the confines of section 25 of the Act.


Livingstone Motor Assemblers Limited (In Receivership) V Indeco Estates Development Company And Others (Supreme Court Judgment No. 1 Of 2013), Ntemena Mwanamwambwa Nov 2022

Livingstone Motor Assemblers Limited (In Receivership) V Indeco Estates Development Company And Others (Supreme Court Judgment No. 1 Of 2013), Ntemena Mwanamwambwa

SAIPAR Case Review

The appeal stems from a winding-up petition filed in the High Court by the respondents seeking an order to commence winding-up proceedings as well as the appointment of a liquidator in respect of the appellant, Livingstone Motor Assemblers Limited. The latter was heavily indebted to several creditors, including the respondents and the Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZANACO) which had commenced receivership proceedings and appointed a receiver/manager extra judiciously, prior to the High Court granting the winding-up order. Disgruntled by the grant of the order, the receiver/manager made an application to vary it so that only he would retain possession of …


Ackim Chirwa, Levy Joseph Ngoma And U-Fuel (Z) Limited V. Mini Mart Development Corporation Limited Caz Appeal No. 68/2021, Chanda Chungu Nov 2022

Ackim Chirwa, Levy Joseph Ngoma And U-Fuel (Z) Limited V. Mini Mart Development Corporation Limited Caz Appeal No. 68/2021, Chanda Chungu

SAIPAR Case Review

No abstract provided.


Madison Investment, Property And Advisory Company Limited V Peter Kanyinji [2018] Zmsc 348 (Scz Selected Judgement No. 48 Of 2018), Ntemena Mwanamwambwa Apr 2022

Madison Investment, Property And Advisory Company Limited V Peter Kanyinji [2018] Zmsc 348 (Scz Selected Judgement No. 48 Of 2018), Ntemena Mwanamwambwa

SAIPAR Case Review

The case at hand brings to the fore, a number of important matters relating to the treatment of a company which has a controlling shareholding in another while at the same time belonging to the same group of companies as the latter.

The case is particularly important to the jurisprudence of Zambian Company law as it endorses the sacredness of the veil over group structures in maintaining investor confidence and preventing the economic liabilities that would unsuspectingly befall local as well as multinational companies operating within a group structure.


Madison Investment, Property And Advisory Company Limited V. Peter Kanyinji Scz Selected Judgment No. 48 Of 2018, Chanda Chungu Apr 2022

Madison Investment, Property And Advisory Company Limited V. Peter Kanyinji Scz Selected Judgment No. 48 Of 2018, Chanda Chungu

SAIPAR Case Review

The Managing Director of Perfect Milling Company was entitled to 25% gratuity of his basic salary at the end of his term as Managing director. However, when he launched a claim against Perfect Milling Company, the company was in bankruptcy and unable to pay. He then sued Madison Investment, claiming that they operated as a single economic unit under the Madison Group of Companies.

The High Court in a judgment delivered by Banda-Bobo J (as she was then) held that notwithstanding the principle that companies have a separate legal identity, the court is empowered to pierce it in certain circumstances …


Are Publicly Traded Corporations Disappearing?, Margaret M. Blair Mar 2020

Are Publicly Traded Corporations Disappearing?, Margaret M. Blair

Cornell Law Review

Corporate law scholars and economists have expressed concern recently about the fact that the number of publicly traded corporations in the United States has declined significantly since a peak in the late 1990s. In this Essay, in honor of the late Professor Lynn Stout, who devoted much of her career to the study of large publicly traded corporations, I show that despite a decline in the number of such corporations in the last two decades, they collectively account for about the same share of total economic activity as they have for the last six decades. While there has been turnover …


Corporate Law And The Myth Of Efficient Market Control, William W. Bratton, Simone M. Sepe Mar 2020

Corporate Law And The Myth Of Efficient Market Control, William W. Bratton, Simone M. Sepe

Cornell Law Review

In recent times, there has been an unprecedented shift in power from managers to shareholders, a shift that realizes the long-held theoretical aspiration of market control of the corporation. This Article subjects the market control paradigm to comprehensive economic examination and finds it wanting.

