Law Commons^™

What’S Scope 3 Good For?, Madison Condon

Faculty Scholarship

Opposition to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) new rule on updated climate risk reporting has focused on one category of disclosures as particularly objectionable: Scope 3 emissions.⁷ Otherwise known as “supply chain emissions,” Scope 3 emissions have been voluntarily reported by a growing number of companies since the term was invented as part of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol in 2001.⁸ They include all the emissions both up and downstream of a corporations’ own activities: the emissions of the privately-owned factory that produced the shoes Target sells, as well as the emissions you burn while driving to the …

Saving Climate Disclosure, Scott Hirst

Faculty Scholarship

Designing a regulatory response to climate change is one of the defining challenges of our era. In an attempt to address it, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently proposed a historic rule requiring climate-related disclosure by companies, resting squarely on the rationale of "investor demand." The proposed climate disclosure rule has met with an unprecedented response, some of it reflective of investor demand, but also including a broad array of opponents critical of the rule, who cast doubt on the rule's validity. A judicial challenge is all but inevitable.

This Article explains that the best way for the …

The Sec's Compensation Clawback Loophole, David I. Walker

Faculty Scholarship

The SEC has recently released final rules implementing the executive incentive compensation recovery or “clawback” provisions of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. These rules are aimed at recovering from executives incentive compensation determined to be excessive in light of a subsequent accounting restatement. Unfortunately, the SEC’s rules create a loophole by excluding purely time-vested stock and stock option grants from the reach of the new clawback regime. This aspect of the rulemaking seems inconsistent with the intent of Congress, and the result likely will be to distort executive pay practices in a perverse fashion, shifting compensation back in the direction of …

Hidden Agendas In Shareholder Voting, Scott Hirst, Adriana Z. Robertson

Faculty Scholarship

Nothing in either corporate or securities law requires companies to notify investors what they will be voting on before the record date for a shareholder meeting. We show that, overwhelmingly, they do not. The result is “hidden agendas”: for 88% of shareholder votes, investors cannot find out what they will be voting on before the record date. This poses an especially serious problem for investors who engage in securities lending: they must decide whether the expected benefit of voting exceeds the expected benefit of continuing to lend their shares (or making them available for lending) without knowing what they will …

Mandating Disclosure Of Climate-Related Financial Risk, Madison Condon, Sarah Ladin, Jack Lienke, Michael Panfil, Alexander Song

Faculty Scholarship

Climate change presents grave risk across the U.S. economy, including to corporations, their investors, the markets in which they operate, and the American public at large. Unlike other financial risks, however, climate risk is not routinely disclosed to the public. Insufficient corporate disclosures have persisted despite the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) issuance of regulatory guidance on the topic, the emergence of voluntary disclosure frameworks and standards, and growing calls from major investors for improved disclosure. Given the inadequacy of the current regime, the SEC should take further action to fulfill its statutory mandate to protect investors and promote efficiency, …

Self-Regulation Of Insider-Trading In Mutual Funds And Advisers, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Mutual funds are required to impose Codes of Ethics on many of their employees. Did this requirement make a difference? After all, similar Codes proliferate in many other financial and business corporations! ⁴ with fairly miserable results. In fact, the temptations facing employees and managers of many business corporations that published self-imposed Codes are relatively weaker than the temptations facing employees and managers of mutual funds. Yet as compared to mutual funds, these business companies have failed to prevent insider-trading!

I believe that regulated mutual funds are less prone to insider-trading than non-regulated funds and traders because their Codes of …

The 'Principal' Reason Why The Pcaob Is Unconstitutional, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The Constitution creates very few federal offices. It creates the House and Senate,1 the Speaker of the House2 and the President pro tempore of the Senate,3 the President,4 the Vice President,5 and the Supreme Court6--and that is it. The Constitution clearly contemplates that there will be other federal “Officers,” who the President must commission7 and who Congress may impeach and remove,8 but the document does not itself create those positions. Instead, it provides general authorization to Congress (in conjunction with the President's presentment power9 and the Vice President's modest voting …

It Depends, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Peter Strauss stated at the outset of this Symposium that the participants were chosen in part for the likelihood that they would generate “intelligent disagreement.” By that standard, I may have been a poor choice--and if that is the case, I will leave it to the reader to determine whether it is a function of the first or second term in the quoted phrase. At first glance, it looks as though I sharply disagree with Rick Pildes and Harold Bruff about whether the PCAOB's members are principal officers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent …

How Should The Financial Markets Be Regulated?, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

The financial markets should be regulated mostly by examinations, not by prosecution. And examinations should be far more intense when prices rise, not after a crash.

