Law Commons^™

Transactional Economics: Victor Goldberg's Framing Contract Law, Mark P. Gergen, Victor P. Goldberg, Stewart Macaulay, Keith A. Rowley

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Mark Gergen: Thank you. It is an honor to speak to this group and to be on a panel with Stewart Macaulay, Keith Rowley, and Victor Goldberg. I have an enormous amount of respect for the three. Keith had the misfortune of being a student of mine in Federal Income Tax.

Framing Contract Law offers a wealth of information about familiar cases. Victor argues that in construing contracts, courts should be attentive to how people engineer contracts to minimize transaction costs. He shows that courts often err in this regard, imposing unnecessary costs. To make his case, Victor delves …

Transparency And Determinacy In Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense Of Explanatory Economic Analysis, Jody S. Kraus

Faculty Scholarship

Explanatory economic analysis of the common law has long been subject to deep philosophical skepticism for two reasons. First, common law decisions appear to be cast in the language of deontic morality, not the consequentialist language of efficiency. For this reason, philosophers have claimed that explanatory economic analysis cannot satisfy the transparency criterion, which holds that a legal theory's explanation must provide a plausible account of the relationship between the reasoning it claims judges actually use to decide cases and the express reasoning judges provide in their opinions. Philosophers have doubted that the economic analysis has a plausible account of …

Desperately Seeking Consideration: The Unfortunate Impact Of U.C.C. Section 2-306 On Contract Interpretation, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

In Section 2-306, the Uniform Commercial Code's drafters intended to assure that two classes of agreements would be enforceable, even though they might appear on their face to be illusory. Variable quantity (output and requirements) contracts were buttressed by reading in a good faith standard (§ 2-306(1)) and exclusive dealing contracts were made enforceable by reading in a best efforts standard (§ 2-306(2)). This was a big mistake. In this paper I show how these two fixes create problems for interpreting contracts. I use two well-known cases, Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc. and Wood v. Lucy, …

A Critique Of The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, Jody S. Kraus

Faculty Scholarship

The classic economic justification of contract law’s default remedy of expectation damages is grounded on the efficient breach hypothesis: that promisors should be permitted and encouraged to breach when the net gains from breach exceed the net gains from performance. Expectation damages ensure that all and only efficient breaches will occur because promisors will find breach profitable only if its benefits exceed the value of performance to the promisee. The efficient breach hypothesis, and the defense of expectation damages that rests on it, has long been criticized for being inconsistent with the moral intuition that promisors necessarily forfeit their right …