The market control paradigm relies on a narrow economic model that focuses on one problem only: management agency costs. With the rise of shareholder power, we need a wider lens that also takes in market prices, investor incentives, and information asymmetries. General equilibrium (GE) theory provides that lens. Several lessons follow from reference to this higher-order …


Cryptocommunity Currencies, J. S. Nelson Mar 2020

Cryptocommunity Currencies, J. S. Nelson

Cornell Law Review

What are cryptocurrencies: securities, commodities, or something else? Maybe they are a new form of established currency-a non-sovereign fiat currency. Like other self-governing bodies, the communities that issue cryptocurrencies should be judged on how well they support their currencies. This analysis is not meaningfully different from how we have evaluated traditional sovereign issuers of currency. Indeed, as traditional-sovereign-issued currency becomes entirely digital, functional distinctions between traditionally sovereign-backed flat currency and widely accepted non-sovereign fat currency start to disappear. The primary way then to distinguish the value of such currencies from each other becomes the quality of their institutional backing. Through …


Introduction, Saule T. Omarova, Diogo Magalhaes Mar 2020

Introduction, Saule T. Omarova, Diogo Magalhaes

Cornell Law Review

No abstract provided.


Artificial Agents In Corporate Boardrooms, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci Mar 2020

Artificial Agents In Corporate Boardrooms, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci

Cornell Law Review

Thousands of years ago, Roman businessmen often ran joint businesses through commonly owned, highly intelligent slaves. Roman slaves did not have full legal capacity and were considered property of their co-owners. Now business corporations are looking to delegate decision-making to uber-intelligent machines through the use of artificial intelligence in boardrooms. Artificial intelligence in boardrooms could assist, integrate, or even replace human directors. However, the concept of using artificial intelligence in boardrooms is largely unexplored and raises several issues. This Article sheds light on legal and policy challenges concerning artificial agents in boardrooms. The arguments revolve around two fundamental questions: (1) …


Remutualization, Erik F. Gerding Mar 2020

Remutualization, Erik F. Gerding

Cornell Law Review

This Article explores how returning to common law or traditional approaches to financial institution governance can inform and improve a range of financial reforms. In particular, this Article seeks to revive the use of organizational form as a tool of financial regulation. Very old varietals, including partnerships and mutual companies, decanted in new bottles can promote financial stability, lower incentives for excessive risk-taking by financial intermediaries, provide mechanisms to police their market conduct, and better align their incentives with the interests of their customers and consumers.


Toward A Horizontal Fiduciary Duty In Corporate Law, Asaf Eckstein, Gideon Parchomovsky May 2019

Toward A Horizontal Fiduciary Duty In Corporate Law, Asaf Eckstein, Gideon Parchomovsky

Cornell Law Review

Fiduciary duty is arguably the single most important aspect of our corporate law system. It consists of two distinct subduties-a duty of care and a duty of loyalty-and it applies to all directors and corporate officers. Yet, under extant law, the duty only applies vertically, in the relationship between directors and corporate officers and the firm. At present, there exists no horizontal fiduciary duty: directors and corporate officers owe no fiduciary duty to each other. Consequently, if one of them falls her peers, they cannot seek direct legal recourse against her even when they stand to suffer significant reputational and …


Impersonal Personhood: Crafting A Coherent Theory Of The Corporate Entity, Bryan P. Magee Jan 2019

Impersonal Personhood: Crafting A Coherent Theory Of The Corporate Entity, Bryan P. Magee

Cornell Law Review

Corporate legal personhood is a baffling and elusive concept. Are corporations persons and, if so, what does this mean? Ascribing the moniker of "person" to a corporation can conjure up the idea that a corporate entity is entitled to all the natural and legal rights that natural "personhood" entails. This, however, ignores that there are different kinds of "legal person" and that the scope of their respective rights differs based on the purpose of the personhood they are given. This Note posits that the law grants corporations entity-hood primarily to centralize contractual rights and obligations. This purpose, this Note contends, …


Activist Directors And Agency Costs: What Happens When An Activist Director Goes On The Board, John C. Coffee Jr., Robert J. Jackson Jr., Joshua R. Mitts, Robert E. Bishop Jan 2019

