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Full-Text Articles in Law
Congressional Silence And The Statutory Interpretation Game, Paul Stancil
Congressional Silence And The Statutory Interpretation Game, Paul Stancil
Faculty Scholarship
This Article explores the circumstances under which the federal legislative apparatus may be unable to respond to a politically objectionable statutory interpretation from the Supreme Court. The Article builds upon existing economic models of statutory interpretation, for the first time incorporating transaction costs into the analysis. The Article concludes by identifying recent real-world disputes in which transaction costs constrained Congress and the President from overriding the Court.
When Agencies Go Nuclear: A Game Theoretic Approach To The Biggest Sticks In An Agency's Arsenal, Brigham Daniels
When Agencies Go Nuclear: A Game Theoretic Approach To The Biggest Sticks In An Agency's Arsenal, Brigham Daniels
Faculty Scholarship
A regulatory agency’s arsenal often contains multiple weapons. Occasionally, however, an agency has the power to completely obliterate its regulatory targets or to make major waves in society by using a “regulatory nuke.” A regulatory nuke is a tool with two primary characteristics. First, it packs power sufficient to profoundly impact individual regulatory targets or significantly affect important aspects of society or the economy. Second, from the perspective of the regulatory agency, it is politically unavailable in all but the most extreme situations. They are found in many corners of the federal bureaucracy. This Article illustrates that even when individual …