Private Investment Funds: Hedge Funds' Regulation By Size, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

This Article focuses on hedge funds-a species of private investment funds. These funds appeared in the 1950s and remained active but small. Then, in a fairly short period, they grew enormously to over $1.5 trillion, although the estimates vary.¹ Hedge fund managers engage in more than twenty-five different categories of investment strategies.² Since 2002, the number of hedge funds has more than doubled to an estimated 9,000 funds,³ and their assets have grown by 400% to an estimated $1.4 trillion since 1999.⁴ Other estimates are higher, suggesting current hedge fund assets at $2 trillion and their …

Legal And Ethical Duties Of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, Susan P. Koniak, George M. Cohen, Roger C. Cramton

Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines the legal and ethical duties of lawyers after Sarbanes-Oxley, focusing on the application, interpretation and ambiguities of the SEC rule implementing Section 307. Although our primary frame of reference will be on the SEC's new rules as an aspect of lawyer regulation, those rules are part of federal securities laws and should be considered in that aspect, i.e., whether they advance the purposes of the federal securities laws. The rules affecting lawyers should not be assessed in a vacuum as a mere turf war between federal regulators on the one hand and the organized bar and its …

Trends In The Regulation Of Investment Companies And Investment Advisers, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Statutes, rules and enforcement actions are tea leaves we can read to predict future trends of mutual fund regulation. While statutes and rules are specific, the trends they signify are far more speculative. This Essay engages in such speculation to envision the long-term implications of the recent new N- 1A disclosure form, I the plain English Rule,² and the profile. ³ More generally, the Essay speculates on future trends in Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") enforcement, and predicts a continued and stronger use of informal enforcement by the Commission.

The Pros And Cons Of A Self-Regulatory Organization For Advisers And Mutual Funds, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Congress is seriously considering bills to establish self-regulatory organizations (SROs) for investment advisers (advisers) and investment companies (Funds). These bills would require members of the investment management industry to regulate themselves under the watchful eye of the Securities and Exchange Commission, similar in approach to the regulation of broker-dealers by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) and the securities exchanges. Proposals to establish SRO for investment advisers have arisen before. However, those proposals did not cover Funds and their advisers,

The Ethics Of Insider Trading, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The quickest way to become famous is often to become infamous, as arbitrageur Ivan Boesky has recently discovered. Prior to November 1986, Mr. Boesky was well-known within the financial community, but largely unknown outside it. That changed dramatically following revelations that he and Dennis Levine, a merger specialist with the investment banking firm of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., had made tens of millions of dollars in the stock market by using Mr. Levine's advance knowledge of impending takeovers by Drexel clients. Today, after disgorging $50 million in profits, paying $50 million in penalties, and receiving a jail sentence,' Mr. Boesky …

A Truce In The Takeover Wars?, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

To a casual observer, hostile corporate takeovers may seem as pointless and destructive a form of modern warfare as the Iran/Iraq conflict. "Raiders" strike with bear hugs, junk bonds, and two-tier tender offers. Incumbent managers respond with poison pills, greenmail payments, shark repellents, and golden parachutes. Congress is wearying of the strife, and may soon impose a cease-fire on the combatants -but to whose benefit?

Investment Company Advertising, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

SEC Regulation has changed from specific guidelines for advertisers to a general antifraud provision. Despite greater latitude, conflicts may arise between the commission's regulation and first amendment protection of commercial speech.

Insider Transactions Under The 1940 Act, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Regulation Of Variable Life Insurance, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

On November 29, 1971 the American Life Convention and Life Insurance Association of America filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to exempt certain variable life insurance policies and separate accounts funding them from the provisions of the federal securities acts.¹ The petition had been preceded by informal negotiations by the insurance industry for a decision by the SEC "not to assert jurisdiction" over such policies and accounts.² The Commission's staff declined to recommend primarily because the staff felt that other interested parties ought to be heard before a determination was made which might adversely …