Activist Directors And Agency Costs: What Happens When An Activist Director Goes On The Board, John C. Coffee Jr., Robert J. Jackson Jr., Joshua R. Mitts, Robert E. Bishop

Cornell Law Review

We develop and apply a new and more rigorous methodology by which to measure and understand both informed trading and the agency costs of hedge fund activism. We use quantitative data to show a systematic relationship between the appointment of a hedge fund-nominated director to a corporate board and an increase in informed trading in that corporation's stock (with the relationship being most pronounced when the fund's slate of directors includes a hedge fund employee). This finding is important from two different perspectives. First, from a governance perspective, activist hedge funds represent a new and potent force in corporate governance. …


Will Delaware Be Different? An Empirical Study Of Tc Heartland And The Shift To Defendant Choice Of Venue, Ofer Eldar, Neel U. Sukhatme Nov 2018

Will Delaware Be Different? An Empirical Study Of Tc Heartland And The Shift To Defendant Choice Of Venue, Ofer Eldar, Neel U. Sukhatme

Cornell Law Review

Why do some venues evolve into litigation havens while others do not? Venues might compete for litigation for various reasons, like enhancing their judges’ prestige and increasing revenues for the local bar. This competition is framed by the party that chooses the venue. Whether plaintiffs or defendants primarily choose venue is crucial because, we argue, the two scenarios are not symmetrical.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods LLC illustrates this dynamic. There, the Court effectively shifted venue choice in many patent infringement cases from plaintiffs to corporate defendants. We use TC Heartland to empirically …


Sustainable Finance & China’S Green Credit Reforms: A Test Case For Bank Monitoring Of Environmental Risk, Virginia Harper Ho Oct 2018

Sustainable Finance & China’S Green Credit Reforms: A Test Case For Bank Monitoring Of Environmental Risk, Virginia Harper Ho

Cornell International Law Journal

In the past few years, the focus of international organizations on sustainable finance— the integration of environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) considerations into global financial systems— has intensified because of its potential to promote financial stability, better risk assessment, and more efficient allocation of capital. The success of these efforts depends in part on whether banks and other financial institutions can manage, price, and monitor environmental risk.

This Article offers new answers to this question from China— one of the most important global test sites for sustainable finance. Corporate governance theory suggests that creditor monitoring can promote managerial accountability and …


A Cooperative Federalism Approach To Shareholder Arbitration, Zachary D. Clopton, Verity Winship Jul 2018

A Cooperative Federalism Approach To Shareholder Arbitration, Zachary D. Clopton, Verity Winship

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Arbitration dominates private law across an ever-expanding range of fields. Its latest target, however, may not be a new field as much as a new form: mandatory arbitration provisions built into corporate charters and bylaws. Recent developments in corporate law coupled with signals from the Securities and Exchange Commission suggest that regulators may be newly receptive to shareholder arbitration. What they do next may have dramatic consequences for whether and how corporate and securities laws are enforced.

The debate about the merits of arbitration is well worn, but its application to shareholder claims opens the door to a different set …


Benefit Corporations: A Proposal For Assessing Liability In Benefit Enforcement Proceedings, Jaime Lee May 2018

Benefit Corporations: A Proposal For Assessing Liability In Benefit Enforcement Proceedings, Jaime Lee

Cornell Law Review

There has been a growing trend of more socially conscious consumption as a new generation of consumers and business leaders rises to the forefront. This trend has elicited a response from existing corporations and entrepreneurs starting new businesses such that socially-minded goals are taken into account in addition to profit-maximizing goals. Because the traditional corporation models restricted the ability of businesses to serve both socially-conscious and profit-maximizing goals simultaneously, new "fourth sector" corporations that combine aspects of the traditional for-profit, non-profit, and government sectors have been increasing in number. The most notable of these "fourth sector" corporations are benefit corporations, …


Contested Visions: The Value Of Systems Theory For Corporate Law, Tamara Belinfanti, Lynn A. Stout Feb 2018

