Law Commons^™

Toward A Liberal Common Good Constitutionalism For Polarized Times, Linda C. Mcclain, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In Common Good Constitutionalism, Adrian Vermeule urges his fellow conservatives to change the way they think about the American Constitution. Instead of maintaining a constitutionalism that emphasizes aggregating popular preferences, limiting government, and securing individual rights, he promotes a constitutionalism that emphasizes the common good and cultivates the attitudes and competences requisite to its pursuit. For the common good constitutionalist, a government is established primarily to do good things for people. It envisions an active government, including a strong president, a strong administrative state, and judges exercising reasoned judgment about which results would contribute to the general welfare, correctly understood, …

Legacies Of Pragmatism, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

Pragmatism has triumphed in the law by becoming all things to all people—or has it? This essay, prepared for a symposium at Drake University Law School's Constitutional Law Center, examines the future of pragmatism in constitutional thought. First, I revisit the work of William James to recover the ideal disposition of a pragmatist decision maker. Second, I analyze pragmatism's impact on constitutional theory from Richard Posner to Cass Sunstein, from Philip Bobbitt to Willy Forbath and Joey Fishkin. I show that pragmatism lives on in constitutional theories that don't self-consciously characterize themselves in such terms. I also contend that pragmatism …

The Substance Of Self-Government, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In Democratic Rights: The Substance of Self-Government, Corey Brettschneider develops an attractive and powerful conception of self-government - the value theory of democracy - that encompasses both substantive rights like privacy and procedural rights. Although he argues, following Habermas and Rawls, that substantive rights and procedural rights are "co-original," the structure of his theory may lead him to reduce the former into the latter and not fully to account for personal self-government in his conception of democratic self-government. The wages of his democratic justifications for substantive rights may be a surprising anxiety or unwarranted tension concerning judicial review protecting such …

The New Originalist Manifesto, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Lawrence B. Solum and Robert W. Bennett's excellent book, Constitutional Originalism: A Debate, calls to mind a famous book in political philosophy, J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams's Utilitarianism: For and Against.' Both works pair two spirited yet fair-minded scholars in a constructive debate between two competing views prevalent in their fields. Originalism has a reasonable, programmatic, and inclusive proponent in Solum, and living constitutionalism has a capable, pragmatic, and effective champion in Bennett.

Sovereignty As Discourse, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

This is a review of Howard Schweber's book, "The Language of Liberal Constitutionalism" (Cambridge University Press, 2007). Schweber argues that "the creation of a legitimate constitutional regime depends on a prior commitment to employ constitutional language, and that such a commitment is both the necessary and sufficient condition for constitution making." I critique the power and limits of this reformulated Lockean thesis, as well as Schweber's secondary claims that, for constitutional language to remain legitimate, it must increasingly become autonomous, specialized, and secular.

Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking The Constitution Seriously Outside The Courts, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Larry Sager and Larry Kramer have written important books that, in quite different ways, call for taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts. Sager's Justice in Plainclothes' and Kramer's The People Themselves2 nonetheless join issue in significant ways, and therefore it is illuminating to analyze them as a pair.

To get a handle on the differences between the two Larrys' books, I have concocted the following fanciful hypothetical. Imagine a law school with a faculty that includes Ronald Dworkin: court-centered constitutional theorist extraordinaire and proponent of a liberal moral reading of the American Constitution.3 Further imagine that the faculty includes …

Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, And Progressive Change, Linda C. Mcclain, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

This paper evaluates arguments made in Ran Hirschl's powerful and sobering book, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard, 2004). Studying Canada, Israel, South Africa, and New Zealand, Hirschl aims to dispel what he views as the hollow hopes that constitutionalism and judicial review will bring about progressive change around the world. If Gerald Rosenberg, in his book, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change, focused on the hollow hopes of liberals for social change securing, e.g., racial equality (Brown) and women's reproductive freedom (Roe), Hirschl focuses on hollow hopes for progressive economic change …

Conservative Or Constitutionalist?, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The persistence of the question posed by the editors of this journal demonstrates that legal conservatives have an identity crisis. In large measure, that crisis is an artifact of the ambiguity in the term "legal conservative." I use the term roughly to mean someone who believes in a variant of original meaning for interpreting constitutions and statutes' and who views the common law as a device for securing social coordination within a spontaneous order-all overlaid with a strong respect for the Anglo-American, Rule of Law tradition. As definitions go, this is pretty imprecise. There is no single meaning for original …