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Full-Text Articles in Law
Power Transitions In A Troubled Democracy, Peter L. Strauss, Gillian E. Metzger
Power Transitions In A Troubled Democracy, Peter L. Strauss, Gillian E. Metzger
Faculty Scholarship
Written as our contribution to a festschrift for the noted Italian administrative law scholar Marco D’Alberti, this essay addresses transition between Presidents Trump and Biden, in the context of political power transitions in the United States more generally. Although the Trump-Biden transition was marked by extraordinary behaviors and events, we thought even the transition’s mundane elements might prove interesting to those for whom transitions occur in a parliamentary context. There, succession can happen quickly once an election’s results are known, and happens with the new political government immediately formed and in office. The layer of a new administration’s political leadership …
The Guatemalan Presidential Election, Center For The Advancement Of Public Integrity
The Guatemalan Presidential Election, Center For The Advancement Of Public Integrity
Center for the Advancement of Public Integrity (Inactive)
With current President Jimmy Morales’ term concluding in 2020, the presidential election is currently underway in Guatemala to determine his successor. The Constitution of Guatemala prohibits incumbent presidents from running for a second term and several prominent political figures are competing to replace President Morales, with many accusations about their checkered political past.
The Trump Administration And The Rule Of Law, Peter L. Strauss
The Trump Administration And The Rule Of Law, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
Written for a French audience in 2017, this article sought to frame the explosive issues about the Trump presidency in relation to the American trend to strong views of the unitary executive, that in the author's view ignore the striking contrast between to propositions in Article II Section 2 of the Constitution, its only words defining presidential power. Made "Commander in chief" of the military, he is next given the power only to require the opinion in writing from the heads of the executive bodies Congress was expected to create how they intended to carry out the duties Congress had …
Things Left Unsaid, Questions Not Asked, Peter L. Strauss
Things Left Unsaid, Questions Not Asked, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
The University of Pennsylvania Law Review’s symposium on executive discretion, held in the fall of 2015 but just published this November, is an important undertaking, but it is remarkable for several silences – for things left unsaid on this important subject – and for questions not asked. First, although the Constitution’s “Take Care” Clause is extensively discussed, the one power Article II gives the President over domestic administration – to require the “Opinion, in writing” of the heads of the agencies Congress has invested with administrative duties – is not. Second, the discussion of the President’s undoubted but possibly …
Politics And Agencies In The Administrative State: The U.S. Case, Peter L. Strauss
Politics And Agencies In The Administrative State: The U.S. Case, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
The pending American presidential election, culminating a period of extreme political partisanship in our national government generally, gives point to an essay on politics and agencies in the American regulatory state. In our two-party system, it has often been the case in recent times, including the last six years, that the President comes from one of our two major political parties and one or both houses of Congress are controlled by the other. All American agencies (including, in the American case, the so-called independent regulatory bodies) are associated with the President in the executive branch, yet dependent on the Senate …
The Challenges Of Fitting Principled Modern Government – A Unified Public Law – To An Eighteenth Century Constitution, Peter L. Strauss
The Challenges Of Fitting Principled Modern Government – A Unified Public Law – To An Eighteenth Century Constitution, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
The papers presented at a fall 2016 conference at Cambridge University, The Unity of Public Law?, generally addressed issues of judicial review in the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, often from a comparative perspective and the view that unifying impulses in “public law” arose from the common law. Accepting what Justice Harlan Fisk Stone once characterized as the ideal of “a unified system of judge-made and statute law woven into a seamless whole by [judges],” The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harvard L Rev 4 (1936), this paper considers a variety of issues that have complicated maintaining …
The Role Of The Chief Executive In Domestic Administration, Peter L. Strauss
The Role Of The Chief Executive In Domestic Administration, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
Written for an international working paper conference on administrative law, this paper sets the Supreme Court's decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in the context of general American concerns about the place of the President in domestic administration, a recurring theme in my writings.
Legislation That Isn't – Attending To Rulemaking's "Democracy Deficit", Peter L. Strauss
Legislation That Isn't – Attending To Rulemaking's "Democracy Deficit", Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
Philip Frickey's commitment to practical legal studies won my admiration early on in his career. In this welcome celebration of his extraordinary career, it seems fitting to essay something "practical" – to attempt a constructive approach to an enduring problem – that has some bearing on his lifelong attention to the problem of "interpretation." If it will not make the problem go away, perhaps it will provide a basis for understanding its inevitable tensions, and in that way will help us step past theoretical exegeses suggesting the possibility of simple answers.
Our Twenty-First Century Constitution, Peter L. Strauss
Our Twenty-First Century Constitution, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
Accommodating our Eighteenth Century Constitution to the government that Congress has shaped in the intervening two and a quarter centuries, Professor Strauss argues, requires accepting the difference between the President’s role as “Commander in Chief” of the Nation’s military, and his right to seek written opinions from those Congress has empowered to administer domestic laws under his oversight. Thus, the question for today is not whether the PCAOB offends Eighteenth Century ideas about government structure, but the question asked by Professors Bruff, Lawson, and Pildes – whether the relationships between PCAOB and SEC, SEC and President meet the constitutional necessity …
Rulemaking And The American Constitution, Peter L. Strauss
Rulemaking And The American Constitution, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
A Constitution that strongly separates legislative from executive activity makes it difficult to reconcile executive adoption of regulations (that is, departmentally adopted texts resembling statutes and having the force of law, if valid) with the proposition that the President is not ‘to be a lawmaker’. Such activity is, of course, an essential of government in the era of the regulatory state. United States courts readily accept the delegation to responsible agencies of authority to engage in it, what we call ‘rulemaking’, so long as it occurs in a framework that permits them to assess the legality of any particular exercise. …
Free Enterprise Fund V. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Peter L. Strauss
Free Enterprise Fund V. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals, Congress created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) under the aegis of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), with President Bush’s support. Its purpose was to replace deficient accounting industry self-regulation with effective external regulation. The choices it made in doing so engendered passionate arguments about constitutionally necessary presidential authority and separation of powers. These divided the D.C. Circuit 2-1 and will be rehearsed before the Supreme Court in the coming weeks. President Bush’s administration defended those choices; Judge Rogers, writing for the majority, found no valid constitutional objection …
Overseer, Or "The Decider"? The President In Administrative Law, Peter L. Strauss
Overseer, Or "The Decider"? The President In Administrative Law, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
All will agree that the Constitution creates a unitary chief executive officer, the President, at the head of the government Congress defines to do the work its statutes detail. Disagreement arises over what his function entails. Once Congress has defined some element of government and specified its responsibilities, we know that the constitutional roles of both Congress and the courts are those of oversight of the agency and its assigned work, not the actual performance of that work. But is it the same for the President? When Congress confers authority on the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate various forms of …