Contested Visions: The Value Of Systems Theory For Corporate Law, Tamara Belinfanti, Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Despite the dominant role corporations play in our economy, culture, and politics, the nature and purpose of corporations remains hotly contested. This conflict was brought to the fore in the recent Supreme Court opinions in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby. Although the prevailing narrative for the past quarter-century has been that corporations “belong” to shareholders and should pursue “shareholder value,” support for this approach, which has been justified as essential for managerial accountability, is eroding. It persists today primarily in the form of the argument that corporations should seek “long-term” shareholder value. Yet, as this Article shows, when shareholder value …


Governance Challenges Of Listed State- Owned Enterprises Around The World: National Experiences And A Framework For Reform, Curtis J. Milhaupt, Mariana Pargendler Oct 2017

Governance Challenges Of Listed State- Owned Enterprises Around The World: National Experiences And A Framework For Reform, Curtis J. Milhaupt, Mariana Pargendler

Cornell International Law Journal

Despite predictions of their demise in the aftermath of the collapse of socialist economies in Eastern Europe, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are very much alive in the global economy. The relevance of listed SOEs— firms subject to government ownership, but with a portion of their shares traded on public stock markets— has persisted and even increased around the world, as policymakers have encouraged the partial floating of SOE shares either as a first step toward, or as an alternative to, privatization. In this Article, we evaluate the governance challenges associated with mixed ownership of enterprise, and examine a variety of national …


"Special," Vestigial, Or Visionary? What Bank Regulation Tells Us About The Corporation - And Vice Versa, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova Jan 2016

"Special," Vestigial, Or Visionary? What Bank Regulation Tells Us About The Corporation - And Vice Versa, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

A remarkable yet seldom noted set of parallels exists between modern U.S. bank regulation, on the one hand, and what used to be garden-variety American corporate law, on the other hand. For example, just as bank charters are matters not of right but of conditional privilege even today, so were all corporate charters not long ago. Just as chartered banks are authorized to engage only in limited, enumerated activities even to- day, so were all corporations restricted not long ago. And just as banks are subject to strict capital regulation even today, so were all corporations not long ago.

In …


Rethinking Chutes: Incentives, Investment, And Innovation, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead Dec 2015

Rethinking Chutes: Incentives, Investment, And Innovation, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Eighty-two percent of public firms have golden parachutes (or “chutes”) under which CEOs and senior officers may be paid tens of millions of dollars upon their employer’s change in control. What justifies such extraordinary payouts?

Much of the conventional analysis views chutes as excessive compensation granted by captured boards, focusing on the payouts that occur following a takeover. Those explanations, if they ever were complete, miss the mark today. This Article demonstrates, theoretically and empirically, that chutes are less relevant to a firm during a takeover than they are before a takeover, particularly in relation to firms that invest in …


Damages Versus Specific Performance: Lessons From Commercial Contracts, Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller Mar 2015

Damages Versus Specific Performance: Lessons From Commercial Contracts, Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Specific performance is a central contractual remedy but, in Anglo-American law, generally is subordinate to damages. Despite rich theoretical discussions of specific performance, little is known about parties' treatment of the remedy in their contracts. We study 2,347 contracts of public corporations to quantify the presence or absence of specific performance clauses in several types of contracts. Although a majority of contracts do not refer to specific performance, substantial variation exists in the rates of including specific performance clauses. High rates of specific performance use in the area of corporate combinations through merger (53.4 percent) or assets sales (45.1 percent), …


Paying For Risk: Bankers, Compensation, And Competition, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead Mar 2015

Paying For Risk: Bankers, Compensation, And Competition, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead

Cornell Law Review

Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong way. They presume that the financial crisis was caused by CEOs who failed to super­vise risk-taking employees. The responses focus on exe­cutive pay, believing that exe­cu­tives will bring non-execu­tives into line—using incen­­­­tives to manage risk-taking—once their own pay is regu­lated. What they over­look is the effect on non-executive pay of the com­pe­­ti­­tion for talent. Even if exe­­cu­tive pay is regu­lated, and exe­cu­tives act in the bank’s best interests, they will still be trapped into providing incentives that encourage risk-taking by non-executives due to the negative exter­nality that arises …


The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional 'Safety And Soundness' To Systematic 'Financial Stability' In Financial Supervision, Robert C. Hockett Jan 2015

The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional 'Safety And Soundness' To Systematic 'Financial Stability' In Financial Supervision, Robert C. Hockett

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Since the global financial dramas of 2008-09, authorities on financial regulation have come increasingly to counsel the inclusion of macroprudential policy instruments in the standard ‘toolkit’ of finance-regulatory measures employed by financial supervisors. The hallmark of this perspective is its focus not simply on the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions, as is characteristic of the traditional ‘microprudential’ perspective, but also on certain structural features of financial systems that can imperil such systems as wholes. Systemic ‘financial stability’ thus comes to supplement, though not to supplant, institutional ‘safety and soundness’ as a regulatory desideratum.

The move from primarily micro- …


Public Actors In Private Markets: Toward A Developmental Finance State, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova Jan 2015

Public Actors In Private Markets: Toward A Developmental Finance State, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The recent financial crisis brought into sharp relief fundamental questions about the social function and purpose of the financial system, including its relation to the “real” economy. This Article argues that, to answer these questions, we must recapture a distinctively American view of the proper relations among state, financial market, and development. This programmatic vision – captured in what we call a “developmental finance state” – is based on three key propositions: (1) that economic and social development is not an “end-state” but a continuing national policy priority; (2) that the modalities of finance are the most potent means of …


The Corporation As A Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, And The Corporate Form, Lynn A. Stout Jan 2015

The Corporation As A Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, And The Corporate Form, Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This Symposium Article argues that the board-controlled corporation can be understood as a legal innovation that historically has functioned as a means of transferring wealth forward and sometimes backward through time, for the benefit of present and future generations. In this fashion the board-controlled corporation promotes both intergenerational equity and intergenerational efficiency. Logic and evidence each suggest, however, that the modern embrace of "shareholder value" as the only corporate objective and "shareholder democracy" as the ideal of corporate governance is damaging the corporate form's ability to serve this economically and ethically important function.


Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences Of "Pay For Performance", Lynn A. Stout Apr 2014

Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences Of "Pay For Performance", Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Contemporary lawmakers and reformers often argue that ex ante incentive contracts providing for large material rewards are the best and possibly only way to motivate corporate executives and other employees to serve their firms' interests. This Article offers a critique of the "pay for performance" approach. In particular, it explores why, for a variety of mutually reinforcing reasons, workplaces that rely on ex ante incentive contracts suppress unselfish prosocial behavior (conscience) and promote selfishness and opportunism. The end result may not be more efficient, but more uncooperative, unethical, and illegal employee behavior.


Paying For Risk: Bankers, Compensation, And Competition, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead Feb 2014

Paying For Risk: Bankers, Compensation, And Competition, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong way. They presume that the financial crisis was caused by CEOs who failed to super­vise risk-taking employees. The responses focus on exe­cutive pay, believing that exe­cu­tives will bring non-execu­tives into line—using incen­­­­tives to manage risk-taking—once their own pay is regu­lated. What they over­look is the effect on non-executive pay of the com­pe­­ti­­tion for talent. Even if exe­­cu­tive pay is regu­lated, and exe­cu­tives act in the bank’s best interests, they will still be trapped into providing incentives that encourage risk-taking by non-executives due to the negative exter­nality that arises …


Lawyers And Fools: Lawyer-Directors In Public Corporations, Lubomir P. Litov, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead Jan 2014

Lawyers And Fools: Lawyer-Directors In Public Corporations, Lubomir P. Litov, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The accepted wisdom—that a lawyer who becomes a corporate director has a fool for a client—is outdated. The benefits of lawyer-directors in today’s world significantly outweigh the costs. Beyond monitoring, they help manage litigation and regulation, as well as structure compensation to align CEO and shareholder interests. The results have been an average 9.5% increase in firm value and an almost doubling in the percentage of public companies with lawyer-directors.

This Article is the first to analyze the rise of lawyer-directors. It makes a variety of other empirical contributions, each of which is statistically significant and large in magnitude. First, …